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"Landy, Michael S"
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Suprathreshold perceptual decisions constrain models of confidence
Perceptual confidence is an important internal signal about the certainty of our decisions and there is a substantial debate on how it is computed. We highlight three confidence metric types from the literature: observers either use 1) the full probability distribution to compute probability correct (Probability metrics), 2) point estimates from the perceptual decision process to estimate uncertainty (Evidence-Strength metrics), or 3) heuristic confidence from stimulus-based cues to uncertainty (Heuristic metrics). These metrics are rarely tested against one another, so we examined models of all three types on a suprathreshold spatial discrimination task. Observers were shown a cloud of dots sampled from a dot generating distribution and judged if the mean of the distribution was left or right of centre. In addition to varying the horizontal position of the mean, there were two sensory uncertainty manipulations: the number of dots sampled and the spread of the generating distribution. After every two perceptual decisions, observers made a confidence forced-choice judgement whether they were more confident in the first or second decision. Model results showed that the majority of observers were best-fit by either: 1) the Heuristic model, which used dot cloud position, spread, and number of dots as cues; or 2) an Evidence-Strength model, which computed the distance between the sensory measurement and discrimination criterion, scaled according to sensory uncertainty. An accidental repetition of some sessions also allowed for the measurement of confidence agreement for identical pairs of stimuli. This N-pass analysis revealed that human observers were more consistent than their best-fitting model would predict, indicating there are still aspects of confidence that are not captured by our modelling. As such, we propose confidence agreement as a useful technique for computational studies of confidence. Taken together, these findings highlight the idiosyncratic nature of confidence computations for complex decision contexts and the need to consider different potential metrics and transformations in the confidence computation.
Journal Article
Cardinal rules: visual orientation perception reflects knowledge of environmental statistics
Orientation judgments are more accurate at the horizontal and vertical orientations, possibly reflecting a statistical inference. Here the authors provide evidence for this idea, finding that observers' internal models for orientation match the local orientation distribution measured in photographs, and suggest how such information could be encoded in a neural population.
Humans are good at performing visual tasks, but experimental measurements have revealed substantial biases in the perception of basic visual attributes. An appealing hypothesis is that these biases arise through a process of statistical inference, in which information from noisy measurements is fused with a probabilistic model of the environment. However, such inference is optimal only if the observer's internal model matches the environment. We found this to be the case. We measured performance in an orientation-estimation task and found that orientation judgments were more accurate at cardinal (horizontal and vertical) orientations. Judgments made under conditions of uncertainty were strongly biased toward cardinal orientations. We estimated observers' internal models for orientation and found that they matched the local orientation distribution measured in photographs. In addition, we determined how a neural population could embed probabilistic information responsible for such biases.
Journal Article
Causal inference regulates audiovisual spatial recalibration via its influence on audiovisual perception
To obtain a coherent perception of the world, our senses need to be in alignment. When we encounter misaligned cues from two sensory modalities, the brain must infer which cue is faulty and recalibrate the corresponding sense. We examined whether and how the brain uses cue reliability to identify the miscalibrated sense by measuring the audiovisual ventriloquism aftereffect for stimuli of varying visual reliability. To adjust for modality-specific biases, visual stimulus locations were chosen based on perceived alignment with auditory stimulus locations for each participant. During an audiovisual recalibration phase, participants were presented with bimodal stimuli with a fixed perceptual spatial discrepancy; they localized one modality, cued after stimulus presentation. Unimodal auditory and visual localization was measured before and after the audiovisual recalibration phase. We compared participants’ behavior to the predictions of three models of recalibration: (a) Reliability-based: each modality is recalibrated based on its relative reliability—less reliable cues are recalibrated more; (b) Fixed-ratio: the degree of recalibration for each modality is fixed; (c) Causal-inference: recalibration is directly determined by the discrepancy between a cue and its estimate, which in turn depends on the reliability of both cues, and inference about how likely the two cues derive from a common source. Vision was hardly recalibrated by audition. Auditory recalibration by vision changed idiosyncratically as visual reliability decreased: the extent of auditory recalibration either decreased monotonically, peaked at medium visual reliability, or increased monotonically. The latter two patterns cannot be explained by either the reliability-based or fixed-ratio models. Only the causal-inference model of recalibration captures the idiosyncratic influences of cue reliability on recalibration. We conclude that cue reliability, causal inference, and modality-specific biases guide cross-modal recalibration indirectly by determining the perception of audiovisual stimuli.
