Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
37
result(s) for
"Lever, Annabelle"
Sort by:
Ideas that matter : democracy, justice, rights
The essays in this volume take off from themes in the work of eminent philosopher and political scientist Joshua Cohen. Cohen is a deeply influential thinker who has written on deliberative democracy, freedom of expression, Rawlsian theory, global justice, and human rights. The essays gathered here both engage with Cohen's work and expand upon it, embodying his commitment to the idea that analytical work by philosophers and social scientists matters to our shared public life and to democracy itself. The contributors offer novel perspectives on pressing issues of public policy from accountability for sexual violence to exploitation in international trade.0The volume is organized around three central ideas. The first concerns democracy, specifically how we can improve collective decision-making both by elucidating our normative principles and enacting institutional changes. The second idea centers on how we confront injustice, investigating the role of emotions, social norms, and culture in democratic politics and public discussion. The final section explores how we develop political principles and values in an interdependent world, one in which theories of justice and forms of cooperation are increasingly extending beyond the state. The principle uniting this collection is that ideas matter-they can guide us in understanding how to confront difficult global problems such as the fragility of democratic institutions, the place of sovereignty in a globalizing world, and the persistence of racial injustice.
Book
A Sense of Proportion: Some Thoughts on Equality, Security and Justice
This article develops an intuitive idea of proportionality as a placeholder for a substantive conception of equality, and contrasts it with Ripstein’s ideas, as presented in an annual guest lecture to the Society of Applied Philosophy in 2016. It uses a discussion of racial profiling to illustrate the conceptual and normative differences between the two. The brief conclusion spells out my concern that talk of ‘proportionality’, though often helpful and, sometimes, necessary for moral reasoning, can end up concealing, rather than illuminating, people’s claims to be treated as equals.
Journal Article
New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property
Are intellectual property rights a threat to autonomy, global justice, indigenous rights, access to lifesaving knowledge and medicines? The essays in this volume examine the justification of patents, copyrights and trademarks in light of the political and moral controversy over TRIPS (the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). Written by a distinguished international group of experts, this book draws on the latest philosophical work on autonomy, equality, property ownership and human rights in order to explore the moral, political and economic implications of property rights in ideas. Written with an interdisciplinary audience in mind, these essays introduce readers to the latest debates in the philosophy of intellectual property, whether their interests are in the restrictions that copyright places on the reproduction of music and printed words or in the morality and legality of patenting human genes, essential medicines or traditional knowledge.
eBook
Political Equality
This article uses Arash Abizadeh to illustrate the appeal and difficulties of the claim that random selection is a more democratic way to select a legislature than election. It agrees with Abizadeh that representative democracy cannot be reduced to the right of voters to choose their legislators. However, it challenges his view that elections are inherently inegalitarian because they enable voters to discriminate unfairly among electoral candidates and his assimilation of gyroscopic to descriptive representation. Finally, the article highlights the difficulties of justifying random selection while rejecting election on egalitarian grounds. It therefore concludes that democratic equality requires more, not less, attention to the ethics of voting and to the conceptual, moral, and political dimensions of citizens’ claims on elected office.
Journal Article
Random Selection, Democracy and Citizen Expertise
This paper looks at Alexander Guerrero’s epistemic case for ‘lottocracy’, or government by randomly selected citizen assemblies. It argues that Guerrero fails to show that citizen expertise is more likely to be elicited and brought to bear on democratic politics if we replace elections with random selection. However, randomly selected citizen assemblies can be valuable deliberative and participative additions to elected and appointed institutions even when citizens are not bearers of special knowledge or virtue individually or collectively.
Journal Article
Compulsory Voting: A Critical Perspective
Compulsory voting is sometimes thought to be justified in democracies because it promotes high levels of voting and mitigates inequalities of turnout amongst social groups. Proponents of compulsory voting also argue that it helps to prevent the free-riding of non-voters on voters. This article casts a sceptical eye on both arguments. Democratic citizens do not have a duty to promote their self-interest, and their duties to others do not generally require them to vote, or to attend the polls. So, while people are sometimes morally obliged to vote, and to vote one way rather than another, legal compulsion to vote or to turn out is generally unjustified and inconsistent with democratic government.
Journal Article
Democracy, Epistemology and the Problem of All-White Juries
Does it matter that almost all juries in England and Wales are all-White? Does it matter even if this result is the unintended and undesired result of otherwise acceptable ways of choosing juries? Finally, does it matter that almost all juries are all-White if this has no adverse effect on the treatment of non-White defendants and victims of crime? According to Cheryl Thomas, there is no injustice in a system of jury selection which predictably results in juries with no minority members so long as this result is not deliberate, and does not adversely affect the treatment of minority defendants and victims of crime. My view is different. In and of itself, I believe, something is wrong with a system of jury selection that predictably results in all-White juries in a diverse society, such as our own. Absent reason to believe that we lack a better alternative to current modes of jury selection, a commitment to democratic government and to the equality of citizens – or so I will argue – condemns existing arrangements as unjust, whether or not they have adverse effects on jury decisions, or on the ways in which our society approaches issues of race and crime.
Journal Article