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This chapter will trace the principles of Thai diplomacy and the long history of Thailand's external relations with the aim of better understanding the country's foreign policy and its impact on both the regional and international political order. While there will be some discussion of ancient kingdoms, the focus will be on the 19th and 20th centuries, during which the country was exposed to the complexities of a truly international order. The hallmarks of Thai foreign policy - flexibility, pragmatism, and opportunism - will be discussed through an examination of major historical eras in Thailand's international relations: the late 19th- and early 20th-century European imperial rivalry in Southeast Asia; the influence of the United States and ideas of democracy in the interwar period; the rise of ultra-nationalism in Japan and the road to the Second World War; a close partnership with the United States in the Cold War; and the struggle to maintain independence in the face of communist victories in Indochina and the withdrawal of American power. This will hopefully set the stage for more in-depth examinations of Thailand's relationship with the Great Powers, regional organisations like ASEAN, and the array of both traditional and non-traditional security issues it confronts today. A Siamese proverb likens foreign policy to the \"bamboo in the wind\": solidly rooted but able to bend in any direction to survive. Thailand's alliance with Japan during the Second World War is explained as a \"necessary evil\". The extremism of Thailand's military government was conveniently re-interpreted in Washington. Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation was premised on the defence of Thailand as a \"first priority\", demonstrating further its importance in Washington's Cold War calculations. Defeat in Vietnam and the reorientation of US policy towards China ushered in a new era for Thailand. Foreign Ministry staff in effect became \"salesmen\" charged with showcasing Thailand. Key politicians like former Foreign Minister Pridi Banomyong opposed complicity with Japan and maintained strong personal connections with the West. Contemporary Thai foreign policy is extremely sensitive to the external environment, so much so that its bent \"bamboo\" may be better described as \"swirling in the wind\".

This sentiment is shared by Myanmar, or Burma. Thai-Burmese relations have rarely been good. In fact, conflict with Burma is a historical constant for Thailand and did much to shape the Thai foreign relations psyche. Since Burma's independence from Britain in 1948 Thai-Burmese relations have been at the forefront for both countries. Burma's sad fifty-five year legacy of revolt, insurgency, and war has significantly undermined its potential threat to Thailand. However, tensions between the two have remained consistently high. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Thailand gave safe haven to irregular forces of the Chinese Kuomintang, many of whom joined rebellious ethnic minorities in their war against the Burmese government after the communist revolution in China. By the mid-1960s, Kuomintang soldiers were also deeply involved with the lucrative opium trade and arms smuggling, so much so that they exercised considerable power in the volatile 'Golden Triangle' border region of Laos, Burma, and Thailand.(38) Even more troubling from Burma's point of view is Thailand's long support for non-communist ethnic insurgents operating along the border. For nearly the entire duration of the Burmese crisis Thailand has given sanctuary to Karen, Shan, Mon, and other minorities. Because it is home to sizeable populations of these groups, Thailand is cautious not to alienate them. During much of the cold war, the Thai government quietly supported the groups, largely out of a desire to keep Burma destabilized. Several prominent Thai leaders also accumulated enormous personal wealth through connections with insurgents involved in the drug trade.(39) Some Thai politicians see the ethnic insurgency differently. Since the introduction of [Chatichai]'s Golden Land concept, economic ties with Burma have become paramount. The visit of the Thai defence minister, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, to Burma in 1988 seemed to put to an end to cold war tensions. Moreover, he secured from the Burmese government valuable resource concessions in exchange for a Thai promise to withdraw support from ethnic insurgents.(40) Thailand thus became the leading proponent of 'constructive engagement' with the repressive military regime in Rangoon. Despite the many changes in Thai politics since then, maintaining a dialogue - and trade - with Burma has remained a salient feature of Thai foreign policy. In 1993 [Chuan Leekpai]'s government proposed an economic 'northern quadrangle' zone extending through the Golden Triangle to Yunnan province in China. In 1994, the Burmese government issued major forestry concessions to Thai companies and entered into talks on the construction of a gas pipeline from the Martaban Gulf into Thailand, even though both deals involved lands controlled by ethnic insurgents.(41) Braving condemnation for doing business with such a notorious regime, Thailand continued to pursue 'constructive engagement' for most of the 1990s. Today Thai foreign policy strategists acknowledge the economic necessity of including Rangoon in any regional development that includes China, which needs better road and sea access to Southeast Asia through Burma. The Thais also understand that, contrary to the cold war mentality, an unstable Burma is not in Bangkok's best interests. The collapse of Burma would destabilize the region and possibly promote a Chinese-Indian rivalry in the void. More likely is the dire effect a collapse would have on the 2400 kilometre Thai border with Burma, of which only 58 kilometres is legally demarcated.(42)