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Physically salient but task-irrelevant distractors can capture attention in visual search, but resource-dependent, executive-control processes can help reduce this distraction. However, it is not only physically salient stimuli that grab our attention: Recent research has shown that reward history also influences the likelihood that stimuli will capture attention. Here, we investigated whether resource-dependent control processes modulate the effect of reward on attentional capture, much as for the effect of physical salience. To this end, we used eye tracking with a rewarded visual search task and compared performance under conditions of high and low working memory load. In two experiments, we demonstrated that oculomotor capture by high-reward distractor stimuli is enhanced under high memory load. These results highlight the role of executive-control processes in modulating distraction by rewardrelated stimuli. Our findings have implications for understanding the neurocognitive processes involved in real-life conditions in which reward-related stimuli may influence behavior, such as addiction.

Efference copies refer to internal duplicates of movement-producing neural signals. Their primary function is to predict, and often suppress, the sensory consequences of willed movements. Efference copies have been almost exclusively investigated in the context of overt movements. The current electrophysiological study employed a novel design to show that inner speech – the silent production of words in one’s mind – is also associated with an efference copy. Participants produced an inner phoneme at a precisely specified time, at which an audible phoneme was concurrently presented. The production of the inner phoneme resulted in electrophysiological suppression, but only if the content of the inner phoneme matched the content of the audible phoneme. These results demonstrate that inner speech – a purely mental action – is associated with an efference copy with detailed auditory properties. These findings suggest that inner speech may ultimately reflect a special type of overt speech. As you read this text, the chances are you can hear your own inner voice narrating the words. You may hear your inner voice again when silently considering what to have for lunch, or imagining how a phone conversation this afternoon will play out. Estimates suggest that we spend at least a quarter of our lives listening to our own inner speech. But to what extent does the brain distinguish between inner speech and the sounds we produce when we speak out loud? Listening to a recording of your own voice activates the brain more than hearing yourself speak out loud. This is because when the brain sends instructions to the lips, tongue, and vocal cords telling them to move, it also makes a copy of these instructions. This is known as an efference copy, and it enables regions of the brain that process sounds to predict what they are about to hear. When the actual sounds match those predicted – as when you hear yourself speak out loud – the brain’s sound-processing regions dampen down their responses. But does the inner speech in our heads also generate an efference copy? To find out, Whitford et al. tracked the brain activity of healthy volunteers as they listened to speech sounds through headphones. While listening to the sounds, the volunteers had to produce either the same speech sound or a different speech sound inside their heads. A specific type of brain activity decreased whenever the inner speech sound matched the external speech sound. This decrease did not occur when the two sounds were different. This suggests that the brain produces an efference copy for inner speech similar to that for external speech. These findings could ultimately benefit people who suffer from psychotic symptoms, for example as part of schizophrenia. Symptoms such as hearing voices are thought to reflect problems with producing and interpreting inner speech. The technique that Whitford et al. have developed will enable us to test this long-held but hitherto untestable idea. The results should increase our understanding of these symptoms and may eventually lead to new treatments.

RationalePrevious research has shown that physically salient and reward-related distractors can automatically capture attention and eye gaze in a visual search task, even though participants are motivated to ignore these stimuli.ObjectivesTo examine whether an acute, low dose of alcohol would influence involuntary attentional capture by stimuli signalling reward.MethodsParticipants were assigned to the alcohol or placebo group before completing a visual search task. Successful identification of the target earned either a low or high monetary reward but this reward was omitted if any eye gaze was registered on the reward-signalling distractor.ResultsParticipants who had consumed alcohol were significantly less likely than those in the placebo condition to have their attention captured by a distractor stimulus that signalled the availability of high reward. Analysis of saccade latencies suggested that this difference reflected a reduction in the likelihood of impulsive eye movements following alcohol.ConclusionsOur findings suggest that alcohol intoxication reduces the capacity to attend to information in the environment that is not directly relevant to the task at hand. In the current task, this led to a performance benefit under alcohol, but in situations that require rapid responding to salient events, the effect on behaviour would be deleterious.

