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Much of the theoretical economics literature has assumed an unambiguous relationship between the strength of patent protection and the rate of innovation. This research address this assumption by examining the impact of major patent policy shifts in 60 nations over the past 150 years. It examines the changes in patent applications by residents of the nation undertaking the policy change. While the study tabulates domestic filings by residents and nonresidents alike, confounding factors may influence this measure. Thus, the research examines filings made by residents of the nation undertaking the policy change in a nation with a relatively constant patent policy, Great Britain. Adjusting for the change in overall patenting, the impact of patent protection-enhancing policy shifts on applications by residents was actually negative, whether filings in Great Britain or domestically were considered.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we study how intellectual property right (IPR) protection affects innovation in China in the years around the privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Innovation increases after SOE privatizations, and this increase is larger in cities with strong IPR protection. Our results support theoretical arguments that IPR protection strengthens firms' incentives to innovate and that private sector firms are more sensitive to IPR protection than SOEs.

The promotion of new high-potential business ventures and venture capital is of critical importance to economic growth. Well-considered policies can profoundly influence such opportunities, but many public initiatives are misguided. This article reviews the evidence behind these claims, as well as the criteria that can delineate appropriate and inappropriate policies towards the promotion of venture capital and high-potential entrepreneurship.

Silicon Valley, Singapore, Tel Aviv--the global hubs of entrepreneurial activity--all bear the marks of government investment. Yet, for every public intervention that spurs entrepreneurial activity, there are many failed efforts that waste untold billions in taxpayer dollars. When has governmental sponsorship succeeded in boosting growth, and when has it fallen terribly short? Should the government be involved in such undertakings at all?Boulevard of Broken Dreamsis the first extensive look at the ways governments have supported entrepreneurs and venture capitalists across decades and continents. Josh Lerner, one of the foremost experts in the field, provides valuable insights into why some public initiatives work while others are hobbled by pitfalls, and he offers suggestions for how public ventures should be implemented in the future. Discussing the complex history of Silicon Valley and other pioneering centers of venture capital, Lerner uncovers the extent of government influence in prompting growth. He examines the public strategies used to advance new ventures, points to the challenges of these endeavors, and reveals the common flaws undermining far too many programs--poor design, a lack of understanding for the entrepreneurial process, and implementation problems. Lerner explains why governments cannot dictate how venture markets evolve, and why they must balance their positions as catalysts with an awareness of their limited ability to stimulate the entrepreneurial sector. As governments worldwide seek to spur economic growth in ever more aggressive ways,Boulevard of Broken Dreamsoffers an important caution. The book argues for a careful approach to government support of entrepreneurial activities, so that the mistakes of earlier efforts are not repeated.

Beginning in the late 1980s, American corporations began increasingly linking the compensation of central research personnel to the economic objectives of the corporation. This paper examines the impact of the shifting compensation of the heads of corporate research and development. Among firms with centralized R&D organizations, a clear relationship emerges: more long-term incentives (such as stock options and restricted stock) are associated with more heavily cited patents. These incentives also appear to be associated with more patent awards and patents of greater originality. Short-term incentives appear to be unrelated to measures of innovation.

A long-standing controversy is whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) relieve managers from short-term pressures from public shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves sacrifice long-term growth to boost short-term performance. We examine one form of long-run activity, namely, investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. Based on 472 LBO transactions, we find no evidence that LBOs sacrifice long-term investments. LBO firm patents are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and become more concentrated in important areas of companies' innovative portfolios.

We analyze how contractibility affects contract design. A major concern when designing research agreements is that researchers use their funding to subsidize other projects. We show that, when research activities are not contractible, an option contract is optimal. The financing firm obtains the option to terminate the agreement and, in case of termination, broad property rights. The threat of termination option deters the financing firm from opportunistic termination. We test this prediction using 580 biotechnology research agreements. Contracts with termination options are more common when research is non-contractible.

The United States patent system has become sand rather than lubricant in the wheels of American progress. Such is the premise behind this provocative and timely book by two of the nation's leading experts on patents and economic innovation.

The growth of the private equity industry has spurred concerns about its impact on the economy. This analysis looks across nations and industries to assess the impact of private equity on industry performance. We find that industries where private equity funds invest grow more quickly in terms of total production and employment and appear less exposed to aggregate shocks. Our robustness tests provide some evidence that is consistent with our effects being driven by our preferred channel. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance .

Private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses and few gains in operating performance. To evaluate these claims, we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers US buyouts from 1980 to 2005. We track 3,200 target firms and their 150,000 establishments before and after acquisition, comparing to controls defined by industry, size, age, and prior growth. Buyouts lead to modest net job losses but large increases in gross job creation and destruction. Buyouts also bring TFP gains at target firms, mainly through accelerated exit of less productive establishments and greater entry of highly productive ones.