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The events of September 8, 1978, in Iran, commonly known as 'Black Friday', have long been portrayed as a mass killing of peaceful protesters by the Shah's regime, with widely cited death tolls ranging from several hundred to several thousand. However, this article presents a comprehensive reassessment of the incident at Jaleh Square in Tehran, arguing that the dominant narrative is rooted more in disinformation and misinformation than verifiable fact. Drawing on official records from the Imperial Iranian Government, post-revolutionary data compiled by the Islamic Republic's own Martyrs Foundation, the article establishes that approximately 58-64 people were killed in the incident thus contradicting inflated figures disseminated by opposition groups, amplified by Western media, and institutionalized in scholarly literature. The article further examines how disinformation campaigns, journalistic failures, and ideological biases contributed to the construction and persistence of the 'massacre' narrative, which continues to serve the Islamic Republic's political agenda to this day. Through this case study, the article underscores the need for critical scrutiny in reporting and historiography, particularly when unverified claims shape national memory and influence political legitimacy.

Tehran viewed the Russian-Turkish-brokered ceasefire of Nov 10, 2020, which ended the 45-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, with very mixed feelings. On the face of it, the cessation of hostilities on Iran's northern border, which attracted considerable foreign intervention at a time when the country is reeling from dire economic problems, the ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic, and lingering domestic restiveness should not have been more welcome for the Iranian regime, not least since it represented the triumph of a Muslim state over its Christian, Washington-backed adversary. Yet, this victory was largely due to the military support provided both by Israel, which had been steadily rolling back Tehran's military presence in Syria and frustrating its progress toward nuclear weapons, and by Turkey, which has persistently sought to expand its foothold in the South Caucasus. Here, Khoshnood and Khoshnood discuss Tehran's new moderation in its hegemonic goals.

On Jan 16, 1979, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who had ruled Iran for nearly thirty-eight years, left the country in the face of a nationwide popular revolution--never to return. Shortly after his departure, it became known that the deposed monarch suffered from advanced cancer, and on Jul 27, 1980, he passed away in Cairo, at age sixty. It is not clear when the shah developed cancer symptoms and when he was first diagnosed. One account traces this diagnosis to 1970 or 1971 when a biopsied gland in the shah's neck, noted by his eminent Viennese physician Karl Fellinger, revealed lymphoma; another account dates Fellinger's biopsy to late April 1974. What is clear, however, is that from at least May 1974. he was under regular observation by French and Iranian physicians, and tliat. in mid-September 1974, his situation was deemed sufficiently serious to justify the initiation of chemotherapy.

In its 2023-2024 security assessment, the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen, or Säpo) singled out the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) as a major national threat. Säpo noted that the IRI's intelligence services routinely engaged in espionage to circumvent international sanctions and obtain advanced technology and expertise from Swedish research institutions and industries. Although no specific sectors were named, Iran--alongside Russia and China--was cited as a state seeking to develop high-tech capabilities in defiance of export controls. Beyond its pursuit of strategically sensitive or sanctioned technologies, the IRI was implicated in assassination plots on Swedish soil that targeted Iranian dissidents and citizens of hostile states. Tehran relied on proxies to conduct intelligence gathering and terrorist activities, with cyber espionage playing a key role in tracking and monitoring dissidents. The Iranian regime also mounted influence campaigns aimed at spreading disinformation and influencing policymakers.

The Islamic Republic of Iran's intelligence operations in Denmark and Norway reflect a deliberate, long-term strategy to suppress dissent, gather strategic intelligence, and advance Tehran's geopolitical and ideological objectives. Through a combination of espionage, cyberattacks, influence operations, and even acts of terrorism and assassination, the IRI has systematically targeted dissidents, institutions, and individuals deemed adversarial. These activities are not isolated incidents but part of a broader, coordinated campaign orchestrated by the regime's highest authorities. The lack of a robust and unified response from Scandinavian governments has emboldened Tehran, reinforcing its perception that the region poses a low-risk, high-reward environment for intelligence activities. As the IRI continues to expand its global footprint, it is imperative for Denmark, Norway, and their European partners to adopt a more cohesive and proactive strategy to counter this growing threat. Increased vigilance, strengthened security measures, and greater public awareness are critical t o safeguarding national sovereignty, academic integrity, and democratic values against the covert influence of the Islamic Republic.