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The research and development (R&D) ecosystem has evolved over the past decade to include pandemic infectious diseases, building on experience from multiple recent outbreaks. Outcomes of this evolution have been particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic with accelerated development of vaccines and monoclonal antibodies, as well as novel clinical trial designs. These products were developed, trialled, manufactured, and authorised for use in several countries within a year of the pandemic's onset. Many gaps remain, however, that must be bridged to establish a truly efficient and effective end-to-end R&D preparedness and response ecosystem. Foremost among them is a global financing system. In addition, important changes are required for multiple aspects of enabling sciences and product development. For each of these elements we identify priorities for improved and faster functionality. There will be no better time than now to seriously address these needs, however difficult, as the ravages of COVID-19 continue to accelerate with devastating health, social, and economic consequences for the entire community of nations.

COVID-19 is the latest zoonotic RNA virus epidemic of concern. Learning how it began and spread will help to determine how to reduce the risk of future events. We review major RNA virus outbreaks since 1967 to identify common features and opportunities to prevent emergence, including ancestral viral origins in birds, bats, and other mammals; animal reservoirs and intermediate hosts; and pathways for zoonotic spillover and community spread, leading to local, regional, or international outbreaks. The increasing scientific evidence concerning the origins of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) is most consistent with a zoonotic origin and a spillover pathway from wildlife to people via wildlife farming and the wildlife trade. We apply what we know about these outbreaks to identify relevant, feasible, and implementable interventions. We identify three primary targets for pandemic prevention and preparedness: first, smart surveillance coupled with epidemiological risk assessment across wildlife–livestock–human (One Health) spillover interfaces; second, research to enhance pandemic preparedness and expedite development of vaccines and therapeutics; and third, strategies to reduce underlying drivers of spillover risk and spread and reduce the influence ofmisinformation. For all three, continued efforts to improve and integrate biosafety and biosecurity with the implementation of a One Health approach are essential. We discuss new models to address the challenges of creating an inclusive and effective governance structure, with the necessary stable funding for cross-disciplinary collaborative research. Finally, we offer recommendations for feasible actions to close the knowledge gaps across the One Health continuum and improve preparedness and response in the future.

Funding: The study on which this Perspectives article is based was supported by a grant from the US Department of Health and Human Services, The Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to the National Academy of Medicine. [...]to learn how to improve care, research must be designed to generate evidence that can support reliable inferences about safety and efficacy. [...]the committee rejected the claim made by some stakeholders that due to Ebola’s high mortality rate, equipoise would not exist for studies of therapeutic interventions that included the possibility of randomization to a standard-of-care control arm [3]. [...]to frontline caregivers facing overwhelming clinical need and acute shortages of supplies and manpower in the early stages of the outbreak, research felt like an unjustifiable diversion of scarce resources.

In the first in a series of four articles highlighting the changing nature of global health institutions, Nicole Szlezák and colleagues outline the origin and aim of the series.In the first in a series of four articles highlighting the changing nature of global health institutions, Nicole Szlezák and colleagues outline the origin and aim of the series.

Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) cause significant disease; treatment is supportive and antibiotic use is controversial. Ciprofloxacin but not fosfomycin causes Shiga toxin-encoding bacteriophage induction and enhanced Shiga toxin (Stx) production from E. coli O157:H7 in vitro. The potential clinical relevance of this was examined in mice colonized with E. coli O157:H7 and given either ciprofloxacin or fosfomycin. Both antibiotics caused a reduction in fecal STEC. However, animals treated with ciprofloxacin had a marked increase in free fecal Stx, associated with death in two-thirds of the mice, whereas fosfomycin did not. Experiments that used a kanamycin-marked Stx2 prophage demonstrated that ciprofloxacin, but not fosfomycin, caused enhanced intraintestinal transfer of Stx2 prophage from one E. coli to another. These observations suggest that treatment of human STEC infection with bacteriophage-inducing antibiotics, such as fluoroquinolones, may have significant adverse clinical consequences and that fluoroquinolone antibiotics may enhance the movement of virulence factors in vivo.

Despite growing awareness of the importance of controlling neglected tropical diseases as a contribution to poverty alleviation and achieving the Millennium Development Goals, there is a need to up-scale programmes to achieve wider public health benefits. This implementation deficit is attributable to several factors but one often overlooked is the specific difficulty in tackling diseases that involve both people and animals - the zoonoses. A Disease Reference Group on Zoonoses and Marginalised Infectious Diseases (DRG6) was convened by the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), a programme executed by the World Health Organization and co-sponsored by UNICEF, UNDP, the World Bank and WHO. The key considerations included: (a) the general lack of reliable quantitative data on their public health burden; (b) the need to evaluate livestock production losses and their additional impacts on health and poverty; (c) the relevance of cross-sectoral issues essential to designing and implementing public health interventions for zoonotic diseases; and (d) identifying priority areas for research and interventions to harness resources most effectively. Beyond disease specific research issues, a set of common macro-priorities and interventions were identified which, if implemented through a more integrated approach by countries, would have a significant impact on human health of the most marginalised populations characteristically dependent on livestock.

The US has experienced a series of epidemics during the past five decades. None has tested the nation's resilience like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which has laid bare critical weaknesses in US pandemic preparedness and domestic leadership and the nation's decline in global standing in public health. Pandemic response has been politicized, proven public health measures undermined, and public confidence in a science-based public health system reduced. This has been compounded by the large number of citizens without ready access to health care, who are overrepresented among infected, hospitalized, and fatal cases. Here, as part of the National Academy of Medicine's Vital Directions for Health and Health Care: Priorities for 2021 initiative, we review the US approach to pandemic preparedness and its impact on the response to COVID-19. We identify six steps that should be taken to strengthen US pandemic resilience, strengthen and modernize the US health care system, regain public confidence in government leadership in public health, and restore US engagement and leadership in global partnerships to address future pandemic threats domestically and around the world.

  Coordination is ultimately essential; however, as several experienced participants in our workshops pointed out, few organizations wish to be coordinated, because of the costs and loss of autonomy entailed. [...]coordination and some degree of harmonization of multiple independent activities are likely to emerge only after the construction of consensus on a widely shared set of rules, roles, and expectations. [...]it needs to support the systematic exchange, coordination, and streamlining of M&E efforts.