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According to Copernicus Climate Change Service, June 2024 is the 12th consecutive month where global temperatures have reached 1.5 °C above pre-industrial averages. For us, the problem is much bigger, not the exhaustion of sense, but the concrete tendency of exhaustion of both human and nonhuman life. [...]the sense of human life is now a lesser problem, while the greater problem resides in the relation of human life to the totality of nonhuman life, upon which it depends. Disaster Is the deterioration of the conditions of all life a nihilistic event? The hypothesis I develop here (and in a forthcoming book) is that, instead of explaining it in habitual terms of catastrophe, it needs to be rethought as an unprecedented disaster, of which we have an equally unprecedented impersonal experience.

I present Gilbert Simondon’s thinking of technics, that I take to be so compelling today because it articulates technological reality in ecological terms as a technogeography and life as being-with-the-machines. I will (1) flesh out Simondon’s program for a being-with-the-machines, (2) show how it corresponds to the essence of the technical objects described in terms of milieu and relation (3) indicate how this is based on Simondon’s ontology of individuation (4) suggest a criticism of Simondon, insofar as he would underestimate the technicality of the human being him/herself and of his/her world.

Abstract This article considers the remote meeting technologies that have become the unavoidable framework of (academic) work during the COVID-19 epidemic. I analyze them with the help of Jacques Derrida's concepts, thus also illustrating the reach of the latter. The article presents four \"transcendental illusions\" as supporting the digital world and, according to Derrida, experience. The illusion of proximity: digitality relies on a haptocentric illusion but it also reveals the distance at the heart of touching. The illusion of presence: digitality functions under the illusion of presence, but it also reveals the spectrality of digital presence. The illusion of a complete memory: although the Internet appears to be a total memory, it is really an archive, that is, a finite set of traces. The illusion of worldwide community: teletechnologies pretend to constitute a universal place, but they only generate a finite dis-place of common alienation.

This paper offers an overview of the stakes of the philosophy of nature in German idealism. It shows why Hegel’s philosophy of nature should not be read only as the fall of the idea in a spiritless exteriority, but also as the chance of the spirit that wants to consider reality as such. It compares this to the opposition between gravity and light in Schelling’s philosophy of nature, and finally makes a hypothesis about the utility of Naturphilosophie today.

The article’s aim is to measure the potential of Derrida’s work for a philosophy of technique. It shows why Derrida does not present a positive philosophy of technology but rather describes technique as a quasi-technique, as if a technique. The article inquires into the potential of such a quasi-technique for a contemporary philosophy of technology: it is suggested that it can function as a salutary “deconstruction” of mainstream philosophy of technology (that “knows” the “essence of technology”) because it shows how to think technique in the absence of essence and as the absence of essence. The article begins with a survey of the machines that figure in Derrida’s texts. It then examines three propositions concerning technology in Derrida’s work: 1) Derrida thinks technology as a metaphor of writing and not the other way round. 2) Derrida thinks technique as prosthesis, firstly of memory, then more generally of life. 3) Derrida’s quasi-technique relies on his peculiar conception of the incorporal materiality of technique.

This essay is a broad overview of philosophy’s capacity of facing the historicity of nature. It shows why classical philosophy of history, especially Hegel, left nature outside of history, and also in what sense this kind of philosophy is outdated. Then it shows how natural sciences discovered historical phenomena since the invention of biology at the very end of the eighteenth century and especially since Darwinism, although these did not examine the philosophical presuppositions of their theories. Assuming that the challenge of contemporary philosophy of history is to learn to include nature in history, the essay finally examines climatic change as a test case that allows us to see the problematics of nature’s historicity today. Climatic change cannot be explained if one holds onto the classical division into natural sciences and humanities, and this is because it is neither a natural nor a cultural phenomenon but manifests reality as a techno-nature, that has a singular, non-teleological and eventful historicity, the understanding of which is crucial today.

Recent debates on biopolitics have focused on negative and positive interpretations of \"life\" that is the object of biopolitical apparatuses. Agamben examines the \"bare life\" that is produced by the sovereign ban, Negri and Hardt speak on the contrary of emancipatory biopolitical production, while Derrida and Esposito study (auto-)immunitary reactions that constitute living beings. The aim of this article is to examine a concrete case that permits to evaluate the explanatory power of these positions. The test case pertains to the recent amendment of the Finnish law on the medical use of human organs, tissues, and cells. It shows very clearly how phenomena that conventionally constitute the basis of proper, personal existence, namely the biological body and death, are not natural phenomena anymore, insofar as they are delimited by biopolitical decisions, that also redefine social relations in a radical manner.

L’article présente un regard synthétique sur les enjeux de la philosophie de la nature de l’idéalisme allemand. Il montre pourquoi la philosophie hégélienne de la nature doit être lue non pas seulement comme la chute de l’idée dans une extériorité sans esprit, mais aussi comme la chance de l’esprit qui veut penser le réel tel qu’il est. Il compare cela à l’opposition de la gravité et de la lumière dans la philosophie de la nature de Schelling, et fait finalement une hypothèse sur l’utilité de la Naturphilosophie aujourd’hui. This paper offers an overview of the stakes of the philosophy of nature in German idealism. It shows why Hegel’s philosophy of nature should not be read only as the fall of the idea in a spiritless exteriority, but also as the chance of the spirit that wants to consider reality as such. It compares this to the opposition between gravity and light in Schelling’s philosophy of nature, and finally makes a hypothesis about the utility of Naturphilosophie today.

L’article présente un regard synthétique sur les enjeux de la philosophie de la nature de l’idéalisme allemand. Il montre pourquoi la philosophie hégélienne de la nature doit être lue non pas seulement comme la chute de l’idée dans une extériorité sans esprit, mais aussi comme la chance de l’esprit qui veut penser le réel tel qu’il est. Il compare cela à l’opposition de la gravité et de la lumière dans la philosophie de la nature de Schelling, et fait finalement une hypothèse sur l’utilité de la Naturphilosophie aujourd’hui. This paper offers an overview of the stakes of the philosophy of nature in German idealism. It shows why Hegel’s philosophy of nature should not be read only as the fall of the idea in a spiritless exteriority, but also as the chance of the spirit that wants to consider reality as such. It compares this to the opposition between gravity and light in Schelling’s philosophy of nature, and finally makes a hypothesis about the utility of Naturphilosophie today.