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61 result(s) for "John Stillion"
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Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth
This monograph analyzes published Chinese and Western sources about current and future capabilities and employment concepts of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). It describes how those capabilities and concepts might be realized in a conflict over Taiwan, assesses the implications of China implementing them, and provides recommendations about actions that should be taken in response.
Blunting the talons: The impact of peace operations deployments on USAF fighter crew combat skills
The primary purpose of this study is to develop a better understanding of how peace operations deployments impact individual fighter aircrew air-to-ground and air-to-air combat skills. It uses existing psychological literature on learning and skill acquisition, and previous studies of fighter crew combat skill acquisition to generate a number of testable hypotheses. Hypotheses are tested through a statistical analysis of data on the number and type of training events USAF aircrew accomplish at home station and when deployed in support of ongoing peace operations over Bosnia and Iraq. This analysis sheds light on the relationship between factors such as aircrew experience, recent practice and combat skill performance and reacquisition. The analysis suggests that fighter crews must practice their combat skills about once a week to maintain proficiency and that lack of practice during peace operations deployments causes rapid and marked decline in important air-to-air and air-to ground combat skill performance—especially for less experienced crews. The findings of the statistical analysis inform an examination of various options available to military and civilian decision makers for reducing the readiness impact of peace operations deployments on fighter crew combat skills.
The Unserious Air War Against Islamic State
Since U.S. planes first struck targets in Iraq on Aug. 8, a debate has raged over the effectiveness of the Obama administration's air campaign against Islamic State. The war of words has so far focused on the need to deploy American boots on the ground to provide accurate intelligence and possibly force Islamic State fighters to defend key infrastructure they have seized, such as oil facilities. But debate is now beginning to focus on the apparent failure of airstrikes to halt the terror group's advances in Iraq and Syria -- especially Islamic State's pending seizure of Kobani on the Syrian border with Turkey. While it is still too early to proclaim the air campaign against Islamic State a failure, it may be instructive to compare it with other campaigns conducted by the U.S. military since the end of the Cold War that were deemed successes. For instance, during the 43-day Desert Storm air campaign against Saddam Hussein's forces in 1991, coalition fighters and bombers flew 48,224 strike sorties. This translates to roughly 1,100 sorties a day. Twelve years later, the 31-day air campaign that helped free Iraq from Saddam's government averaged more than 800 offensive sorties a day. Perhaps the small number of strikes in the air campaign against Islamic State is due to the lack of suitable ground targets. Yet representatives from the Pentagon have characterized forces fighting under Islamic State's black banner as more of a conventional army than a highly dispersed, irregular force similar to today's Taliban. Moreover, Islamic State fighters are using captured armored vehicles, artillery, mortars and other implements of modern land warfare to seize and hold terrain. These operations require a considerable amount of movement and resupply that can be detected by airborne surveillance.
The Unserious Air War Against Islamic State
Since U.S. planes first struck targets in Iraq on Aug. 8, a debate has raged over the effectiveness of the Obama administration's air campaign against Islamic State. The war of words has so far focused on the need to deploy American boots on the ground to provide accurate intelligence and possibly force Islamic State fighters to defend key infrastructure they have seized, such as oil facilities. But debate is now beginning to focus on the apparent failure of airstrikes to halt the terror group's advances in Iraq and Syria -- especially Islamic State's pending seizure of Kobani on the Syrian border with Turkey. While it is still too early to proclaim the air campaign against Islamic State a failure, it may be instructive to compare it with other campaigns conducted by the U.S. military since the end of the Cold War that were deemed successes. For instance, during the 43-day Desert Storm air campaign against Saddam Hussein's forces in 1991, coalition fighters and bombers flew 48,224 strike sorties. This translates to roughly 1,100 sorties a day. Twelve years later, the 31-day air campaign that helped free Iraq from Saddam's government averaged more than 800 offensive sorties a day. Perhaps the small number of strikes in the air campaign against Islamic State is due to the lack of suitable ground targets. Yet representatives from the Pentagon have characterized forces fighting under Islamic State's black banner as more of a conventional army than a highly dispersed, irregular force similar to today's Taliban. Moreover, Islamic State fighters are using captured armored vehicles, artillery, mortars and other implements of modern land warfare to seize and hold terrain. These operations require a considerable amount of movement and resupply that can be detected by airborne surveillance.
The Unserious Air War Against ISIS
Yet representatives from the Pentagon have characterized forces fighting under Islamic State's black banner as more of a conventional army than a highly dispersed, irregular force similar to today's Taliban. [...]Islamic State fighters are using captured armored vehicles, artillery, mortars and other implements of modern land warfare to seize and hold terrain.
The Unserious Air War Against ISIS; The campaign against Serbia in 1999 averaged 138 strike sorties daily. Against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: seven
Yet representatives from the Pentagon have characterized forces fighting under Islamic State's black banner as more of a conventional army than a highly dispersed, irregular force similar to today's Taliban. [...]Islamic State fighters are using captured armored vehicles, artillery, mortars and other implements of modern land warfare to seize and hold terrain.
Global Access Strategy 2000
A global access strategy that includes maintaining core assets and developing new political and technological opportunities can help the US Air Force manage and develop access and basing options both now and in future years.