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Does the extent or lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament affect the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime? Commentators have long asserted both positive and negative responses to this question as if the answer were self-evident. Given that opposite positions have been advanced with equal conviction, a more systematic analysis is required. This analysis begins by attempting to identify all of the potential arguments that can be made both for and against the hypothesis of a disarmament-nonproliferation linkage. The arguments are grouped in terms of five broader sets of explanatory factors: security, institutions, norms, domestic politics, and psychology. This approach clarifies the various causal microfoundations that could underpin different arguments in the debate as well as the types of empirical tests that would be most relevant for evaluating the \"linkage hypothesis.\" Comparative assessment of the arguments on both sides suggests that signs of commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states will tend to enhance support for nonproliferation. Because of the multitude of other factors that affect state decisionmaking, however, progress on disarmament will not by itself address all of the challenges to making the nonproliferation regime effective.

International efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons-rest upon foundations provided by global treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Over time, however, states have created a number of other mechanisms for organizing international cooperation to promote nonproliferation. Examples range from regional efforts to various worldwide export-control regimes and nuclear security summit meetings initiated by U.S. president Barack Obama. Many of these additional nonproliferation arrangements are less formal and have fewer members than the global treaties. International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferationcalls attention to the emergence of international cooperation beyond the core global nonproliferation treaties. The contributors examine why these other cooperative nonproliferation mechanisms have emerged, assess their effectiveness, and ask how well the different pieces of the global nonproliferation regime complex fit together. Collectively, the essayists show that states have added new forms of international cooperation to combat WMD proliferation for multiple reasons, including the need to address new problems and the entrepreneurial activities of key state leaders. Despite the complications created by the existence of so many different cooperative arrangements, this collection shows the world is witnessing a process of building cooperation that is leading to greater levels of activity in support of norms against WMD and terrorism.

Students entering a graduate program often encounter a new type of assignment that differs from the papers they had to write in high school or as college undergraduates: the literature review (also known as a critical review essay). Put briefly, a literature review summarizes and evaluates a body of writings about a specific topic. The need to conduct such reviews is by no means limited to graduate students; scholarly researchers generally carry out literature reviews throughout their research careers. In a world where the Internet has broadened the range of potentially relevant sources, however, doing a literature review can pose challenges even to an experienced researcher.In drafting this overview, I have incorporated some points made by Paul Pitman in a lecture delivered to students at the Naval Postgraduate School. I have also incorporated some suggestions contained in a handout prepared by John Odell for students in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California.

While policy makers and scholars have long devoted considerable attention to strategies like deterrence, which threaten others with unacceptable consequences, such threat-based strategies are not always the best option. In some cases, a state may be better off seeking to give others a greater sense of security, rather than by holding their security at risk. The most prominent use of these security assurances has been in conjunction with efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Ongoing concerns about the nuclear activities of countries like Iran and North Korea, and the possible reactions of other states in their regions, have catapulted this topic into high profile. This book represents the first study to explore the overall utility of assurance strategies, to evaluate their effectiveness as a tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, and to identify conditions under which they are more or less likely to be effective.

A programme of research on learning in international relations began developing in the 1980s. However, learning research has not realised its potential. This article seeks to stimulate new work on learning by analysing why learning is important in international relations and outlining a research focus that reflects this assessment of learning's significance. The research so far has mostly treated learning as a foreign policy phenomenon, but this fails to capture one of the major reasons for interest in learning. Learning matters in part because of long-standing debates about whether it is possible to make progress in reducing the amount of armed conflict in world politics. For such progress to occur, it is likely that some form of learning would have to take place. However, learning by just a single state will often not be sufficient to change the quality of international outcomes. There thus needs to be research specifically on the possibility of shared learning by two or more states, a research focus this article will label ‘international learning’. A few illustrative examples will demonstrate the feasibility of doing research on shared, cross-national learning.

The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation.

Arctic wetlands play a critical role in the global carbon cycle and are experiencing disproportionate impacts from climate change. Even though Alaska hosts 65% of U.S. wetlands, less than half of the wetlands in Alaska have been mapped by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service National Wetlands Inventory (NWI) or other high-resolution wetlands protocols. The availability of time series satellite data and the development of machine learning algorithms have enabled the characterization of Arctic wetland inundation dynamics and vegetation types with limited ground data input. In this study, we built a semi-automatic process to generate sub-pixel water fraction (SWF) maps across the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska using random forest regression and 139 Sentinel-2 images taken in ice-free seasons from 2016 to 2019. With this, we characterized the seasonal dynamics of wetland inundation and explored their potential usage in determining NWI water regimes. The highest levels of surface water expression were detected in June, resulting from seasonal active layer thaw and snowmelt. Inundation was most variable in riverbeds, lake and pond margins, and depressional wetlands, where water levels fluctuate substantially between dry and wet seasons. NWI water regimes that indicate frequent inundation, such as permanently flooded wetlands, had high SWF values (SWF ≥ 90%), while those with infrequent inundation, such as temporarily flooded wetlands, had low SWF values (SWF < 10%). Vegetation types were also classified through the synergistic use of a vegetation index, water regimes, synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) data, topographic data, and a random forest classifier. The random forest classification algorithms demonstrated good performance in classifying Arctic wetland vegetation types, with an overall accuracy of 0.87. Compared with NWI data produced in the 1980s, scrub-shrub wetlands appear to have increased from 91 to 258 km2 over the last three decades, which is the largest percentage change (182%) among all vegetation types. However, additional field data are needed to confirm this shift in vegetation type. This study demonstrates the potential of using time series satellite data and machine learning algorithms in characterizing inundation dynamics and vegetation types of Arctic wetlands. This approach could aid in the creation and maintenance of wetland inventories, including the NWI, in Arctic regions and enable an improved understanding of long-term wetland dynamics.

A programme of research on learning in international relations began developing in the 1980s. However, learning research has not realised its potential. This article seeks to stimulate new work on learning by analysing why learning is important in international relations and outlining a research focus that reflects this assessment of learning's significance. The research so far has mostly treated learning as a foreign policy phenomenon, but this fails to capture one of the major reasons for interest in learning. Learning matters in part because of long-standing debates about whether it is possible to make progress in reducing the amount of armed conflict in world politics. For such progress to occur, it is likely that some form of learning would have to take place. However, learning by just a single state will often not be sufficient to change the quality of international outcomes. There thus needs to be research specifically on the possibility of shared learning by two or more states, a research focus this article will label 'international learning'. A few illustrative examples will demonstrate the feasibility of doing research on shared, cross-national learning.

Specialists on U.S. public opinion and foreign policy have rejected the Almond-Lippmann consensus, which implied public attitudes were dangerously erratic, and have moved in varying degrees toward a view of public opinion as rational. Consensus on this new view would be premature. The revisionists have not yet addressed all elements of the traditional critique of the American public. In particular, they have overlooked the thesis of postwar foreign policy realists that the public reacts to foreign threats too slowly and then too strongly. This article presents a preliminary test of the classical realist hypotheses, through an analysis of public opinion on military spending from 1965 to 1991. On balance, the results favor the rational public perspective. Some caveats, however, suggest the need for further research before the traditional, negative view of the public should be rejected.

Global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (wmd) have given rise to international regimes that cover nuclear, biological, and chemical (nbc) weapons, respectively. These regimes each have at their core a global treaty: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (npt), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (bwc), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (cwc). These core treaties have been complemented by other global treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (ctbt), and by formal international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons