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33 result(s) for "Langdon, Robyn"
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Electrophysiological, cognitive and clinical profiles of at-risk mental state: The longitudinal Minds in Transition (MinT) study
The onset of schizophrenia is typically preceded by a prodromal period lasting several years during which sub-threshold symptoms may be identified retrospectively. Clinical interviews are currently used to identify individuals who have an ultra-high risk (UHR) of developing a psychotic illness with a view to provision of interventions that prevent, delay or reduce severity of future mental health issues. The utility of bio-markers as an adjunct in the identification of UHR individuals is not yet established. Several event-related potential measures, especially mismatch-negativity (MMN), have been identified as potential biomarkers for schizophrenia. In this 12-month longitudinal study, demographic, clinical and neuropsychological data were acquired from 102 anti-psychotic naive UHR and 61 healthy controls, of whom 80 UHR and 58 controls provided valid EEG data during a passive auditory task at baseline. Despite widespread differences between UHR and controls on demographic, clinical and neuropsychological measures, MMN and P3a did not differ between these groups. Of 67 UHR at the 12-month follow-up, 7 (10%) had transitioned to a psychotic illness. The statistical power to detect differences between those who did or did not transition was limited by the lower than expected transition rate. ERPs did not predict transition, with trends in the opposite direction to that predicted. In exploratory analysis, the strongest predictors of transition were measures of verbal memory and subjective emotional disturbance.
Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning
This volume brings together philosophical perspectives on emotions, imagination and moral reasoning with contributions from neuroscience, cognitive science, social psychology, personality theory, developmental psychology, and abnormal psychology. The book explores what we can learn about the role of emotions and imagination in moral reasoning from psychopathic adults in the general community, from young children, and adolescents with callous unemotional traits, and from normal child development. It discusses the implications for philosophical moral psychology of recent experimental work on moral reasoning in the cognitive sciences and neurosciences. Conversely, it shows what cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have still to learn from philosophical perspectives on moral reasoning, moral reflection, and moral responsibility. Finally, it looks at whether experimental methods used for researching moral reasoning are consistent with the work in social psychology and with philosophical thought on adult moral reasoning in everyday life. The volume's wide-ranging perspectives reflect the varied audiences for the volume, from students of philosophy to psychologists working in cognition, social and personality psychology, developmental psychology, abnormal psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
Perception, cognition, and delusion
Firestone & Scholl's (F&S) critique of putative empirical evidence for the cognitive penetrability of perception focuses on studies of neurologically normal populations. We suggest that a comprehensive exploration of the cognition–perception relationship also incorporate work on abnormal perception and cognition. We highlight the prominence of these issues in contemporary debates about the formation and maintenance of delusions.
A quasi-randomized feasibility pilot study of specific treatments to improve emotion recognition and mental-state reasoning impairments in schizophrenia
Background Impaired ability to make inferences about what another person might think or feel (i.e., social cognition impairment) is recognised as a core feature of schizophrenia and a key determinant of the poor social functioning that characterizes this illness. The development of treatments to target social cognitive impairments as a causal factor of impaired functioning in schizophrenia is of high priority. In this study, we investigated the acceptability, feasibility, and limited efficacy of 2 programs targeted at specific domains of social cognition in schizophrenia: “SoCog” Mental-State Reasoning Training (SoCog-MSRT) and “SoCog” Emotion Recognition Training (SoCog-ERT). Method Thirty-one participants with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder were allocated to either SoCog-MSRT ( n  = 19) or SoCog-ERT ( n  = 12). Treatment comprised 12 twice-weekly sessions for 6 weeks. Participants underwent assessments of social cognition, neurocognition and symptoms at baseline, post-training and 3-months after completing training. Results Attendance at training sessions was high with an average of 89.29 % attendance in the SoCog-MSRT groups and 85.42 % in the SoCog-ERT groups. Participants also reported the 2 programs as enjoyable and beneficial. Both SoCog-MSRT and SoCog-ERT groups showed increased scores on a false belief reasoning task and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test. The SoCog-MSRT group also showed reduced personalising attributional biases in a small number of participants, while the SoCog-ERT group showed improved emotion recognition. Conclusions The results are promising and support the feasibility and acceptability of the 2 SoCog programs as well as limited efficacy to improve social cognitive abilities in schizophrenia. There is also some evidence that skills for the recognition of basic facial expressions need specific training. Trial registration Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12613000978763 . Retrospectively registered 3/09/2013.
