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We investigate the influence of foreign institutional investors on firms’ auditor choices in an international setting. Foreign institutional investors are likely to demand high-quality audits to mitigate the information asymmetry they face and facilitate their external monitoring when they invest overseas. On the other hand, foreign institutional investors not only face difficulties in monitoring overseas firms in general but also have the limited ability to influence their auditor choices in particular. Using a large sample of 111,078 firm-year observations from 40 non-US countries for the period of 2001–2011, we find that firms with higher foreign institutional ownership are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors. To address the endogeneity concern, we show that our findings are robust to the use of identification strategies exploiting the exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership following MSCI index additions, two-stage least squares regressions, and change-on-change regressions. More importantly, we further explore cross-sectional/cross-country variations in the relation between foreign institutional investors and auditor choice and find that this relation is stronger (a) when foreign institutional investors are from countries with stronger governance institutions and (b) when the investee firms are located in countries with higher information asymmetries. Overall, our findings suggest that cross-border institutional investment plays an important role in influencing firms’ auditor choices and improving the information environment of firms across different countries around the world.

This study investigates whether and how the deviation of cash flow rights (ownership) from voting rights (control), or simply the ownership-control wedge, influences the likelihood that extreme negative outliers occur in stock return distributions, which we refer to as stock price crash risk. We do so using a comprehensive panel data set of firms with a dual-class share structure from 20 countries around the world for the period of 1995–2007. We predict and find that opaque firms with a large wedge are more crash prone than opaque firms with a small wedge. In addition, we predict and find that the positive relation between the wedge and crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more effective external monitoring and for firms with greater growth opportunities. The results of this study are broadly consistent with Jin and Myers's theory that agency costs, combined with opacity, exacerbate stock price crash risk.

This study investigates how managers in firms that have committed fraud strategically use socially responsible activities in coordination with their fraudulent financial reporting practices. Using propensity score matching to select control firms that have a similar probability of fraud in the pre-fraud benchmark period, we find that the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of fraudulent firms in the fraud-committing period is significantly higher compared with the CSR performance of non-fraudulent control firms during this period, and compared with that during their own pre-fraud benchmark periods. This higher CSR performance by fraudulent firms is achieved by means of investing in both stakeholder and third-party CSR categories and by improving in CSR strengths. Furthermore, the increase in CSR performance is more pronounced for fraudulent firms with a weak governance environment, and for firms located in high-religiosity states. Overall, our findings suggest that fraudulent firms strategically adjust their CSR performance to coordinate with their fraudulent financial activities.

Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk.

This study examines the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on audit fees. We first build an analytical audit fee model to analyze the impact on audit fees for the change in both audit complexity and financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption. We then test the model's predictions using audit fee data from European Union countries that mandated IFRS adoption in 2005. We find that mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit fees. We also find that the IFRS-related audit fee premium increases with the increase in audit complexity brought about by IFRS adoption, and decreases with the improvement in financial reporting quality arising from IFRS adoption. Finally, we find some evidence that the IFRS-related audit fee premium is lower in countries with stronger legal regimes. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.

Using a sample of borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study compares various features of loan contracts between firms with ICW and those without ICW. Our results show the following. First, the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by about 28 basis points, after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Second, firms with more severe, company-level ICW pay significantly higher loan rates than those with less severe, account-level ICW. Third, lenders impose tighter nonprice terms on firms with ICW than on those without ICW. Fourth, fewer lenders are attracted to loan contracts involving firms with ICW. Finally, our within-firm analyses show that banks increase loan rates charged to ICW firms after their disclosure of internal control problems and that banks reduce loan rates after firms remediate previously reported ICW.

This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.

This study investigates whether and how a firm’s voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) influences the extent to which firm-specific information is capitalized into stock prices measured by stock price synchronicity. We also study the role of analyst following and institutional environments in determining the relation between IFRS reporting and synchronicity. Using firm-level data from 34 countries, we find that synchronicity is significantly lower for IFRS adopters than for non-adopters across all regression specifications and that for IFRS adopters it decreases from the pre-adoption period to the post-adoption period. This finding supports the view that voluntary IFRS adoption facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, thereby reducing synchronicity. We also find that the synchronicity-reducing effect of IFRS adoption is attenuated (accentuated) for firms with high (low) analyst following and is stronger (weaker) for firms in countries with poor (good) institutional environments.

Purpose Using an international sample of firms affiliated with a business group, this paper aims to investigate the audit quality of common auditors, i.e. auditors shared by multiple firms affiliated with the same business group. Design/methodology/approach This paper utilizes a large sample of group-affiliated firms from 35 regions. Following the frameworks of DeFond and Zhang (2014) and Fung et al. (2017), this paper measures audit quality using the absolute value of abnormal accruals and modified audit opinions. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to address the research question. Findings The findings demonstrate that audit quality improves for firms that share the same auditor with other group members. Importantly, cross-country analyses reveal that this relationship is stronger when auditors operate in countries with stricter local auditor inspection programs and an overall opaque information environment. Additionally, the impact of common auditors on audit quality is more pronounced for group affiliates that have a more opaque firm-level information environment and are monitored by heightened institutional ownership. Practical implications While affiliates are more likely to select the same audit firms as common auditors, the evidence regarding the effects of common auditors is mixed. The results of this study provide further insights into auditor choices for group-affiliated firms and offer a potential avenue for better protecting shareholders' interests. Originality/value The results of this study add to the ongoing debates regarding the costs and benefits of common auditor choice for group affiliates. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate that the effects of common auditors may vary in different external environments.

Using a large sample of U.S. audit client firms over the period 2000–2005, this paper investigates whether and how the size of a local practice office within an audit firm (hereafter, office size) is a significant, engagement-specific factor determining audit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit firm size at the national level and auditor industry leadership at the city or office level. For our empirical tests, audit quality is measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, and the office size is measured in two different ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office and the other based on a total of audit fees earned by each office. Our results show that the office size has significantly positive relations with both audit quality and audit fees, even after controlling for national-level audit firm size and office-level industry expertise. These positive relations support the view that large local offices provide higher-quality audits compared with small local offices, and that such quality differences are priced in the market for audit services.