Journal Article
Feeling lucky? Prospective and retrospective cues for sensorimotor confidence
On a daily basis, humans interact with the outside world using judgments of sensorimotor confidence, constantly evaluating our actions for success. We ask, what sensory and motor-execution cues are used in making these judgements and when are they available? Two sources of temporally distinct information are prospective cues, available prior to the action (e.g., knowledge of motor noise and past performance), and retrospective cues specific to the action itself (e.g., proprioceptive measurements). We investigated the use of these two cues in two tasks, a secondary motor-awareness task and a main task in which participants reached toward a visual target with an unseen hand and then made a continuous judgment of confidence about the success of the reach. Confidence was reported by setting the size of a circle centered on the reach-target location, where a larger circle reflects lower confidence. Points were awarded if the confidence circle enclosed the true endpoint, with fewer points returned for larger circles. This incentivized accurate reaches and attentive reporting to maximize the score. We compared three Bayesian-inference models of sensorimotor confidence based on either prospective cues, retrospective cues, or both sources of information to maximize expected gain (i.e., an ideal-performance model). Our findings primarily showed two distinct strategies: participants either performed as ideal observers, using both prospective and retrospective cues to make the confidence judgment, or relied solely on prospective information, ignoring retrospective cues. Thus, participants can make use of retrospective cues, evidenced by the behavior observed in our motor-awareness task, but these cues are not always included in the computation of sensorimotor confidence.
Journal Article
Identifying cortical areas that underlie the transformation from 2D retinal to 3D head-centric motion signals
•We investigated the representation of binocular motion across the visual hierarchy.•We could decode motion direction in 3 cortical clusters: V1-V3, hMT+, and V3A/IPS0.•Performance in V1-V3 was best explained based on decoding of retinal motion signals.•Performance in the other clusters was better explained by associated 3D motion.•Results reveal cortical areas and transformations that underly motion perception.
Accurate motion perception requires that the visual system integrate the 2D retinal motion signals received by the two eyes into a single representation of 3D motion. However, most experimental paradigms present the same stimulus to the two eyes, signaling motion limited to a 2D fronto-parallel plane. Such paradigms are unable to dissociate the representation of 3D head-centric motion signals (i.e., 3D object motion relative to the observer) from the associated 2D retinal motion signals. Here, we used stereoscopic displays to present separate motion signals to the two eyes and examined their representation in visual cortex using fMRI. Specifically, we presented random-dot motion stimuli that specified various 3D head-centric motion directions. We also presented control stimuli, which matched the motion energy of the retinal signals, but were inconsistent with any 3D motion direction. We decoded motion direction from BOLD activity using a probabilistic decoding algorithm. We found that 3D motion direction signals can be reliably decoded in three major clusters in the human visual system. Critically, in early visual cortex (V1-V3), we found no significant difference in decoding performance between stimuli specifying 3D motion directions and the control stimuli, suggesting that these areas represent the 2D retinal motion signals, rather than 3D head-centric motion itself. In voxels in and surrounding hMT and IPS0 however, decoding performance was consistently superior for stimuli that specified 3D motion directions compared to control stimuli. Our results reveal the parts of the visual processing hierarchy that are critical for the transformation of retinal into 3D head-centric motion signals and suggest a role for IPS0 in their representation, in addition to its sensitivity to 3D object structure and static depth.
Journal Article
Repeated exposure to either consistently spatiotemporally congruent or consistently incongruent audiovisual stimuli modulates the audiovisual common-cause prior
To estimate an environmental property such as object location from multiple sensory signals, the brain must infer their causal relationship. Only information originating from the same source should be integrated. This inference relies on the characteristics of the measurements, the information the sensory modalities provide on a given trial, as well as on a cross-modal common-cause prior: accumulated knowledge about the probability that cross-modal measurements originate from the same source. We examined the plasticity of this cross-modal common-cause prior. In a learning phase, participants were exposed to a series of audiovisual stimuli that were either consistently spatiotemporally congruent or consistently incongruent; participants’ audiovisual spatial integration was measured before and after this exposure. We fitted several Bayesian causal-inference models to the data; the models differed in the plasticity of the common-source prior. Model comparison revealed that, for the majority of the participants, the common-cause prior changed during the learning phase. Our findings reveal that short periods of exposure to audiovisual stimuli with a consistent causal relationship can modify the common-cause prior. In accordance with previous studies, both exposure conditions could either strengthen or weaken the common-cause prior at the participant level. Simulations imply that the direction of the prior-update might be mediated by the degree of sensory noise, the variability of the measurements of the same signal across trials, during the learning phase.