An experimental investigation of mentalization ability in borderline personality disorder
Deficits in mentalization ability have been theorized to underlie borderline personality disorder (BPD) and have led to mentalization-based treatments. Yet there has been little empirical investigation into whether mentalization deficits do differentiate the BPD population from healthy controls, and the specific nature of these differences. Five pre-existing Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks that assessed simple to complex mentalization capacity in both the affective and cognitive domains were administered to the same groups of age and gender matched patients with BPD and controls. Self-report measures assessed cognitive and affective empathy and childhood trauma and abuse. The BPD group did not differ significantly from the healthy control group on basic cognitive false-belief picture-sequencing tasks, or on overall accuracy when discriminating mental states from viewing images of eyes, and attributing emotions based on social events. They were, however, significantly less accurate in identifying positive mental states on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) task and showed significantly more mentalization errors on affective and cognitive understanding of faux pas (faux pas total score p<.01) and on a Joke Appreciation task (p=.01), that required integration of multiple perspectives. They also self-reported less empathic perspective taking (p<.01). Observation of patterns of performance hinted at specific underlying biases (e.g. a default tendency to use superficial black-and-white attributions to others, such as, “he is mean”, when explaining behavior). It was also found that as childhood experiences of punishment increased, adulthood mentalization ability decreased on all affective ToM tasks and on the cognitive and affective components of understanding faux pas. The BPD group was as capable as controls in undertaking simple mentalization. However, deficits in mentalization capacity became evident when mentalization tasks became more complex and required the integration of multiple perspectives. Increasing childhood experiences of punishment were related to decreasing mentalization ability in adulthood. Findings support the use of treatments to improve mentalization skills in BPD, however, further research is needed to better specify the nature of underlying mentalizing biases in this population.
Theory of Mind in Williams Syndrome Assessed Using a Nonverbal Task
This study examined Theory of Mind in Williams syndrome (WS) and in normal chronological age-matched and mental age-matched control groups, using a picture sequencing task. This task assesses understanding of pretence, intention and false belief, while controlling for social-script knowledge and physical cause-and-effect reasoning. The task was selected because it is entirely non-verbal, so that the WS individuals could not rely on their good verbal skills when performing the task. Results indicated a specific deficit in understanding of false belief within the WS group. There was also evidence of heterogeneity in the WS group, with the false belief impairment restricted to only a particular subgroup of WS individuals identified originally by Porter, M., & Coltheart, M. (2005). Cognitive heterogeneity in Williams syndrome. Developmental Neuropsychology, 27 (2), 275–306.
Theory of mind and neurocognition in early psychosis: a quasi-experimental study
Background People with chronic psychosis often display theory of mind impairments that are not fully accounted for by other, more general neurocognitive deficits. In these patients, both theory of mind and neurocognitive deficits contribute to poor functioning, independently of psychotic symptoms. In young people with recent-onset psychosis, however, it is unclear the extent to which theory of mind impairment is independent of neurocognitive deficits. The primary aim of this study was to examine the evidence for specific theory of mind impairments in early psychosis. A secondary aim was to explore the relations between theory of mind, neurocognition, symptom severity, and functional outcomes. Methods Twenty-three patients who were within two years of their first psychotic episode and 19 healthy controls completed theory of mind and neurocognitive batteries. Social functioning, quality of life, and symptom severity were also assessed in patients. Results Patients demonstrated deficits in tasks assessing theory of mind and neurocognition relative to controls. Patients’ deficits in theory of mind were evident even after adjusting for their deficits in neurocognition. Neither theory of mind nor neurocognition predicted social functioning or quality of life in this early psychosis sample. Severity of negative symptoms, however, was a significant predictor of both outcomes. Conclusions While a specific theory of mind impairment was evident in this early psychosis sample, severity of negative symptoms emerged as the best predictor of poor functional outcome. Further early psychosis research is needed to examine the longitudinal progression of theory of mind impairments – independent of neurocognitive deficits – and their impact on psychosocial function.
Linking social cognition with social interaction: Non-verbal expressivity, social competence and \mentalising\ in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders
Background Research has shown that patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSD) can be distinguished from controls on the basis of their non-verbal expression. For example, patients with SSD use facial expressions less than normals to invite and sustain social interaction. Here, we sought to examine whether non-verbal expressivity in patients corresponds with their impoverished social competence and neurocognition. Method Fifty patients with SSD were videotaped during interviews. Non-verbal expressivity was evaluated using the Ethological Coding System for Interviews (ECSI). Social competence was measured using the Social Behaviour Scale and psychopathology was rated using the Positive and Negative Symptom Scale. Neurocognitive variables included measures of IQ, executive functioning, and two mentalising tasks, which tapped into the ability to appreciate mental states of story characters. Results Non-verbal expressivity was reduced in patients relative to controls. Lack of \"prosocial\" nonverbal signals was associated with poor social competence and, partially, with impaired understanding of others' minds, but not with non-social cognition or medication. Conclusion This is the first study to link deficits in non-verbal expressivity to levels of social skills and awareness of others' thoughts and intentions in patients with SSD.