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The failure of the vast majority of economists in government, academia and the private sector to predict either the post-2008 Great Recession or the degree of its severity has raised serious credibility issues for the profession. The repeated failures of central banks and other policymakers in all advanced countries to meet their inflation or growth targets in spite of astronomical monetary easing, have left the public rightfully suspicious of the establishment and its economists. The Other Half of Macroeconomics and the Fate of Globalization elucidates what was missing in economics all along and what changes are needed to make the profession relevant to the economic challenges of today. Once the other half of macroeconomics is understood both as a post-bubble phenomenon and as a phase of post-industrial economies, it should be possible for policy makers to devise appropriate measures to overcome difficulties advanced countries are facing today such as stagnation and income inequality.-- Provided by Publisher.

Get a new perspective from the 'other half' of macroeconomics The failure of the vast majority of economists in government, academia and the private sector to predict either the post-2008 Great Recession or the degree of its severity has raised serious credibility issues for the profession. The repeated failures of central banks and other policymakers in all advanced countries to meet their inflation or growth targets in spite of astronomical monetary easing, have left the public rightfully suspicious of the establishment and its economists. The Other Half of Macroeconomics and the Fate of Globalization elucidates what was missing in economics all along and what changes are needed to make the profession relevant to the economic challenges of today. Once the other half of macroeconomics is understood both as a post-bubble phenomenon and as a phase of post-industrial economies, it should be possible for policy makers to devise appropriate measures to overcome difficulties advanced countries are facing today such as stagnation and income inequality.     Shows how it's possible to devise appropriate policy response to slow wage and productivity growth in these economies     Demonstrates that the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy changes as an economy undergoes different stages of development     Argues that tax rules, regulations and even educational system must be revised to match the need of pursued (by emerging nations) countries     Explains the 200-year process of economic development and where that process is taking all of us Inside, Richard C. Koo offers a completely new way of looking at the economic predicament of advanced countries today. 

Compare global experiences during the balance sheet recession and find out what is needed for a full recovery The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap details the many hidden dangers remaining as the world slowly recovers from the balance sheet recession of 2008. Author and leading economist Richard Koo explains the unique political and economic pitfalls that stand in the way of recovery from this rare type of recession that was largely overlooked by economists. Koo anticipated the current predicament in the West long before others and issued warnings in his previous books: Balance Sheet Recession and The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics. This new book illustrates how history is repeating itself in Europe while the United States, which learnt from the Japanese experience, is doing better by avoiding the fiscal cliff. However, because of the liberal dosage of quantitative easing already implemented, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan may face a treacherous path to normalcy in what Koo calls the QE Trap. He argues that it is necessary to understand balance sheet recession in order to resolve the Eurozone crisis, particularly the competitiveness problems. Koo issues warnings against those who are too ready to argue for structural reforms when the problems are actually with balance sheets. He re-examines Japan's two decades of experiences with this rare recession and offers an insider view on the Abenomics. On China, readers will gain a very different historical perspective as Koo argues that western commentators have forgotten their own history when they talk about the re-balancing of the Chinese economy. * Learn from Japan which experienced the same predicament afflicting the West fifteen years earlier * Discover how unwinding of quantitative easing will affect the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, as well as the emerging world * Examine solutions to the Eurozone problems caused by two balance sheet recessions eight years apart * Gain insight into China's problems from the West's own experiences with urbanisation Koo, who developed the concept of balance sheet recession based on Japan's experience, took the revolution in macroeconomics started by John Maynard Keynes in 1936 to a new height. The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap offers the world cure for balance sheet recession.

There is quite a bit of confusion in the policy circles, in the academic circles and also in the markets regarding the international economic situation unleashed by the 2007-2008 crisis. And, as there is so much confusion, the economic policy responses have been largely inconsistent, not only in the United States but also all around the world, and this might be prolonging the recession unnecessarily. However, what we are currently going through happened in Japan exactly 15 years ago. What is happening now is that, after the bursting of the bubble, the private sector is deleveraging or reducing its debt to a minimum. This is called a balance sheet recession. And, in this type of recession, cutting the interest rate to zero and increasing the monetary base do not translate into an improvement of credit to the private sector and into a recovery of economic activity. The monetary policy becomes ineffective. As shown by the Japanese experience, the response to prevent the collapse of economic activity lies in the fiscal policy, i.e. the government should increase spending by financing itself with the savings the private sector generates in order to deleverage. Only after the balance sheets have been repaired and the private sector is willing to, and may, get into debt, should the government start to cut its budget deficit. Hay bastante confusión en los círculos políticos, académicos y también en los mercados con respecto a la situación económica internacional que se desencadenó por la crisis de 2007-2008. Y como hay tanta confusión, las respuestas de política económica han sido en gran parte inconsistentes, no solo en EEUU si no por todo el mundo, y esto puede estar prolongando innecesariamente la recesión. Sin embargo, lo que estamos viviendo actualmente ocurrió en Japón hace exactamente quince años. Lo que está pasando ahora, después del estallido de la burbuja, es que el sector privado se está desapalancando o reduciendo su deuda al mínimo. Esto se denomina recesión de balances. Y, en este tipo de recesión, recortar los tipos de interés al cero y aumentar la base monetaria no se traduce en una mejora del acceso al crédito del sector privado y en una recuperación de la actividad económica. La política monetaria se vuelve ineficaz. Tal y como muestra la experiencia japonesa, la respuesta para prevenir el colapso de la actividad económica reside en la política fiscal, esto es, el gobierno debe incrementar el gasto financiándose a si mismo con los ahorros que el sector privado genera al desapalancarse. Solo después de que los balances hayan sido saneados y el sector privado esté deseando, y pueda, endeudarse, puede empezar el gobierno a reducir su déficit presupuestario.

An overview of the helicopter money debate shows that the actual policies can be classified into four main types. They are dropping money from the sky, direct financing of government deficits, handing cash directly to consumers, and government scrip and perpetual zero‐coupon bonds. With the Japanese and European economies having difficulty reaching their inflation targets even after implementing negative interest rates and massive quantitative easing (QE), some people are now discussing the possibility of helicopter money. The dollar's strengthening can itself be seen as a manifestation of a global QE trap that began in response to the Fed's announcement of its intention to normalize interest rates. The Fed's official position on unwinding QE was that it would normalize its balance sheet first, and only then set about normalizing interest rates. The bond market has never seen the Fed unload trillions of dollars in government bonds, but it has plenty of experience with rate hikes.

There are two main reasons why an economy can end up in the “other half” of macroeconomics with no private sector borrowers. The first is that borrowers cannot find attractive investment opportunities at home, and the second is that their financial health has deteriorated to the point where they are unable to borrow until they repair their balance sheets. Today all advanced countries confront both factors, which have reduced the number of borrowers. This chapter dsicusses balance sheet problems in Japan, UK, U.S., and Europe. Japan, UK, or Europe have been in severe balance sheet recessions since their asset bubbles burst in 2008. Once the bubble bursts and households and businesses are left facing debt overhangs, no amount of monetary easing by the central bank will persuade them to resume borrowing until their balance sheets are fully repaired. Experience shows that when private‐sector borrowers disappear, fiscal stimulus is absolutely essential in keeping the economy going.