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Building a relationship with egypt was key to gaining the confidence of Arab states.12 In the Cold war environment, Kissinger was intent on controlling the negotiations and excluding the Soviets.13 His overriding objectives were to prevent Soviet military dominance, limit its influence in the region, and avert military actions.14 After examining and rejecting several options, including a com- prehensive plan involving the Soviets to be negotiated at an international conference in Geneva, he decided on a step-by-step approach to secure Israeli concessions and an interim agreement.\\n when communications between Jackson and the Ford white House broke down over compromise wording at the same time that the number of Soviet emigrants suddenly began dropping, Jewish lobbying groups, originally cautious about Jackson's approach, were now determined to get those Soviet Jews who wanted to leave out of the Soviet Union. they intensified their efforts.83 the chairman of the national Conference on Soviet Jewry approached twenty-five top Jewish leaders and asked them to initiate telegrams to Ford, with copies to Kissinger, to communicate their outrage over the reversal in negotiations. they would hold Ford personally accountable if the negotiations were to collapse. with the election approaching, Ford lent his support to the amendment. Despite the letter from three-quarters of the Senate, Israel still made important concessions to ensure access to American arms.88 Ultimately Ford took multiple factors, including domestic lobbying, into consideration before putting forth his plan.89 He balanced these issues with other compel- ling requirements, such as access to the vast petroleum reserves in the Middle east, a perceived Soviet threat, fears of renewed fighting in the region, and the need to cultivate a relationship with moderate Arab regimes-especially egypt.

Although there were no intense or bitter battles between the State Dept and the Johnson White House, distinct strategies, attitudes and priorities determined the nature of decision making regarding the Middle East, a region that become more critical when the US assumed global responsibilities after World War II.

President Jimmy Carter's loss of the Jewish vote in the 1980 election demonstrated the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy-making in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Carter's comprehensive plan for peace in the Middle East, especially his support for a Palestinian homeland, put him at odds with the leadership in the American Jewish community. The successes of the Camp David Accords could not turn this around. His loss of a substantial portion of the Jewish vote demonstrated his unwillingness to deal with ethnic politics, his failure to comprehend this politically important group and their concerns about the survival of Israel, his political miscalculations, and his faith in his own appraisal of conditions in the Middle East.

When President Harry Truman called for a balanced defense budget, the U.S. Air Force responded by launching a lobbying campaign to replace large naval and ground forces with capital-intensive strategic air power. The Air Force succeeded, having benefited from the public's misconception that the effectiveness of air power during World War II had little to do with land and sea support provided by other branches of the military.