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This article seeks to unearth why change in Japanese security policy tradition prevails over continuity. Japan's recent change, evident in security objectives, military capabilities, defense expenditure, and institutional and legal transformations, connotes a departure from the original principles of the peace constitution and Japan's defense-oriented policies, transforming Japan from a \"peace nation\" to a \"normal power.\" Moreover, Japanese political elites have willingly tried to exploit the opportunity structure to change Japanese security policy. I argue that the multivariate approach, incorporating structural, motivational, cognitive, and temporal dimensions, can serve as a 'tool kit' to understand this change in Japanese pacifist tradition and elites' willingness to seize the opportunity structure.

No theory seems to describe accurately and explain competently the new, unusual, and idiosyncratic Northeast Asian regional order phenomenon. It is because Northeast Asian specialists like the blind men have seen only one of the parts of the ‘Elephant’ or a part of what is taking place in Northeast Asia. This paper attempts to employ a new, more appropriate, more productive analytical tool to understand and navigate efficiently the Northeast Asian regional order. The main objective of this paper is ‘the rise of China and Northeast Asian regional order’, what it is and what is taking place in the empirical world when we say that something we call ‘the rise of China and Northeast Asian regional order’ is taking place.

Administration responses to congressional inquiries indicated South Korean strength was \"adequate,\" and General MacArthur characterized Korean security forces as adequately trained and combat ready to allow complete U.S. troop withdrawal (Kaufman, 1986: 21-29; Paige, 1968: 65-72; Rovere, 1992: 97-102). [...]South Korea was peripheral to U.S. interests, according to secretary of State Dean Acheson's January 1950 assessment (1971: 1-14), as the U.S. defense perimeter ran from the Aleutians through Japan and the Ryukyus to the Philippines - implying that the U.S. could not be expected to guarantee her security were she attacked. [...]it happened that different patterns of perception led State and Defense to hold reach different conclusions: on the eve of the Korean War the former opposed U.S. force withdrawal from Korea, while Defense advocated rapid departure. [...]tired of footing the bill for an expensive occupation with inadequate funding and frequent State and congressional carping, Defense developed a plan to quit the peninsula. [...]Truman remained committed to trimming, not increasing, the military budget, and in 1949 appointed as secretary of defense Louis Johnson, who pledged to cut defense spending. [...]it came that, lacking congressional support and sufficient funds, Defense made - from its perspective - the realistic judgment that ongoing commitments in Korea were untenable and threatened to \"haul freight\" as a way of placing the problem in State's lap (Cumings, 1990: 59; Kaufman, 1986: 22; Pemberton, 1992: 134-135; Stueck, 1981: 155; Truman, 1956: 328-330).

This paper draws on misperception and bureaucratic theories to explore why USU.S. forces withdrew from Korea on the eve of the Korean War and why the Truman administration misperceived the Korean situation. Because, as the literature suggests, position in the institutional hierarchy determines perception, in the months leading up to war, the State Department and military approached the decision on withdrawal differently and reached opposite conclusions: State objected to and Defense urged extraction. The determinative decision within the bureaucratic dominance structure of decision-making, however, was President Trumans, as a sort of umpire. Perceptual divergence throughout the process generated inter-bureaucratic conflict. This paper concludes that the final decision to withdraw from Korea reflected bargaining and compromise and pulling and hauling among actors who never fully resolved their differences. KCI Citation Count: 0

A central theme of this study is to explore a question of why the periodic crises in the process of European integration get constructively resolved. This study argues that “European myths” matter in that European myths are prominent sources that regulate the crises. European myths directly, indirectly and mainly influence the constructive crisis resolution in the EC/EU. To test this hypothesis is presented in three main sections. The first provides general systems theory as an analytical framework and the development of European integration theory. The second seeks to show that to identify the regulatory mechanisms functioning in the process of European integration, two theories such as realism/neorealism and constructivism emerge particularly relevant. It is argued that rational calculation argument alone that is based on realism/neorealism is an insufficient explanation for the constructive crisis resolution. The final main section seeks to demonstrate that the periodic crises in European integration, as the constructivists argue, have been constructively and successfully settled down by the European myths including the myth of European unity and the myth of Franco-German entente. This study views European myths as publicly held beliefs cementing Europeans leaders, comforting them by alleviating uncertainties, and leading them to resolving the crises, especially that associated with traumatic historical experiences and dark tragedies in the First World War and the Second World War. Thus it is argued that European myths are a major foundation of regulatory mechanisms because those influence the constructive crisis resolution, cement community, and build consensus by eliminating all choices expect the choice to move European integration forward. This study concludes that (1) myths-based argument is not an alternative to the rational calculation argument, but rather an addition to it; (2) European myths are embedded in a new political culture—a problem-solving culture—of the EC/EU; (3) the regulatory capacity of the EC/EU system has repeatedly turned out to be more than sufficient to handle disturbances from the environment that caused the crises; (4) however, once the European myths weaken, the tensions among EU member states are likely to boost; (5) because the basic contradiction, deep-seated distrust, suspicion, and divergent interests have not been resolved, the future path for the European unity will be likely rocky.