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The Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) began building in the late 1980s on a 3-tiered structure of 146 laboratories with different and complementary technical and support capacities (poliovirus isolation, molecular strain characterization including sequencing, quality assurance, and research). The purpose of this network is to provide timely and accurate laboratory results to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. Deeply integrated with field case-based surveillance, it ultimately provides molecular epidemiological data from polioviruses used to inform programmatic and immunization activities. This network of global coverage requires substantial investments in laboratory infrastructure, equipment, supplies, reagents, quality assurance, staffing and training, often in resource-limited settings. The GPLN has not only developed country capacities, but it also serves as a model to other global laboratory networks for vaccine-preventable diseases that will endure after the polio eradication goal is achieved. Leveraging lessons learned during past 27 years, the authors discuss options for transitioning GPLN assets to support control of other viral vaccine-preventable, emerging, and reemerging diseases.

Reversion and spread of vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) to cause outbreaks of poliomyelitis is a rare outcome resulting from immunisation with the live-attenuated oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs). Global withdrawal of all three OPV serotypes is therefore a key objective of the polio endgame strategic plan, starting with serotype 2 (OPV2) in April 2016. Supplementary immunisation activities (SIAs) with trivalent OPV (tOPV) in advance of this date could mitigate the risks of OPV2 withdrawal by increasing serotype-2 immunity, but may also create new serotype-2 VDPV (VDPV2). Here, we examine the risk factors for VDPV2 emergence and implications for the strategy of tOPV SIAs prior to OPV2 withdrawal. We first developed mathematical models of VDPV2 emergence and spread. We found that in settings with low routine immunisation coverage, the implementation of a single SIA increases the risk of VDPV2 emergence. If routine coverage is 20%, at least 3 SIAs are needed to bring that risk close to zero, and if SIA coverage is low or there are persistently \"missed\" groups, the risk remains high despite the implementation of multiple SIAs. We then analysed data from Nigeria on the 29 VDPV2 emergences that occurred during 2004-2014. Districts reporting the first case of poliomyelitis associated with a VDPV2 emergence were compared to districts with no VDPV2 emergence in the same 6-month period using conditional logistic regression. In agreement with the model results, the odds of VDPV2 emergence decreased with higher routine immunisation coverage (odds ratio 0.67 for a 10% absolute increase in coverage [95% confidence interval 0.55-0.82]). We also found that the probability of a VDPV2 emergence resulting in poliomyelitis in >1 child was significantly higher in districts with low serotype-2 population immunity. Our results support a strategy of focused tOPV SIAs before OPV2 withdrawal in areas at risk of VDPV2 emergence and in sufficient number to raise population immunity above the threshold permitting VDPV2 circulation. A failure to implement this risk-based approach could mean these SIAs actually increase the risk of VDPV2 emergence and spread.

The use of the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in developing countries has reduced the incidence of poliomyelitis by >99% since 1988 and is the primary tool for global polio eradication. Spontaneous reversions of the vaccine virus to a neurovirulent form can impede this effort. In persons with primary B-cell immunodeficiencies, exposure to OPV can result in chronic infection, mutation, and excretion of immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived polioviruses, (iVDPVs). These iVDPVs may have the potential for transmission in a susceptible population and cause paralysis. The extent to which sera from OPV recipients are able to neutralize iVDPVs with varying degrees of antigenic site substitutions is investigated here. We tested sera from a population immunized with a combination vaccine schedule (both OPV and inactivated polio vaccine) against a panel of iVDPVs and found that increases in amino acid substitution in the P1 capsid protein resulted in a decrease in the neutralizing capacity of the sera. This study underscores the importance of maintaining high vaccine coverage in areas of OPV use as well as active surveillance of those known to be immunocompromised.

Eight outbreaks of paralytic polio attributable to circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) have highlighted the risks associated with oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use in areas of low vaccination coverage and poor hygiene. As the Polio Eradication Initiative enters its final stages, it is important to consider the extent to which these viruses spread under different conditions, so that appropriate strategies can be devised to prevent or respond to future cVDPV outbreaks. This paper examines epidemiological (temporal, geographic, age, vaccine history, social group, ascertainment), and virological (type, genetic diversity, virulence) parameters in order to infer the numbers of individuals likely to have been infected in each of these cVDPV outbreaks, and in association with single acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases attributable to VDPVs. Although only 114 virologically-confirmed paralytic cases were identified in the eight cVDPV outbreaks, it is likely that a minimum of hundreds of thousands, and more likely several million individuals were infected during these events, and that many thousands more have been infected by VDPV lineages within outbreaks which have escaped detection. Our estimates of the extent of cVDPV circulation suggest widespread transmission in some countries, as might be expected from endemic wild poliovirus transmission in these same settings. These methods for inferring extent of infection will be useful in the context of identifying future surveillance needs, planning for OPV cessation and preparing outbreak response plans.

