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Building Militaries in Fragile States
Combining rigorous academic scholarship with the experience of a senior Pentagon policymaker, Mara E. Karlin explores the key national security issue of our time: how to effectively build partner militaries. Given the complex and complicated global security environment, declining U.S. defense budgets, and an increasingly connected (and often unstable) world, the United States has an ever-deepening interest in strengthening fragile states. Particularly since World War II, it has often chosen to do so by strengthening partner militaries. It will continue to do so, Karlin predicts, given U.S. sensitivity to casualties, a constrained fiscal environment, the nature of modern nationalism, increasing transnational security threats, the proliferation of fragile states, and limits on U.S. public support for military interventions. However, its record of success is thin.While most analyses of these programs focus on training and equipment, Building Militaries in Fragile States argues that this approach is misguided. Instead, given the nature of a fragile state, Karlin homes in on the outsized roles played by two key actors: the U.S. military and unhelpful external actors. With a rich comparative case-study approach that spans Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Karlin unearths provocative findings that suggest the traditional way of working with foreign militaries needs to be rethought. Benefiting from the practical eye of an experienced national security official, her results-based exploration suggests new and meaningful findings for building partner militaries in fragile states.
eBook
Building Militaries in Fragile States
Combining rigorous academic scholarship with the experience of a
senior Pentagon policymaker, Mara E. Karlin explores the key
national security issue of our time: how to effectively build
partner militaries. Given the complex and complicated global
security environment, declining U.S. defense budgets, and an
increasingly connected (and often unstable) world, the United
States has an ever-deepening interest in strengthening fragile
states. Particularly since World War II, it has often chosen to do
so by strengthening partner militaries. It will continue to do so,
Karlin predicts, given U.S. sensitivity to casualties, a
constrained fiscal environment, the nature of modern nationalism,
increasing transnational security threats, the proliferation of
fragile states, and limits on U.S. public support for military
interventions. However, its record of success is thin.
While most analyses of these programs focus on training and
equipment, Building Militaries in Fragile States argues
that this approach is misguided. Instead, given the nature of a
fragile state, Karlin homes in on the outsized roles played by two
key actors: the U.S. military and unhelpful external actors. With a
rich comparative case-study approach that spans Europe, Asia, and
the Middle East, Karlin unearths provocative findings that suggest
the traditional way of working with foreign militaries needs to be
rethought. Benefiting from the practical eye of an experienced
national security official, her results-based exploration suggests
new and meaningful findings for building partner militaries in
fragile states.
eBook
Understanding the Problem
In 2014, much of the Iraqi Army dissolved as the Islamic State overran key Iraqi cities like Tikrit and Mosul. After more than a decade of U.S. training and more than $20 billion in assistance to strengthen the force, training was for naught as Iraqi soldiers fled battles and holed up in their homes, military leadership disappeared, and nearly three divisions worth of equipment were abandoned to the Islamic State. Yet another example of U.S. efforts to build militaries in fragile states had failed.
As a civilian policymaker in the U.S. Defense Department, I led a wide range of programs
Book Chapter
Greece
In 1947, the United States launched an unprecedented effort to assist Greece, including vigorously building its military as it faced guerrillas supported by various communist states. Its strategy in Greece was to strengthen Greek institutions in an effort to halt the creep of communism in the Eastern Mediterranean. Under the specter of the Cold War, U.S. involvement in Greece evolved considerably over a short span of time in an attempt to ensure Greek victory over the insurgency. Once the United States became deeply involved in delicate Greek military affairs, influencing its structure and personnel while refraining from becoming a co-combatant
Book Chapter
Lebanon II
In 2005, the United States sought—for the second time—to build the Lebanese military for internal defense. It sought to strengthen Lebanese institutions in the wake of Syria’s withdrawal and to limit the ability of state and non-state actors to undermine the fragile state. Its military assistance program partially failed because the nature of U.S. involvement was largely limited, while antagonistic external actors like Iran and Syria continued destabilizing Lebanon, primarily by supporting Hizballah. Structurally, the U.S. program focused on an internal defense mission and on disbursing equipment and training to build the nascent force. However, the United States
Book Chapter
South Vietnam
In 1955, the United States took responsibility from France for building the newly created South Vietnamese military.¹ Its strategy in South Vietnam was to strengthen the South Vietnamese state as a bulwark against communism in Asia. The military assistance program—inaugurated to help the nascent South Vietnamese government exert its sovereignty throughout its territory—was a spectacular failure because the United States played a limited role in South Vietnamese military affairs and overreacted to the threat posed by external actors. Instead of its intended focus on building a South Vietnamese military capable of maintaining internal defense, the U.S. program was
Book Chapter
Findings and Implications
As a U.S. defense official, I facilitated a multibillion-dollar program to support Pakistan’s military. We gave Pakistan equipment and training and reimbursed its military for operations it supposedly conducted, but for too long, we didn’t ask the hard or uncomfortable questions. This book, an exploration of when, why, and under what circumstances U.S. programs to strengthen partner militaries for internal defense succeeded, has put all of those issues on the table. It is based on the assumption that the United States builds militaries in fragile states so that the partner state is able to extend the monopoly on violence throughout
Book Chapter
Lebanon I
In 1982, the United States began building Lebanon’s fledgling military, and more than two decades later, it launched another program to do so, as this chapter and the next explore. The nature of U.S. involvement and the role of unhelpful external actors differed meaningfully between these two programs. They therefore present an ideal opportunity for cross-case variation to illuminate my hypothesis that a capable security sector is more likely when the United States gets deeply involved in the partner state’s sensitive military affairs and antagonistic external actors play a diminishing role.
In the first case, U.S. strategy in Lebanon was
Book Chapter
FOOL ME TWICE: How the United States Lost Lebanon—Again
[...] a rapid tumble of events, including the assassination of incoming Lebanese President Bachir Gemayel, the massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, the failure of regional states to support the May 17 agreement for Israeli withdrawal negotiated by Secretary of State George Shultz, and the systematic effort of Syria and its allies to destroy an independent Lebanon created a difficult and dangerous environment for the American peacekeepers, culminating in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut-Iran's first, but not last, use of proxies to carry out a lethal assault on US military forces. While the Syrian and Iranian governments quickly provided the terrorist group Hezbollah with sophisticated weaponry, the US commitment to devote more than half a billion dollars to rapidly train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) languished in the ponderous machinery of statecraft.\\n It was clear to him that there was a new dynamic in the region, and any hope for his survival, and the survival of his tiny community, depended on his willingness to embrace it.
Journal Article