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The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.

The acoustic properties of vocalizations in common marmosets differ between populations. These differences may be the result of social vocal learning, but they can also result from environmental or genetic differences between populations. We performed translocation experiments to separately quantify the influence of a change in the physical environment (experiment 1), and a change in the social environment (experiment 2) on the acoustic properties of calls from individual captive common marmosets. If population differences were due to genetic differences, we expected no change in the vocalizations of the translocated marmosets. If differences were due to environmental factors, we expected vocalizations to permanently change contingent with environmental changes. If social learning was involved, we expected that the vocalizations of animals translocated to a new population with a different dialect would become more similar to the new population. In experiment 1, we translocated marmosets to a different physical environment without changing the social composition of the groups or their neighbours. Immediately after the translocation to the new facility, one out of three call types showed a significant change in call structure, but 5-6 weeks later, the calls were no longer different from before the translocation. Thus, the novel physical environment did not induce long lasting changes in the vocalizations of the marmosets. In experiment 2, we translocated marmosets to a new population with a different dialect. Importantly, our previous work had shown that these two populations differed significantly in vocalization structure. The translocated marmosets were still housed in their original social group, but after translocation they were surrounded by the vocalizations from neighbouring groups of the new population. The vocal distance between the translocated individuals and the new population decreased for two out of three call types over 16 weeks. Thus, even without direct social contact or interaction, the vocalizations of the translocated animals converged towards the new population, indicating that common marmosets can modify their calls due to acoustic input from conspecifics alone, via crowd vocal learning. To our knowledge, this is the first study able to distinguish between different explanations for vocal dialects as well as to show crowd vocal learning in a primate species.

If social learning is more efficient than independent individual exploration, animals should learn vital cultural skills exclusively, and routine skills faster, through social learning, provided they actually use social learning preferentially. Animals with opportunities for social learning indeed do so. Moreover, more frequent opportunities for social learning should boost an individual's repertoire of learned skills. This prediction is confirmed by comparisons among wild great ape populations and by social deprivation and enculturation experiments. These findings shaped the cultural intelligence hypothesis, which complements the traditional benefit hypotheses for the evolution of intelligence by specifying the conditions in which these benefits can be reaped. The evolutionary version of the hypothesis argues that species with frequent opportunities for social learning should more readily respond to selection for a greater number of learned skills. Because improved social learning also improves asocial learning, the hypothesis predicts a positive interspecific correlation between social-learning performance and individual learning ability. Variation among primates supports this prediction. The hypothesis also predicts that more heavily cultural species should be more intelligent. Preliminary tests involving birds and mammals support this prediction too. The cultural intelligence hypothesis can also account for the unusual cognitive abilities of humans, as well as our unique mechanisms of skill transfer.

Synchronization is widespread in animals, and studies have often emphasized how this seemingly complex phenomenon can emerge from very simple rules. However, the amount of flexibility and control that animals might have over synchronization properties, such as the strength of coupling, remains underexplored. Here, we studied how pairs of marmoset monkeys coordinated vigilance while feeding. By modeling them as coupled oscillators, we noted that (1) individual marmosets do not show perfect periodicity in vigilance behaviors, (2) nevertheless, marmoset pairs started to take turns being vigilant over time, a case of anti-phase synchrony, (3) marmosets could couple flexibly; the coupling strength varied with every new joint feeding bout, and (4) marmosets could control the coupling strength; dyads showed increased coupling if they began in a more desynchronized state. Such flexibility and control over synchronization require more than simple interaction rules. Minimally, animals must estimate the current degree of asynchrony and adjust their behavior accordingly. Moreover, the fact that each marmoset is inherently non-periodic adds to the cognitive demand. Overall, our study provides a mathematical framework to investigate the cognitive demands involved in coordinating behaviors in animals, regardless of whether individual behaviors are rhythmic or not.

The social environment influences animal personality on evolutionary and immediate time scales. However, studies of animal personality rarely assess the effects of the social environment, particularly in species that live in stable groups with individualized relationships. We assessed personality experimentally in 17 individuals of the common marmoset, living in four groups. We found their personality to be considerably modified by the social environment. Marmosets exhibited relatively high plasticity in their behaviour and showed ‘group-personality’, i.e. group-level similarity in the personality traits. In exploratory behaviour this was maintained only in the social environment but not when individuals were tested alone, suggesting that exploration tendency is subjected to social facilitation. Boldness, in contrast, showed higher consistency across the social and solitary conditions and the group-level similarity in trait scores was sustained also outside of the immediate social environment. The ‘group-personality’ was not due to genetic relatedness, supporting that it was produced by social effects. We hypothesize that ‘group-personality’ may be adaptive for highly cooperative animals through facilitating cooperation among individuals with similar behavioural tendency.

Behavioral coordination is a fundamental element of human cooperation. It is facilitated when individuals represent not only their own actions but also those of their partner. Identifying whether action corepresentation is unique to humans or also present in other species is therefore necessary to fully understand the evolution of human cooperation. We used the auditory joint Simon task to assess whether action corepresentation occurs in common marmosets, a monkey species that engages extensively in coordinated action during cooperative infant care. We found that marmosets indeed show a joint Simon effect. Furthermore, when coordinating their behavior in the joint task, they were more likely to look at their partner than in a joint control condition. Corepresentation is thus not unique to humans but also present in the cooperatively breeding marmosets. Since marmosets are small-brained monkeys, our results suggest that routine coordination in space and time, rather than complex cognitive abilities, plays a role in the evolution of corepresentation.