Existing research indicates that learning about the Pavlovian 'signal value' of stimuli can induce attentional biases: findings suggest that our attentional system prioritises detection of stimuli that have previously signalled availability of high reward. These findings potentially provide a human analogue of sign-tracking behaviour previously reported in studies of non-human animals. Here we examine a visual search task that has been developed to demonstrate the Pavlovian influence of reward on attention, in which the critical reward-signalling stimuli are never explicit targets of search. This procedure has previously yielded robust effects of reward on attention; however it remains unclear whether this pattern reflects a persistent and automatic bias in attentional capture based on prior experience of stimulus-reward pairings, or whether it results from participants strategically attending to reward-signalling distractors because they provide useful information about reward magnitude. To investigate this issue, in the current study participants initially completed a rewarded visual search task, in which colours of distractor stimuli signalled availability of high or low reward. Participants then completed a test phase in which rewards were no longer available, such that distractor colours no longer provided useful information on reward availability. Performance during the initial rewarded phase was impaired by the presence of a distractor signalling availability of high relative to low reward. Crucially, the magnitude of this reward-related distraction effect did not reduce in the subsequent unrewarded test phase. This suggests that participants' experience of differences in reward value signalled by distractor stimuli in this task can induce persistent biases in the extent to which these stimuli involuntarily capture attention, even when they are entirely task-irrelevant.

The exploitation-exploration (EE) trade-off describes how, when making a decision, an organism must often choose between a safe alternative with a known pay-off, and one or more riskier alternatives with uncertain pay-offs. Recently, the concept of the EE trade-off has been extended to the examination of how organisms distribute limited attentional resources between several stimuli. This work suggests that when the rules governing the environment are certain, participants learn to “exploit” by attending preferentially to cues that provide the most information about upcoming events. However, when the rules are uncertain, people “explore” by increasing their attention to all cues that may provide information to help in predicting upcoming events. In the current study, we examine how uncertainty affects the EE trade-off in attention using a contextual two-armed bandit task, where participants explore with both their attention and their choice behavior. We find evidence for an influence of uncertainty on the EE trade-off in both choice and attention. These findings provide support for the idea of an EE trade-off in attention, and that uncertainty is a primary motivator for exploration in both choice and attentional allocation.

Existing research demonstrates different ways in which attentional prioritization of salient nontarget stimuli is shaped by prior experience: Reward learning renders signals of high-value outcomes more likely to capture attention than signals of low-value outcomes, whereas statistical learning can produce attentional suppression of the location in which salient distractor items are likely to appear. The current study combined manipulations of the value and location associated with salient distractors in visual search to investigate whether these different effects of selection history operate independently or interact to determine overall attentional prioritization of salient distractors. In Experiment 1 , high-value and low-value distractors most frequently appeared in the same location; in Experiment 2 , high-value and low-value distractors typically appeared in distinct locations. In both experiments, effects of distractor value and location were additive, suggesting that attention-promoting effects of value and attention-suppressing effects of statistical location-learning independently modulate overall attentional priority. Our findings are consistent with a view that sees attention as mediated by a common priority map that receives and integrates separate signals relating to physical salience and value, with signal suppression based on statistical learning determined by physical salience, but not incentive salience.

Recent research has shown that reward learning can modulate oculomotor and attentional capture by physically salient and task-irrelevant distractor stimuli, even when directing gaze to those stimuli is directly counterproductive to receiving reward. This value-modulated oculomotor capture effect may reflect biased competition in the oculomotor system, such that the relationship between a stimulus feature and reward enhances that feature’s representation on an internal priority map. However, it is also possible that this effect is a result of reward reducing the threshold for a saccade to be made to salient items. Here, we demonstrate value-modulated oculomotor capture when two reward-associated distractor stimuli are presented simultaneously in the same search display. The influence of reward on oculomotor capture is found to be most prominent at the shortest saccade latencies. We conclude that the value-modulated oculomotor capture effect is a consequence of biased competition on the saccade priority map and cannot be explained by a general reduction in saccadic threshold.

Previous studies have provided evidence that selective attention tends to prioritize the processing of stimuli that are good predictors of upcoming events over nonpredictive stimuli. Moreover, studies using eye-tracking to measure attention demonstrate that this attentional bias towards predictive stimuli is at least partially under voluntary control and can be flexibly adapted via instruction. Our experiment took a similar approach to these prior studies, manipulating participants' experience of the predictiveness of different stimuli over the course of trial-by-trial training; we then provided explicit verbal instructions regarding stimulus predictiveness that were designed to be either consistent or inconsistent with the previously established learned predictiveness. Critically, we measured the effects of training and instruction on attention to stimuli using a dot probe task, which allowed us to assess rapid shifts of attention (unlike the eye-gaze measures used in previous studies). Results revealed a rapid attentional bias towards stimuli experienced as predictive (versus those experienced as nonpredictive), that was completely unaffected by verbal instructions. This was not due to participants' failure to recall or use instructions appropriately, as revealed by analyses of their learning about stimuli, and their memory for instructions. Overall, these findings suggest that rapid attentional biases such as those measured by the dot probe task are more strongly influenced by our prior experience during training than by our current explicit knowledge acquired via instruction.