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80 result(s) for "Lippitt, John"
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Kierkegaard, “the Public”, and the Vices of Virtue-Signaling: The Dangers of Social Comparison
Concerns about the dangers of social comparison emerge in multiples places in Kierkegaard’s authorship. I argue that these concerns—and his critique of the role of “the public”—take on a new relevance in the digital age. In this article, I focus on one area where concerns about the risks of social comparison are paramount: the contemporary debate about moral grandstanding or “virtue-signaling”. Neil Levy and Evan Westra have recently attempted to defend virtue-signaling against Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke’s critique. I argue that these defences fail and that a consideration of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers is critical to seeing why. The over-confidence to which they give rise exacerbates certain vices with the potential to do moral, social and epistemic harm: I focus in particular on self-righteousness (complementing Kierkegaard’s discussion of envy). I then argue that Kierkegaard’s contrast between the religious category of the “single individual”—the genuine person of “character”—and the person who effectively appeals to the authority of some version of “the public” deepens our understanding of why we should reject defences of virtue-signaling. It helps us to distinguish between two kinds of virtue-signaler (“superficial enthusiasts” and “clear-eyed cynics”), both of whom contribute, in different ways, to the negative impacts of the vice of self-righteousness. Contrary to Levy’s claim that virtue-signaling is virtuous, I conclude that typically it is closer to vice than to virtue.
The Oxford handbook of Kierkegaard
\"The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard' offers 29 chapters written by leading international scholars, regarding Kierkegaard's historical context, authorship, writing style, major philosophical topics, and continuing influence in the disciplines of philosophy, theology, and literature.
“Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices”: Editorial Introduction
In recent years, scholars have been divided on what to make of Kierkegaard’s relation to what some have called the virtues tradition [...]
Kierkegaard and the Problem of Self-Love
The problem of whether we should love ourselves - and if so how - has particular resonance within Christian thought and is an important yet underinvestigated theme in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard argues that the friendships and romantic relationships which we typically treasure most are often merely disguised forms of 'selfish' self-love. Yet in this nuanced and subtle account, John Lippitt shows that Kierkegaard also provides valuable resources for responding to the challenge of how we can love ourselves, as well as others. Lippitt relates what it means to love oneself properly to such topics as love of God and neighbour, friendship, romantic love, self-denial and self-sacrifice, trust, hope and forgiveness. The book engages in detail with Works of Love, related Kierkegaard texts and important recent studies, and also addresses a wealth of wider literature in ethics, moral psychology and philosophy of religion.
Self-Forgiveness and the Moral Perspective of Humility: Ian McEwan's Atonement
Reflection on Briony Tallis in Ian McEwan's Atonement can help us understand two key aspects of self-forgiveness. First, she illustrates an unorthodox conception of humility that aids the process of responsible self-forgiveness. Second, she fleshes out a self-forgiveness that includes continued self-reproach. While Briony illustrates elements of the self-absorption about which critics of continued self-reproach (such as Margaret Holmgren) are rightly concerned, she also shows a way of getting beyond this, such that the delicate balance between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is upheld. Atonement also shows the significance for the task of self-forgiveness of a particular kind of narrative continuity.
State-Level Impact of Mandated Referrals From Child Welfare to Part C Early Intervention
New federal legislation requires states to develop policies to refer children younger than age 3 with substantiated cases of abuse or neglect to state Early Intervention (EI) systems. This article presents state-by-state estimates of potential referral and enrollment increases for EI. Many states could experience a significant increase in referrals (average 44%) and enrollment (average 22%). For effective implementation, states' EI systems will need to (a) increase EI system capacity, (b) identify additional funding, (c) find ways to successfully engage potentially resistant families, and (d) forge new interagency linkages. The state-by-state estimates provide both an indication of the potential impact in each state as well as goals that would reflect effective implementation of the referral mandate.
Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek and the 'God filter'
Kierkegaard's Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with 'special relationships'. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira and Sharon Krishek. Krishek charges Ferreira with failing to acknowledge some important conflicts in Kierkegaard's account of preferential love. In this article, I argue that some key passages are indeed insufficiently addressed in Ferreira's account. Yet ultimately, I argue, Krishek ends up condemning the Kierkegaard of Works of Love unfairly. As a solution to Krishek's concerns, I present a defence of Kierkegaard's position centred round the image of God as a 'filter' through which our loves must pass. Also, while acknowledging that Krishek raises some important questions for Ferreira's account, I outline a possible response, based in part on Kierkegaard's idea that neighbour love is only a 'sketch' until brought to fruition in any given manifestation of concrete love. Ultimately, I claim, Kierkegaard's position in Works of Love can indeed be defended from Krishek's critique.
True self-love and true self-sacrifice
In recent commentary on Kierkegaard's Works of Love, a distinction is commonly drawn between 'proper' and 'selfish' forms of self-love. In arguing that not all vices of self-focus can be captured under the heading of selfishness, I seek to distinguish selfishness from self-centredness. But the latter vice has a far more handsome cousin: proper self-focus of the kind necessary for 'becoming a self'. As various feminist thinkers have argued, this will be missed if we valorise self-sacrifice too uncritically. But nor need the latter concept be ditched. By distinguishing varieties of self-sacrifice, we can see the importance of avoiding the all too easy slide from proper self-sacrifice to outright self-annihilation. And we can discover that this avoidance is aided by recognising a kind of pride as part of true self-love.
Cracking the Mirror: On Kierkegaard's Concerns about Friendship
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard's key concerns about friendship: its \"preferential\" nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard's endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as \"second self\" involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called \"drawing\" view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard's worry as misplaced. However, the \"drawing\" view also enables us to begin to see what a \"Kierkegaardian\" friendship might look like.