Individuals with primary immunodeficiency disorder may excrete poliovirus for extended periods and will constitute the only remaining reservoir of virus after eradication and withdrawal of oral poliovirus vaccine. Here, we analyzed the epidemiology of prolonged and chronic immunodeficiency-related vaccine-derived poliovirus cases in a registry maintained by the World Health Organization, to identify risk factors and determine the length of excretion. Between 1962 and 2016, there were 101 cases, with 94/101 (93%) prolonged excretors and 7/101 (7%) chronic excretors. We documented an increase in incidence in recent decades, with a shift toward middle-income countries, and a predominance of poliovirus type 2 in 73/101 (72%) cases. The median length of excretion was 1.3 years (95% confidence interval: 1.0, 1.4) and 90% of individuals stopped excreting after 3.7 years. Common variable immunodeficiency syndrome and residence in high-income countries were risk factors for long-term excretion. The changing epidemiology of cases, manifested by the greater incidence in recent decades and a shift to from high- to middle-income countries, highlights the expanding risk of poliovirus transmission after oral poliovirus vaccine cessation. To better quantify and reduce this risk, more sensitive surveillance and effective antiviral therapies are needed.

The attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) has many properties favoring its use in polio eradication: ease of administration, efficient induction of intestinal immunity, induction of durable humoral immunity, and low cost. Despite these advantages, OPV has the disadvantage of genetic instability, resulting in rare and sporadic cases of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) and the emergence of genetically divergent vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Whereas VAPP is an adverse event following exposure to OPV, VDPVs are polioviruses whose genetic properties indicate prolonged replication or transmission. Three categories of VDPVs are recognized: (1) circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) from outbreaks in settings of low OPV coverage, (2) immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs) from individuals with primary immunodeficiencies, and (3) ambiguous VDPVs (aVDPVs), which cannot be definitively assigned to either of the first 2 categories. Because most VDPVs are type 2, the World Health Organization's plans call for coordinated worldwide replacement of trivalent OPV with bivalent OPV containing poliovirus types 1 and 3.

Within the past 4 years, poliomyelitis outbreaks associated with circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) have occurred in Hispaniola (2000-01), the Philippines (2001), and Madagascar (2001-02). Retrospective studies have also detected the circulation of endemic cVDPV in Egypt (1988-93) and the likely localized spread of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV)-derived virus in Belarus (1965-66). Gaps in OPV coverage and the previous eradication of the corresponding serotype of indigenous wild poliovirus were the critical risk factors for all cVDPV outbreaks. The cVDPV outbreaks were stopped by mass immunization campaigns using OPV. To increase sensitivity for detecting vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs), in 2001 the Global Polio Laboratory Network implemented additional testing requirements for all poliovirus isolates under investigation. This approach quickly led to the recognition of the Philippines and Madagascar cVDPV outbreaks, but of no other current outbreaks. The potential risk of cVDPV emergence has increased dramatically in recent years as wild poliovirus circulation has ceased in most of the world. The risk appears highest for the type 2 OPV strain because of its greater tendency to spread to contacts. The emergence of cVDPVs underscores the critical importance of eliminating the last pockets of wild poliovirus circulation, maintaining universally high levels of polio vaccine coverage, stopping OPV use as soon as it is safely possible to do so, and continuing sensitive poliovirus surveillance into the foreseeable future. Particular attention must be given to areas where the risks for wild poliovirus circulation have been highest, and where the highest rates of polio vaccine coverage must be maintained to suppress cVDPV emergence.

Background.Oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) has not been used in the United States since 2000. Type 1 vaccinederived poliovirus (VDPV) was identified in September 2005, from an unvaccinated Amish infant hospitalized in Minnesota with severe combined immunodeficiency. An investigation was conducted to determine the source of the virus and its means of transmission. Methods. The infant was tested serially for poliovirus excretion. Investigations were conducted to detect poliovirus infections or paralytic poliomyelitis in Amish communities in Minnesota, neighboring states, and Ontario, Canada. Genomic sequences of poliovirus isolates were determined for phylogenetic analysis. Results. No source for the VDPV could be identified. In the index community, 8 (35%) of 23 children tested, including the infant, had evidence of type 1 poliovirus or VDPV infection. Phylogenetic analysis suggested that the VDPV circulated in the community for ∼2 months before the infant's infection was detected and that the initiating OPV dose had been given before her birth. No paralytic disease was found in the community, and no poliovirus infections were found in other Amish communities investigated. Conclusions. This is the first demonstrated transmission of VDPV in an undervaccinated community in a developed country. Continued vigilance is needed in all countries to identify poliovirus infections in communities at high risk of poliovirus transmission.

