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Effective arms control between rival states requires reconciling three autonomous elements simultaneously: a) politics—the substantive agreement about what military items and activities will be restricted or prohibited; b) technology—the means and methods to monitor compliance with those negotiated limitations; and c) law—the rights and obligations that enable effective international use of the designated verification capabilities. Each of these three variables changes over time; the history of arms control reveals the difficulty of keeping them in sync as international conditions evolve. Today, we are in a period of remarkably rapid revolution regarding all three factors—particularly evident in the air and space domains—which will generate exciting new opportunities and require negotiators to be extraordinarily deft and responsive. This essay reviews some illustrative prior state practice in arms control in harmonizing the three variables and speculates about future adaptations.

Military and law enforcement authorities have found themselves constrained by inadequate weaponry. An emerging category of 'non-lethal weapons' carries promise for resolving this dilemma, proffering new capabilities for disabling opponents without inflicting death or permanent injury. This book explores the new powers and inherent dangers of non-lethal weapons.

This book addresses an important but little-noticed phenomenon in the revolutionary world of military technology. Across a wide range of otherwise-unrelated weapons programs, the Pentagon is now pursuing arms that are deliberately crafted to be less powerful, less deadly, and less destructive than the systems they are designed to supplement or replace. This direction is historically anomalous; military forces generally pursue ever-bigger bangs, but the modern conditions of counter-insurgency warfare and military operations 'other than war' (such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance) demand a military capable of modulated force. By providing a capacity to intervene deftly yet effectively, the new generations of 'useable' weaponry should enable the U.S. military to accomplish its demanding missions in a manner consistent with legal obligations, public relations realities, and political constraints. Five case studies are provided, regarding precision-guided 'smart bombs', low-yield nuclear weapons, self-neutralizing anti-personnel land mines, directed-energy anti-satellite weapons, and non-lethal weapons.

Though smallpox was eradicated from the planet two decades ago, recent terrorist acts have raised the horrific possibility that rogue states, laboratories, or terrorist groups are in possession of secret stockpiles of the virus that causes the disease, and may be preparing to unleash it on target populations. Because it is a far deadlier killer than other biological warfare agents such as anthrax, and because the universal vaccination against smallpox was halted decades ago, a smallpox attack today would be nothing short of catastrophic. This clear, authoritative study looks at the long and fascinating history of the virus, with an informative overview of the political, biological, environmental, medical, and legal issues surrounding the question of whether or not the virus should be exterminated. The only two known samples of the virus are currently stored in Atlanta and Russia. The World Health Organization has repeatedly scheduled their destruction--an action that would rid the planet of all publicly acknowledged smallpox strains forever. Opponents of this plan argue that by destroying these last samples we are denying the possibility that this unique virus could be turned to beneficial purposes in basic scientific research. Others see the stockpile as part of a deterrent against future germ attacks. Proponents of prompt eradication argue that scientists have already learned all they can from this particular virus, and that by destroying the stockpile we are preventing it from ever falling into the wrong hands. As a thirty-year veteran of arms control issues, David Koplow is uniquely suited to provide readers with an informed and well-considered understanding of the complexities involved in the handling of this deadly virus.

Critics of non-lethal weapons (NLW) have asserted numerous complaints about the concepts, the Department of Defense research and development efforts, the pace of innovation in the field. These critiques challenge the cost of the programs, their consistency with international law, the adverse public reaction to some of the devices, and the dangers of proliferation, among other points. This article summarizes the various assessments, in form of a \"top ten list\" of criticisms, and evaluates their weight. The author concludes that some of these points of objection have merit, but overall, the NLW enterprise is worthy of continuation and even expansion, to meet more fully its ambitious goals.

Since the publication of my 1993 Fletcher Forum article \"Bonehead Non-Proliferation,\" three vitally important international developments regarding nuclear weapons have materialized. First, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an essential linchpin for global security, was extended by its parties in 1995 into a permanent agreement-a tremendous outcome that was not certain when my original article was published. Second, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, globally prohibiting all nuclear explosions, was concluded in 1996-my article focused on the imperative for crafting such an instrument. Third, a group of distinguished senior U.S. government security officials succeeded in reviving the concept of the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, deservedly putting nuclear disarmament back onto the global agenda, most unexpectedly and emphatically. However, none of these three vital developments has come to complete fruition; each has been impeded by recalcitrant political forces in the United States and elsewhere. Indeed, in today's geopolitical milieu, additional important advances in arms control and non-proliferation seem unattainable. Nonetheless, the overwhelming, horrifying nuclear threats, and the supreme importance of abating the dangers for the sake of our species' survival, require reinforced vigor in the pursuit of additional controls.

Outer space offers a vast array of opportunities, with different locations or regions available for exploitation by diverse users for a growing variety of satellite functions. But not all sectors of space are equally valuable for all applications, and the most desirable venues can become crowded, affording a premium for those who gain access first and impeding the development of a fair and efficient all-inclusive international legal regime. This article focuses on Lagrange points, a finite series of special locations in space where the gravitational forces from a pair of large celestial bodies interact in unusual ways. These points afford unique advantages for human-made space objects to loiter indefinitely with minimal expenditure of propulsive energy. Lagrange points constitute a scarce resource that is just beginning to be occupied; existing international law is inadequate for optimal governance of their future occupation and use. This article proposes that the Lagrange points should be regarded as \"the common heritage of mankind.\" That structure has been applied-with intense controversy-in other domains, even though it remains imprecisely defined. The article offers a more comprehensive understanding of the concept, a portrait of how it could be applied to Lagrange points, and an argument in favor of that resolution.

In examining three contemporaneous examples of conspicuous U.S. violations of binding international legal agreements, David Koplow suggests what their consequences might be for U.S. foreign policy and explains how destructive they are for efforts to enhance respect for international law. He argues against the hypocrisy inherent in traditional U.S. treaty behavior and contends that, in the long run, a pattern of greater respect for international treaty obligations would better serve U.S. and global interests.

What should be done if we suddenly discover a large asteroid on a collision course with Earth? The consequences of an impact could be enormous—scientists believe that such a strike 60 million years ago led to the extinction of the dinosaurs, and something of similar magnitude could happen again. Although no such extraterrestrial threat now looms on the horizon, astronomers concede that they cannot detect all the potentially hazardous “near-Earth objects,” and even more striking, they acknowledge that if such a danger were discerned, there is currently no proven capability for diverting or destroying it. One possible response to this type of incipient catastrophe could be to send into space a nuclear explosive device, hoping the massive blast could alter the asteroid’s trajectory. Indeed, if time were short, that might be the only effective remedy. But two major nuclear arms control treaties—which have been joined by most of the leading countries and are widely appreciated as fundamental to global security—specifically forbid that approach. This Article examines that critical clash of legal, political, and technical values, and concludes that the best response would be for the UN Security Council to adopt a binding resolution pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to deal with the emergency on an expeditious, global basis. A proposed draft of such a resolution is presented, along with explanatory annotations.