Explore the vast range of titles available.

This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance (CG) on earnings management (EM) in Indian commercial banks. In addition, the study examines the role of board gender diversity within the CG framework using data from 22 publicly traded commercial banks in India from 2010 to 2019. The study uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to develop a comprehensive CG measure. Using a Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) approach, the study finds that CG has a significant negative impact on EM in Indian commercial banks. The findings further revealed a positive association between gender diversity of boards and EM, indicating that the lack of gender diversity on a bank's board outweighs the benefits of gender-diverse boards. Our study shows that CG mechanisms are more effective when combined together than individual governance mechanisms. The study also provides new insight into the role of board gender diversity as a CG mechanism on EM in banks in the context of a developing country. The study provides practical implications for investors, managers, regulators and policymakers.

Purpose This study aims to examine declines in audit quality after the COVID-19 travel restrictions/stay-at-home orders were issued in the USA in early 2020. Design/methodology/approach Taking advantage of variation in the dates of stay-at-home orders issued by different US states, this study identifies engagements that were significantly affected by the lock down orders. Findings The results suggest that engagements affected by the restrictions produced lower audit quality, as measured through restatements and discretionary accruals, relative to those completed before COVID-19 travel restrictions/stay-at-home orders. Further analysis reveals that this decrease in audit quality was attributable to firms with high inventory relative to assets, high R&D expenses relative to assets and non-Big 4 auditors. Practical implications This study finds that the restrictions on physical and on-site interaction caused auditors to universally struggle with resource/judgment-intensive accounts such as inventory and R&D expenditures. The results suggest that while Big 4 auditors managed to maintain their status quo level of audit quality following COVID-19 restrictions, non-Big 4 auditors were unable to overcome the challenges of an online work environment and their audit quality declined. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically examine changes in audit quality as a response to a substantial change in auditors’ working environment due to the global health crisis. As work-from-home becomes more prevalent in audit firms, the results suggest that, on average, this move does diminish audit quality.

In this study, we examine whether and how banks employ dividend payout policies in response to the risk of stock price crashes. Using a sample of U.S. banks, we find that banks increase their dividend payouts when faced with a higher risk of stock price crashes. In addition, we find that well-capitalized banks tend to pay more dividends when the risk of a stock price crash is elevated. This aligns with the regulatory pressure theory that banks distribute dividends when they have sufficient capital that meets or exceeds the regulatory standards. This is also in line with the signaling theory that dividend payments reflect a bank’s confidence in its financial health. Furthermore, we find that financially opaque banks tend to make more dividend payments when they are at a higher risk of stock price crashes. This supports the agency cost theory, suggesting that dividends counterbalance the need to monitor bank managers in less transparent reporting environments.

We explore how expansionary monetary policy (EMP) influences bank loan loss provisioning. We find that banks’ discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs) increase during periods of EMP. This effect is stronger for banks with greater risk-taking, a larger proportion of influential stakeholders, lower ex-ante transparency of loan loss provisions, and more stringent bank regulation, which is consistent with external stakeholders requiring more conservative and timelier loan loss provisioning. We also find that both the timeliness and the validity of banks’ loan loss provisions (LLPs) increase during EMP periods. Our results are robust to the use of instrumental variable estimation and exogenous variations in monetary policy. Lastly, we show that conservative (i.e., higher DLLPs) and timely loan loss provisioning discipline banks from excessive risk-taking during periods of EMP.

This thesis first examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals and absolute performance-matched abnormal accruals in global firms. Second, I document that institutional block-holdings curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals across the world. Third, I document that analyst following is related to more reduction in earnings management in common law countries than in code-law countries. Fourth, I find that institutional block-holders are more effective monitors in common law countries than in code law countries. This thesis also examines the relation between investor attention and stock mispricing of abnormal accruals in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Consistent with the model’s hypothesis that investor attention reduces stock mispricing, I document three key findings. First, I find a significant and negative correlation between stock mispricing and analyst following in global firms. Second, stock mispricing is negatively correlated with institutional ownership in U.S. firms. Stock mispricing is not significantly correlated with institutional block-holdings in global firms. Third, stock mispricing per dollar of abnormal accrual is decreasing in analyst following for sufficiently large abnormal accruals in U.S. and global firms.