Use of oral live-attenuated polio vaccines (OPV), and injected inactivated polio vaccines (IPV) has almost achieved global eradication of wild polio viruses. To address the goals of achieving and maintaining global eradication and minimising the risk of outbreaks of vaccine-derived polioviruses, we tested novel monovalent oral type-2 poliovirus (OPV2) vaccine candidates that are genetically more stable than existing OPVs, with a lower risk of reversion to neurovirulence. Our study represents the first in-human testing of these two novel OPV2 candidates. We aimed to evaluate the safety and immunogenicity of these vaccines, the presence and extent of faecal shedding, and the neurovirulence of shed virus. In this double-blind, single-centre phase 1 trial, we isolated participants in a purpose-built containment facility at the University of Antwerp Hospital (Antwerp, Belgium), to minimise the risk of environmental release of the novel OPV2 candidates. Participants, who were recruited by local advertising, were adults (aged 18–50 years) in good health who had previously been vaccinated with IPV, and who would not have any contact with immunosuppressed or unvaccinated people for the duration of faecal shedding at the end of the study. The first participant randomly chose an envelope containing the name of a vaccine candidate, and this determined their allocation; the next 14 participants to be enrolled in the study were sequentially allocated to this group and received the same vaccine. The subsequent 15 participants enrolled after this group were allocated to receive the other vaccine. Participants and the study staff were masked to vaccine groups until the end of the study period. Participants each received a single dose of one vaccine candidate (candidate 1, S2/cre5/S15domV/rec1/hifi3; or candidate 2, S2/S15domV/CpG40), and they were monitored for adverse events, immune responses, and faecal shedding of the vaccine virus for 28 days. Shed virus isolates were tested for the genetic stability of attenuation. The primary outcomes were the incidence and type of serious and severe adverse events, the proportion of participants showing viral shedding in their stools, the time to cessation of viral shedding, the cell culture infective dose of shed virus in virus-positive stools, and a combined index of the prevalence, duration, and quantity of viral shedding in all participants. This study is registered with EudraCT, number 2017-000908-21 and ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT03430349. Between May 22 and Aug 22, 2017, 48 volunteers were screened, of whom 15 (31%) volunteers were excluded for reasons relating to the inclusion or exclusion criteria, three (6%) volunteers were not treated because of restrictions to the number of participants in each group, and 30 (63%) volunteers were sequentially allocated to groups (15 participants per group). Both novel OPV2 candidates were immunogenic and increased the median blood titre of serum neutralising antibodies; all participants were seroprotected after vaccination. Both candidates had acceptable tolerability, and no serious adverse events occurred during the study. However, severe events were reported in six (40%) participants receiving candidate 1 (eight events) and nine (60%) participants receiving candidate 2 (12 events); most of these events were increased blood creatinine phosphokinase but were not accompanied by clinical signs or symptoms. Vaccine virus was detected in the stools of 15 (100%) participants receiving vaccine candidate 1 and 13 (87%) participants receiving vaccine candidate 2. Vaccine poliovirus shedding stopped at a median of 23 days (IQR 15–36) after candidate 1 administration and 12 days (1–23) after candidate 2 administration. Total shedding, described by the estimated median shedding index (50% cell culture infective dose/g), was observed to be greater with candidate 1 than candidate 2 across all participants (2·8 [95% CI 1·8–3·5] vs 1·0 [0·7–1·6]). Reversion to neurovirulence, assessed as paralysis of transgenic mice, was low in isolates from those vaccinated with both candidates, and sequencing of shed virus indicated that there was no loss of attenuation in domain V of the 5ʹ-untranslated region, the primary site of reversion in Sabin OPV. We found that the novel OPV2 candidates were safe and immunogenic in IPV-immunised adults, and our data support the further development of these vaccines to potentially be used for maintaining global eradication of neurovirulent type-2 polioviruses. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

On November 23, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson announced plans for a 5-year smallpox eradication and measles control program in West Africa that enabled the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to establish a Smallpox Eradication Program in January 1966. Since then, CDC's global immunization endeavors have encompassed global smallpox eradication, the establishment and growth of the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) to strengthen national immunization programs, global efforts to eradicate polio and eliminate measles and rubella, and vaccine introduction into national immunization schedules beyond the original 6 EPI vaccines. CDC has provided scientific leadership, evidence-based guidance, and programmatic strategies to build public health infrastructure around the world, needed to achieve and measure the impact of these global immunization initiatives. This article marks the 50th anniversary of CDC's global immunization leadership, highlights key historical events, and provides an overview of CDC's future directions.