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74 result(s) for "Lanteri, Alessandro"
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Approximating the First Passage Time Density of Diffusion Processes with State-Dependent Jumps
We study the problem of the first passage time through a constant boundary for a jump diffusion process whose infinitesimal generator is a nonlocal Jacobi operator. Due to the lack of analytical results, we address the problem using a discretization scheme for simulating the trajectories of jump diffusion processes with state-dependent jumps in both frequency and amplitude. We obtain numerical approximations on their first passage time probability density functions and results for the qualitative behavior of other statistics of this random variable. Finally, we provide two examples of application of the method for different choices of the distribution involved in the mechanism of generation of the jumps.
Autonomous Systems and Technology Resistance: New Tools for Monitoring Acceptance, Trust, and Tolerance
We introduce the notion of Tolerance for autonomous artificial agents (and its antithetical concept, Intolerance ), motivating its theoretical adoption in the fields of social robotics and human—agent interaction, where it can effectively complement two contiguous, but essentially distinct, constructs— Acceptance and Trust— that are broadly used by researchers. We offer a comprehensive conceptual model of Tolerance, construed as a user’s insusceptibility or resilience to Autonomy Estrangement (i.e., the uncanny sense of isolation and displacement experienced by the humans who believe, for right or wrong reasons, that robots can subvert and/or control their lives). We also refer to Intolerance to indicate the opposite property, that is the user’s susceptibility or proneness to Autonomy Estrangement. Thus, Tolerance and Intolerance are inverse representations of the same phenomenological continuum, with Intolerance increasing when Tolerance decreases and vice versa. While Acceptance and Trust measure how the user’s interaction with a particular robot is satisfying and efficacious, the dyad Tolerance/Intolerance reflects how the user’s attitude is affected by deeply held normative beliefs about robots in general. So defined, a low Tolerance (that is a high Intolerance) is expected to correlate to antagonistic responses toward the prospect of adoption: specifically, Intolerant attitudes predict the kind of anxious and hostile behaviours toward Agents that originate from the concerns that autonomous systems could deeply disrupt the lives of humans (affecting their work cultures, ways of living, systems of values, etc.) or dominate them (making humans redundant, undermining their authority, threatening their uniqueness, etc.). Thus, Negative beliefs and worldviews about Agents are the cause of the Intolerant attitude toward Agents, which predicts Autonomy Estrangement, which in turn correlates to low Adoption Propensity and avoidance and rejection behaviours.
The economics of economists : institutional setting, individual incentives and future prospects
\"The profession of academic economics has been widely criticized for being excessively dependent on technical models based on unrealistic assumptions about rationality and individual behaviour, and yet it remains a sparsely studied area. This volume presents a series of background readings on the profession by leading scholars in the history of economic thought and economic methodology. Adopting a fresh critique, the contributors investigate the individual incentives prevalent in academic economics, describing economists as rational actors who react to their intellectual environment and the incentives for economic research. Timely topics are addressed, including the causes and consequences of the financial crisis on the discipline, as well as more traditional themes such as pluralism in research, academic organizations, teaching methodology, gender issues and professional ethics. This collection will appeal to scholars working on topics related to economic methodology and the teaching of economics\"-- Provided by publisher.
Three-and-a-half folk concepts of intentional action
Fiery Cushman and Alfred Mele recently proposed a 'two-and-a-half rules' theory of folk intentionality. They suggested that laypersons attribute intentionality employing: one rule based on desire, one based on belief, and another principle based on moral judgment, which may either reflect a folk concept (and so count as a third rule) or a bias (and so not count as a rule proper) and which they provisionally count as 'half a rule'. In this article, I discuss some cases in which an agent is judged as having neither belief nor desire to bring about an action, and yet laypersons find the agent's action to be intentional. Many lay responses apparently follow a rule, but many other seem biased. The contribution of this study is twofold: by addressing actions performed without desire or belief, it expands Mele and Cushman's account; it also helps discriminate between a two-rules and a three-rules theory. As a conclusion, I argue in favor of a three-and-a-half concepts theory.
Innovating with impact
The authors show how to create innovations that deliver customer value. Their Innovation Pyramid outlines a strategic process that is rooted in the right cultures and mindsets and uses a range of methods, techniques and themes to reach the pinnacle of maximum impact.
An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem
Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios ('lever' and 'stranger') either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when asked to express general moral opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the responses they had previously given.
Judgements of Intentionality and Moral Worth: Experimental Challenges to Hindriks
Joshua Knobe found that people are more likely to describe an action as intentional if it has had a bad outcome than a good outcome, and to blame a bad outcome than to praise a good one. These asymmetries raised numerous questions about lay moral judgement. Frank Hindriks recently proposed that one acts intentionally if one fails to comply with a normative reason against performing the action, that moral praise requires appropriate motivation, whereas moral blame does not, and that these asymmetries are normal features of a theory of intentional action, not anomalies. I present two empirical studies revealing asymmetries in lay judgements of intentionality and moral blameworthiness; these cannot be explained by Hindrìks' theory of intentional action.