Journal Article
Human online adaptation to changes in prior probability
Optimal sensory decision-making requires the combination of uncertain sensory signals with prior expectations. The effect of prior probability is often described as a shift in the decision criterion. Can observers track sudden changes in probability? To answer this question, we used a change-point detection paradigm that is frequently used to examine behavior in changing environments. In a pair of orientation-categorization tasks, we investigated the effects of changing probabilities on decision-making. In both tasks, category probability was updated using a sample-and-hold procedure: probability was held constant for a period of time before jumping to another probability state that was randomly selected from a predetermined set of probability states. We developed an ideal Bayesian change-point detection model in which the observer marginalizes over both the current run length (i.e., time since last change) and the current category probability. We compared this model to various alternative models that correspond to different strategies-from approximately Bayesian to simple heuristics-that the observers may have adopted to update their beliefs about probabilities. While a number of models provided decent fits to the data, model comparison favored a model in which probability is estimated following an exponential averaging model with a bias towards equal priors, consistent with a conservative bias, and a flexible variant of the Bayesian change-point detection model with incorrect beliefs. We interpret the former as a simpler, more biologically plausible explanation suggesting that the mechanism underlying change of decision criterion is a combination of on-line estimation of prior probability and a stable, long-term equal-probability prior, thus operating at two very different timescales.
Journal Article
Precision-based causal inference modulates audiovisual temporal recalibration
Cross-modal temporal recalibration guarantees stable temporal perception across ever-changing environments. Yet, the mechanisms of cross-modal temporal recalibration remain unknown. Here, we conducted an experiment to measure how participants’ temporal perception was affected by exposure to audiovisual stimuli with constant temporal delays that we varied across sessions. Consistent with previous findings, recalibration effects plateaued with increasing audiovisual asynchrony (nonlinearity) and varied by which modality led during the exposure phase (asymmetry). We compared six observer models that differed in how they update the audiovisual temporal bias during the exposure phase and in whether they assume a modality-specific or modality-independent precision of arrival latency. The causal-inference observer shifts the audiovisual temporal bias to compensate for perceived asynchrony, which is inferred by considering two causal scenarios: when the audiovisual stimuli have a common cause or separate causes. The asynchrony-contingent observer updates the bias to achieve simultaneity of auditory and visual measurements, modulating the update rate by the likelihood of the audiovisual stimuli originating from a simultaneous event. In the asynchrony-correction model, the observer first assesses whether the sensory measurement is asynchronous; if so, she adjusts the bias proportionally to the magnitude of the measured asynchrony. Each model was paired with either modality-specific or modality-independent precision of arrival latency. A Bayesian model comparison revealed that both the causal-inference process and modality-specific precision in arrival latency are required to capture the nonlinearity and asymmetry observed in audiovisual temporal recalibration. Our findings support the hypothesis that audiovisual temporal recalibration relies on the same causal-inference processes that govern cross-modal perception.
Journal Article
Temporal causal inference with stochastic audiovisual sequences
Integration of sensory information across multiple senses is most likely to occur when signals are spatiotemporally coupled. Yet, recent research on audiovisual rate discrimination indicates that random sequences of light flashes and auditory clicks are integrated optimally regardless of temporal correlation. This may be due to 1) temporal averaging rendering temporal cues less effective; 2) difficulty extracting causal-inference cues from rapidly presented stimuli; or 3) task demands prompting integration without concern for the spatiotemporal relationship between the signals. We conducted a rate-discrimination task (Exp 1), using slower, more random sequences than previous studies, and a separate causal-judgement task (Exp 2). Unisensory and multisensory rate-discrimination thresholds were measured in Exp 1 to assess the effects of temporal correlation and spatial congruence on integration. The performance of most subjects was indistinguishable from optimal for spatiotemporally coupled stimuli, and generally sub-optimal in other conditions, suggesting observers used a multisensory mechanism that is sensitive to both temporal and spatial causal-inference cues. In Exp 2, subjects reported whether temporally uncorrelated (but spatially co-located) sequences were perceived as sharing a common source. A unified percept was affected by click-flash pattern similarity and the maximum temporal offset between individual clicks and flashes, but not on the proportion of synchronous click-flash pairs. A simulation analysis revealed that the stimulus-generation algorithms of previous studies is likely responsible for the observed integration of temporally independent sequences. By combining results from Exps 1 and 2, we found better rate-discrimination performance for sequences that are more likely to be integrated than those that are not. Our results support the principle that multisensory stimuli are optimally integrated when spatiotemporally coupled, and provide insight into the temporal features used for coupling in causal inference.
Journal Article