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result(s) for
"Jeffrey, Richard C"
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Subjective Probability
2004
This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability is a mode of judgment. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with these problems and issues. After an introduction to basic probability theory, there are chapters on scientific hypothesis-testing, on changing your mind in response to generally uncertain observations, on expectations of the values of random variables, on de Finetti's dissolution of the so-called problem of induction, and on decision theory.
The logic of strategy
by
Skyrms, Brian
,
Bicchieri, Cristina
,
Jeffrey, Richard C.
in
Epistemology
,
Game theory
,
History & Philosophy
1999
Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems.
Flipping and ex post aggregation
by
Risse, Mathias
,
Jeffrey, Richard
,
Hild, Matthias
in
Aggregation
,
Bayes-Statistik
,
Bayesian analysis
2003
We show that Bayesian ex post aggregation is unstable with respect to refinements. Suppose a group of Bayesians use ex post aggregation. Since it is a joint problem, each agent's problem is captured by the same model, but probabilities and utilities may vary. If they analyze the same situation in more detail, their refined analysis should preserve their preferences among acts. However, ex post aggregation could bring about a preference reversal on the group level. Ex post aggregation thus depends on how much information is used and may keep oscillating (\"flipping\") as one keeps adding more information.
Journal Article