The drivers of divergent scleral morphologies in primates are currently unclear, though white sclerae are often assumed to underlie human hyper-cooperative behaviours. Humans are unusual in possessing depigmented sclerae whereas many other extant primates, including the closely-related chimpanzee, possess dark scleral pigment. Here, we use phylogenetic generalized least squares (PGLS) analyses with previously generated species-level scores of proactive prosociality, social tolerance (both n = 15 primate species), and conspecific lethal aggression (n = 108 primate species) to provide the first quantitative, comparative test of three existing hypotheses. The ‘self-domestication’ and ‘cooperative eye’ explanations predict white sclerae to be associated with cooperative, rather than competitive, environments. The ‘gaze camouflage’ hypothesis predicts that dark scleral pigment functions as gaze direction camouflage in competitive social environments. Notably, the experimental evidence that non-human primates draw social information from conspecific eye movements is unclear, with the latter two hypotheses having recently been challenged. Here, we show that white sclerae in primates are associated with increased cooperative behaviours whereas dark sclerae are associated with reduced cooperative behaviours and increased conspecific lethal violence. These results are consistent with all three hypotheses of scleral evolution, suggesting that primate scleral morphologies evolve in relation to variation in social environment.

Marmoset monkeys show high levels of proactive prosociality, a trait shared with humans, presumably because both species rely on allomaternal care. However, it is not clear whether the proximate regulation of this convergent trait is also similar, in particular with regard to intentionality, which is a defining characteristic of prosocial behavior in the human literature. The aim of this paper was to investigate whether marmoset monkeys’ prosociality fulfils the criteria of intentionality developed in primate communication research. The results show that marmoset prosocial behavior (i) has some degree of flexibility, since individuals can use multiple means to reach their goal and adjust them to specific conditions, (ii) depends on the presence of an audience, i.e. potential recipients (social use), and (iii) is goal-directed, because (a) it continues exactly until the putative goal is reached, and (b) individuals check back and look at/for their partner when their prosocial actions do not achieve the putative goal (i.e. if their actions don’t lead to the expected outcome, this elicits distinct reactions in the actor). These results suggest that marmoset prosociality is under some degree of voluntary, intentional control. They are in line with other findings that marmosets perceive each other as intentional agents, and only learn socially from actions that are perceived as intentional. The most parsimonious conclusion is, therefore, that prosocial behavior is fundamentally under voluntary control in marmosets, just as it is in humans, even though our more sophisticated cognitive abilities allow for a far more complex integration of prosociality into a broader variety of contexts and of behavioral goals.

Humans engage in cooperative childcare, which includes some elements not found in other animals, such as the presence of post-reproductive helpers, extensive food sharing among adults and a pervasive sexual division of labour. In animals, cooperative offspring care has typically been studied in two different contexts. The first mainly involves helpers contributing care in cooperatively breeding family groups; the second context is allomaternal care in species usually not categorized as cooperative breeders (e.g. plural and communal breeders, often without male care). Comparative analyses suggest that cooperative breeding and allomaternal care in plural and communal breeders have distinct evolutionary origins, with humans fitting neither pathway entirely. Nevertheless, some critical proximate mechanisms of helping, including hormonal regulators, are likely to be shared across species. Other mechanisms may vary among species, such as social tolerance, proactive prosociality or conditional mother–infant bonding. These are presumably associated with specific details of the care system, such as whether all group members contribute, or whether mothers can potentially raise offspring alone. Thus, cooperative offspring care is seen in different contexts across animal lineages, but may nonetheless share several important psychological characteristics. We end by discussing how work on humans may play a unifying role in studying cooperative offspring care.

When quantifying animal cognition, memory represents one of the most tested domains and is key to understanding cognitive evolution. Memory tests thus play an important role in comparative cognitive research, yet slight variations in the experimental settings can substantially change the outcome, questioning whether different memory tests tap into different memory systems or whether they test memory at all. Here, we first assessed memory performance of 16 common marmosets ( Callithrix jacchus ) in two distinct paradigms varying in their format and delay. First, we examined marmoset memory in a 24-h delay memory test (24 h-DMT) in which they could freely explore an environment with three novel objects of which one contained food. We examined their retention the day after, and the procedure was iterated cumulatively with previous objects remaining in the enclosure until the marmosets had to choose the correct out of 30 objects. Second, we administered a classical delayed response test (DRT) in the same animals with three objects and a maximum delay of 30 s. In the DRT, marmoset performance was poor and not better than chance after 15 s already. However, individuals excelled in the 24 h-DMT, performing above chance level after 24 h even with tenfold the number of objects to choose from compared to the DRT. Moreover, individual performances in the two tests were not correlated, and typical age effects on memory could not be detected in both experiments. Together, these results suggest that the two tests explore different domains, and that the 24 h-DMT examines long-term memory. The outcome of the DRT is more difficult to assign to memory since individuals performed only moderately even in the 0-s delay condition. This puts into question whether this task design indeed tests memory or other cognitive processes.