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The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.

The war in Ukraine has altered the course of global history. These authors explore how.When Vladimir Putin's forces sought to conquer Ukraine in February 2022, they did more than threaten the survival of a vulnerable democracy. The invasion unleashed a crisis that has changed the course of world affairs. This conflict has reshaped alliances, deepened global cleavages, and caused economic disruptions that continue to reverberate around the globe. It has initiated the first great-power nuclear crisis in decades and raised fundamental questions about the sources of national power and military might in the modern age. The outcome of the conflict will profoundly influence the international balance of power, the relationship between democracies and autocracies, and the rules that govern global affairs. In War in Ukraine, Hal Brands brings together an all-star cast of analysts to assess the conflict's origins, course, and implications and to offer their appraisals of one of the most geopolitically consequential crises of the early twenty-first century. Essays cover topics including the twists and turns of the war itself, the successes and failures of US strategy, the impact of sanctions, the future of Russia and its partnership with China, and more.Contributors: Anne Applebaum, Joshua Baker, Alexander Bick, Hal Brands, Daniel Drezner, Peter Feaver, Lawrence Freedman, Francis Gavin, Brian Hart, William Inboden, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kimmage, Michael Kofman, Stephen Kotkin, Mark Leonard, Bonny Lin, Thomas Mahnken, Dara Massicot, Michael McFaul, Robert Person, Kori Schake, and Ashley Tellis.

India’s core goals for Southeast Asia are in basic harmony with those of the United States, including regional stability, peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, and containment of radicalism Still, America should not expect India to enter any sort of alliance, nor join any coalition to balance against China, but should demonstrate strategic patience and willingness to cultivate a long-term relationship.

As the United States shifts its security posture eastward in an “Asian rebalancing,” a key piece of the reconfigured puzzle will be that of India. This report explores the challenges in building cooperation with India in Southeast Asia. --

While launching pre-emptive military strikes and extending U.S. security guarantees are often analyzed as ways to prevent nuclear proliferation, little attention has been paid to using conventional arms transfers to curb nuclear proliferation. Leaders of countries with nuclear aspirations, however, have repeatedly argued that if their country received more arms from the United States, they would have less incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. This dissertation explores the policy-relevant question of whether conventional arms transfers can curb nuclear proliferation by examining how arms sales can increase the arms recipient's military capabilities and strengthen the recipient's alliance with the United States. Since Washington does not provide arms to adversaries, this study focuses on U.S. nonproliferation efforts toward allied and neutral countries. I combine quantitative analysis with historical case studies to analyze the effect of U.S. arms transfers on nuclear proliferation during the Cold War. Using an original dyadic dataset, I statistically model nuclear proliferation as involving two stages: first initiating one of two types of nuclear weapons programs and then assembling a nuclear bomb. For allied and neutral countries, I find that U.S. arms sales typically prevent nuclear proliferation whereas arms embargoes may encourage proliferation. The exceptions occur at the second stage of proliferation: arms embargoes are likely to prevent U.S. allies from assembling the bomb and arms sales may motivate allies to acquire the bomb. In other words, allies may take U.S. arms sales for granted, but may cooperate when sanctioned. In-depth case studies of Israel, South Korea, and Pakistan support the statistical findings, but also reveal that arms sales provide the U.S. leverage over all nuclear aspiring countries regardless of the maturity of the arms recipient's nuclear weapons program. U.S. arms transfers to Israel encouraged Tel Aviv to delay production of nuclear weapons until 1967 and to manufacture nuclear weapons at a slow rate until 1973. After the 1973 October War, U.S. arms sales could not prevent Israel from expanding its nuclear arsenal but did encourage Israel to never publicly test, demonstrate, or use its nuclear weapons. Similarly, in the mid-1970s, Washington combined reassurances with the threat of ending the U.S.-ROK security relationship – including terminating the U.S. arms supply – to pressure South Korea into shelving its nuclear project. After South Korea restarted its nuclear program in the late 1970s, Seoul again canceled the program in exchange for U.S. support and arms. On the other hand, Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons began in 1972, after the country suffered two military defeats and a sustained U.S. arms embargo. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, allowed Pakistan to enjoy a stronger U.S. commitment and substantial U.S. arms sales. In the 1980s, Islamabad continued to seek nuclear weapons but limited its activities: it did not test a nuclear device or delivery vehicle and delayed the assembly of a nuclear bomb. Though arms transfers may not be able to completely reverse or contain mature nuclear weapons programs, arms sales can delay nuclear proliferation and buy the international community more time to deal with the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Arms embargoes, on the other hand, are more likely to reinforce a country's perceived need for nuclear weapons.

Two faulty decisions made in Berlin and Tokyo changed the course of World War II and may have saved the world from fascist domination.¹ In 1941, over a six-month period, one Axis power attacked the Soviet Union and another attacked the United States.² Each decision, made quite separately, resulted in a surprise attack on a powerful nation with strategic depth. In both cases the effect of the surprise attack was overestimated and the reconstitution capabilities of the larger nation were underestimated. Both decisions were made with short-term victory in mind and without a full appreciation of the consequences of a

Japan’s decision to bomb Pearl Harbor was a blunder of the highest order.¹ It ultimately led to the use of atomic weapons against two Japanese cities, the collapse of the existing Japanese state, the end of the Japanese empire, years of foreign occupation, and death sentences for many of its leaders. Tokyo blundered in steps. Perhaps the greatest misstep was the July 2, 1941, decision to invade southern Indochina. That decision locked into placed a confrontation between Tokyo and Washington that Tokyo should have foreseen and that would require dramatic Japanese concessions to defuse. Once that confrontation was initiated, many