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"La Raja, Raymond J"
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Reformers lament that, with every effort to regulate the sources of campaign funding, candidates creatively circumvent the new legislation. But in fact, political fundraisers don't need to look for loopholes because, as Raymond J. La Raja proves, legislators intentionally design regulations to gain advantage over their partisan rivals. La Raja traces the history of the U.S. campaign finance system from the late nineteenth century through the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002. Then, using the 2004 presidential election as a case study, he compares the ways in which Democrats and Republicans adapted their national fund-raising and campaigning strategies to satisfy BCRA regulations. Drawing upon this wealth of historical and recent evidence, he concludes with recommendations for reforming campaign finance in ways that promote fair competition among candidates and guarantee their accountability to voters.
eBook
A cash lottery increases voter turnout
Reform efforts to improve turnout typically focus on reducing the costs of participation or strengthening appeals to civic duty. While these efforts generate modest effects, this paper explores whether citizens might respond to extrinsic rewards to encourage voting. We conduct a field experiment offering lottery prizes to undergraduate students in conjunction with a student government election at a major public university. We find that extrinsic rewards appear to boost voting significantly in these low turnout elections and that the effects of a lottery appear to be especially strong among those of lower socio-economic status.
Journal Article
The Fates of Challengers in U.S. House Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in Supporting Candidates and Shaping Electoral Outcomes
Extended party network (EPN) theory characterizes political parties in the United States as dynamic networks of interest groups that collaboratively support favored candidates for office. Electoral predictions derived from EPN theory have yet to be tested on a large sample of races. We operationalize EPNs in the context of organized interest contributions to U.S. House campaigns. We deduce that support by a partisan community of interests signals the ideological credibility and appeal of a candidate. EPN integration overcomes voter ambiguity surrounding challengers' ideological preferences, and resources provided by these coordinating interest groups promote a consistent message about the candidate. Using data from the 1994–2010 cycles, we apply network analysis to detect EPN support of challengers and find that EPN integration substantially improves the electoral prospects of challengers. The effect of EPN integration is distinct from that of campaign resources. The findings provide support for EPN theory, as applied to congressional elections.
Journal Article
New Directions in American Politics
New Directions in American Politics introduces students not just to how the American political system works but also to how political science works. La Raja brings together top scholars to write original essays across the standard curriculum of American government and politics, capturing emerging research in the discipline in a way that is accessible for undergraduates. Each chapter combines substantive knowledge with the kind of skill-building and analytical inquiry that is being touted in higher education everywhere. Contributors to New Directions highlight why the questions they seek to answer are critical for understanding American politics, and situate them in the broader context of controversies in research.
The teaching of American politics follows a well-worn path. Textbooks for introductory courses hew to a traditional set of chapters that describe the Founding, American institutions, the ways citizens participate in politics, and sometimes public policy. The material rarely engages students in the kind of questions that animate scholarship on politics. One hurdle for instructors is finding material that reflects quality scholarship-and thus teaches students about why, not just what-and yet is accessible for undergraduates. Articles in scholarly journals are typically unsuited for undergraduate courses, particularly introductory courses. What is needed is a book that conveys exciting trends in scholarship across vital topics in American politics and illustrates analytical thinking. New Directions in American Politics is that book and will be an ideal companion to standard textbooks that focus mostly on nuts and bolts of politics.
The book features:
Contributions from a top-notch cast of active scholars and a highly regarded editor
A focus on analytical thinking that addresses questions of causality
Full coverage of the American pol
eBook
Who Gave Soft Money? The Effect of Interest Group Resources on Political Contributions
We consider the effect of various organizational resources on political contributions. Using a unique data set of soft money contributors from 1997 to 1998, our resource-based model examines how capital, membership, and experience influence the decision to give money to political parties. By observing decision making in a relatively unconstrained regulatory environment typified by the soft money regime, we demonstrate the conventional wisdom that financial resources determine the size of political contributions. Financial wealth, however, does not predict whether an organization will make a contribution in the first place. Instead, we show that a lack of alternative resources makes it more likely that organizations will spend money on politics. These findings have important implications for determining who benefits under various campaign finance rules.
Journal Article
Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency on Making Small Campaign Contributions
This study assesses whether public disclosure of campaign contributions affects citizens' willingness to give money to candidates. In the American states, campaign finance laws require disclosure of private information for contributors at relatively low thresholds ranging from $1 to $300. The Internet has made it relatively easy to publicize such information in a way that changes the social context for political participation. Drawing on social influence theory, the analysis suggests that citizens are sensitive to divulging private information, especially those who are surrounded by people with different political views. Using experimental data from the 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, it demonstrates how individuals refrain from making small campaign contributions or reduce their donations to avoid disclosing their identities. The conclusion discusses the implications of transparency laws for political participation, especially for small donors.
Journal Article
Detecting and Understanding Donor Strategies in Midterm Elections
What explains how political donors decide where to give? Existing research indicates that people donate money to express support for a preferred political \"team\" and enjoy the emotional benefits of participating in politics. While this explains why people donate, it does little to help understand the different strategies that donors may pursue. In this paper, we use data on individual decisions as to where to allocate contributions to provide fresh insight into the strategies donors are pursuing. Our approach yields a much more nuanced view of campaign finance by showing how differently situated donors pursue divergent contribution strategies. Of particular note, we identify an influential class of engaged and wealthy political donors that spreads their dollars widely, especially focusing on giving to out-of-jurisdiction candidates. This illustrates just how influential the recent elimination of aggregate contribution limits may be in allowing a small share of donors to be broadly influential.
Journal Article
A cash lottery increases voter turnout
Reform efforts to improve turnout typically focus on reducing the costs of participation or strengthening appeals to civic duty. While these efforts generate modest effects, this paper explores whether citizens might respond to extrinsic rewards to encourage voting. We conduct a field experiment offering lottery prizes to undergraduate students in conjunction with a student government election at a major public university. We find that extrinsic rewards appear to boost voting significantly in these low turnout elections and that the effects of a lottery appear to be especially strong among those of lower socio-economic status.
Journal Article
Term Limits, Campaign Contributions, and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures
Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross-state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.
Journal Article