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Why is contempt seen as potentially lacking in the respect for persons and therefore prima facie subject to negative moral evaluation? This paper starts by looking at a distinctive feature of contempt in the context of thick relationships, such as those of friendship, close professional collaboration, or romantic love: there is an irreversibility effect attached to the experience of contempt. Once contempt occurs in a thick relationship, it seems very difficult to return to non-contemptuous reactive attitudes. The second part argues that the irreversibility effect is due to the fact that contempt is an affective attitude which tends to invisibilize the person who is the object of contempt. The tendency to invisibilize is inscribed in the intentional structure of contempt as well as in its motivational dimension. The final part explores some consequences of this hypothesis, and in particular argues that it also explains why contempt motivated by abject wrongdoing, as opposed to resentment, anger, or hatred, tends to block any process of forgiveness.

The lecture by Thomas Reid (1710–1796) that is translated and presented here dates from his years as the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. It presents an uncompromising discussion of the “theory” of the previous holder of the Chair, Adam Smith (1723–1790). The “system of sympathy” set out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the focus of several objections, drawn from the arsenal Reid employs in his general attack on all forms of moral sentimentalism that rely one-sidedly on the affective component of evaluations. The text reveals that Francis Hutcheson and David Hume were not the only targets of this critique and highlights some of the difficulties and audacities of Adam Smith’s “theory of morals.”

Abstract Forgiveness involves a process, not an isolated act or decision. The initial step lies within the voluntary control of the forgiver. The immediate outcome of the commitment to forgive is the formation of a new context that modifies some of the circumstances for the forgiver as well as for the wrongdoer. Further consequences, notably changes in the forgiver’s desires and feelings, cannot be brought about directly. A sound account of forgiveness should focus on its intertemporal structure and highlight the relation between the initial commitment and the subsequent process.

Forgiveness involves a process, not an isolated act or decision. The initial step lies within the voluntary control of the forgiver. The immediate outcome of the commitment to forgive is the formation of a new context that modifies some of the circumstances for the forgiver as well as for the wrongdoer. Further consequences, notably changes in the forgiver’s desires and feelings, cannot be brought about directly. A sound account of forgiveness should focus on its intertemporal structure and highlight the relation between the initial commitment and the subsequent process.

The aim of this article is to clarify the conditions of real disagreement in the epistemology of moral judgments. It would seem that moral subjectivists can deal with disagreement more easily than realists. The former can refer disagreement to the diversity of individual or social preferences that evaluations express. The latter seem to struggle to account for it in contexts where the informational conditions of an evaluation are met. This paper defends a third approach, attentive to the epistemology of evaluation, which puts the emphasis on how moral value judgments are essentially dependent on reasons. In morality as in other areas, judging is, among other things, assuming responsibility for a verdict that may be justified.

Quelles sont les opinions spéculatives de John Locke sur la nature de l’esprit et des idées et sur les conditions métaphysiques de la pensée et de la conscience ? Faut-il en rester à la vision traditionnelle d’un Locke qui reste agnostique à propos de telles questions, au prétexte que leur traitement excède la méthode adoptée dans l’ Essai  ? Philippe Hamou a affronté ce problème et a entrepris de réévaluer la philosophie de l’esprit lockienne, dans une série de travaux qui illustrent l’intérêt contemporain pour la métaphysique qui convient à cette épistémologie. La présente discussion situe la contribution de P. Hamou au sein des études récentes et propose quelques objections. What are John Locke’s speculative opinions on the nature of the mind and its ideas and on the metaphysical conditions of thought and consciousness? Should we stick to the traditional view that Locke remains agnostic on such questions, on the grounds that addressing them would exceed the method adopted in his Essay ? Philippe Hamou has faced this problem and has set out to reassess Locke’s philosophy of mind in a series of publications that reflect recent interest in the metaphysics appropriate to Lockean epistemology. The present discussion situates Hamou’s contribution within recent studies and offers some objections.

La leçon de la main de Thomas Reid (1710-1796) qui est ici traduite et présentée date de ses années d’enseignement dans la chaire de philosophie morale à Glasgow. Elle consiste en la discussion intransigeante de la « théorie » du titulaire précédent, Adam Smith (1723-1790). Le « système de la sympathie » exposé dans The theory of moral sentiments est l’objet de plusieurs objections, puisées dans l’arsenal que Reid emploie dans son attaque générale contre toutes les formes de sentimentalisme moral qui s’appuient unilatéralement sur la composante affective des évaluations. Le texte montre que Francis Hutcheson et David Hume n’étaient pas les seules cibles de cette critique et met en lumière certaines difficultés et certaines audaces de la « théorie de la morale » d’Adam Smith. The lecture of Thomas Reid (1710-1796) which is translated and presented here dates from his years as the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. It comprises an uncompromising discussion of the “theory” of the previous holder of the Chair, Adam Smith (1723-1790). The “system of sympathy” set out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the focus of several objections, drawn from the arsenal Reid employs in his general attack on all forms of moral sentimentalism that rely one-sidedly on the affective component of evaluations. The text reveals that Francis Hutcheson and David Hume were not the only targets of this critique and highlights some of the difficulties and audacities of Adam Smith’s “theory of morals”.

According to Thomas Reid, powers of will and powers of understanding are distinguishable in thought, but conjoined in practice. This paper examines the claim that there is no inert intelligence, the operations of the understanding involving some degree of activity. The question is: whose activity? For it is clear that a great deal of our mental activity is not in our power. We need to distinguish between a weak and a strong sense of 'power', and consider our dependence 'upon God and the laws of nature' in our mental exertions.

The lecture of Thomas Reid (1710-1796) which is translated and presented here dates from his years as the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. It comprises an uncompromising discussion of the “theory” of the previous holder of the Chair, Adam Smith (1723-1790). The “system of sympathy” set out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the focus of several objections, drawn from the arsenal Reid employs in his general attack on all forms of moral sentimentalism that rely one-sidedly on the affective component of evaluations. The text reveals that Francis Hutcheson and David Hume were not the only targets of this critique and highlights some of the difficulties and audacities of Adam Smith’s “theory of morals”. La leçon de la main de Thomas Reid (1710-1796) qui est ici traduite et présentée date de ses années d’enseignement dans la chaire de philosophie morale à Glasgow. Elle consiste en la discussion intransigeante de la « théorie » du titulaire précédent, Adam Smith (1723-1790). Le « système de la sympathie » exposé dans The theory of moral sentiments est l’objet de plusieurs objections, puisées dans l’arsenal que Reid emploie dans son attaque générale contre toutes les formes de sentimentalisme moral qui s’appuient unilatéralement sur la composante affective des évaluations. Le texte montre que Francis Hutcheson et David Hume n’étaient pas les seules cibles de cette critique et met en lumière certaines difficultés et certaines audaces de la « théorie de la morale » d’Adam Smith.