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During his final years, John Stuart Mill reportedly attempted to update the argument of On Liberty (1859). Published posthumously in 1907, ‘On Social Freedom’ represents the initial, unrefined draft of his reworked ideas. This article argues that John Stuart Mill was not the author of ‘On Social Freedom’. First, we revisit the question of the essay’s authorship traditionally: the emphasis is on the essay’s content and the historical context of the mid-twentieth-century debate on Mill as its author. We trace the disagreement to two broad reactions to Mill’s thought. Ultimately, the question of whether the manuscript’s substantial divergence from J. S. Mill’s renowned works is enough to refute his authorship depends on one’s interpretation of Mill as a systematic philosopher. Second, we tackle this task non-traditionally: the focus shifts to the tools of computer-assisted authorship identification and the use of machine learning (ML) techniques. Once we establish some key ideas, methods, and limitations of this field of studies, we present our attempts at a computer-assisted solution to the puzzle. The results of our experiments, using ML techniques, corroborate the conclusions reached via the traditional route.

John Stuart Mill's account of his education in Autobiography (1873) is typically sifted through three interrelated sets of polarities: nurture/nature; reason/emotion; authority/autonomy. First, the father tried to mold the son's development towards a specific ideal, curbing his spontaneous growth. Second, James relentlessly sharpened John Stuart's analytical prowess to the almost total neglect of his emotional needs. Third, the authoritarianism involved in the design and execution of James Mill's curriculum rendered John Stuart Mill incapable of autonomy. This article argues that the dualities of nurture/nature and reason/emotion are not unambiguous, though ever-present in the reception of the younger Mill's education. Widening our perspective in their examination opens the possibility of a different assessment of that famous education being no education for autonomy.

In the early draft of his Autobiography (London, 1873), John Stuart Mill described himself as “a pupil of Plato, and cast in the mould of his dialectics.” However, how Plato’s influence came about, to what extent, and with regard to which aspects of Mill’s thought, form questions that do not usually preoccupy Mill scholarship. To fill this gap in critical attention, this book draws upon a variety of primary sources to pay particular attention to Mill’s concern with reform, method, character, virtue, and happiness through his reading of the ancient Greeks—particularly Plato. At the same time, this book focuses on the intellectual relationship between father and son, studying their responses to the prevalent trends as to the worth of classical studies and of Platonic philosophy in nineteenth-century Britain. Not only does John Stuart Mill’s “intoxication” with ancient Greece manifest itself in all those aspects of his works already mentioned; but—what is most important—it also permeates his unvarying aim: the improvement of mankind through the improvement of its individual members.

James Mill's History of British India (1817) made a rather strange claim: first-hand experience of India was not vital in writing a history – potentially, it led to false ideas about its subject-matter: eyewitnesses are susceptible to bias. The historian was thus to perform his task as a judge: sifting through various testimonies to obtain a ‘more perfect’ conception of the whole than those who witnessed its various parts. Although strange, Mill's claim does not bewilder his readers: after all, Mill was a ‘militant’ exponent of theorizing utilitarianism. I argue that such a reading of Mill's method is injudiciously restrictive. Not only did Mill draw on well-known methodological concerns in contemporary historiographical practice, not necessarily linked with Jeremy Bentham or the Scottish theoretical historiography, but he also seemed to adopt the vocabulary of forensic rhetoric, making his claim that his was a ‘judging’ history more literal than it has been supposed.

In his biography of James Mill, Alexander Bain made a number of claims with regard to Mill's essay “Government” (1820). First, the essay was a catalyst in the movement for reform, making “in all probability . . . our political history very different from what it might otherwise have been.” Second, the essay provided a unique opportunity for Mill to expound on “the whole theory of Government in a compact shape.” Third, as far as his “Logic of Politics” was concerned, Mill depended on the deductive method—the method of geometry—having quickly discarded the applicability of inductive logic in politics. In this article, I take issue with the last claim.

In this article, I take issue with two common misconceptions as regards JamesMill's 'Government' (1820); first, that the essay comprised Mill's whole theory of government; second, that Mill's intended audience were the proponents of moderate reform. The first focuses on the deductive nature ofMill's political argument to the complete exclusion of earlier ideas on good government -- some of which ideas had made it into 'Government'. The second situates the essay in the Radicals-vs-Whigs debate that took place in the 1820s and reached a high pitch just before the Reform Act of 1832. However, a close study of Mill's views on the conditions of good government in pre-1820 works suggests that Mill's focus on one particular condition of good government -- the identification of interests through representation -- was a conscious choice. To uncover the reasons for that choice, I turn from the Whig to the Tory critique of utilitarian radicalism. Shifting the focus in this way seems to account for Mill's emphasis on 'the passions, the wants, and the weaknesses of ordinary humanity' as the basis upon which a scheme of representation ought to be constructed.

This chapter argues that two distinct, yet connected, contexts – Mill's “mental crisis” and his task as a “Logician” – led to the formation of two arguments on the value of art. On one hand, Mill argued that aesthetic cultivation was important as an end in itself. Excellence was to be pursued disinterestedly as part of a beautiful life. On the other, Mill argued aesthetic cultivation was important as a means to the utilitarian end – strengthening the social sympathies made social happiness attainable. The first argument highlights what Mill thought was missing from the theory of his utilitarian predecessors, while the second brought Mill closer to this tradition, rather than moving him further away from it.