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Changes in sea level lead to some of the most severe impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Consequently, they are a subject of great interest in both scientific research and public policy.This paper defines concepts and terminology associated with sea level and sea-level changes in order to facilitate progress in sea-level science, in which communication is sometimes hindered by inconsistent and unclear language.We identify key terms and clarify their physical and mathematical meanings, make links between concepts and across disciplines, draw distinctions where there is ambiguity, and propose new terminology where it is lacking or where existing terminology is confusing. We include formulae and diagrams to support the definitions.

A number of studies have examined the size of the allowable global cumulative carbon budget compatible with limiting twenty-first century global average temperature rise to below 2°C and below 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels. These estimates of cumulative emissions have a number of uncertainties including those associated with the climate sensitivity and the global carbon cycle. Although the IPCC fifth assessment report contained information on a range of Earth system feedbacks, such as carbon released by thawing of permafrost or methane production by wetlands as a result of climate change, the impact of many of these Earth system processes on the allowable carbon budgets remains to be quantified. Here, we make initial estimates to show that the combined impact from typically unrepresented Earth system processes may be important for the achievability of limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The size of the effects range up to around a 350 GtCO2 budget reduction for a 1.5°C warming limit and around a 500 GtCO2 reduction for achieving a warming limit of 2°C. Median estimates for the extra Earth system forcing lead to around 100 GtCO2 and 150 GtCO2, respectively, for the two warming limits. Our estimates are equivalent to several years of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions at present rates. In addition to the likely reduction of the allowable global carbon budgets, the extra feedbacks also bring forward the date at which a given warming threshold is likely to be exceeded for a particular emission pathway. This article is part of the theme issue 'The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'.

Understanding how 1.5 °C pathways could adjust in light of new adverse information, such as a reduced 1.5 °C carbon budget, or slower-than-expected low-carbon technology deployment, is critical for planning resilient pathways. We use an integrated assessment model to explore potential pathway adjustments starting in 2025 and 2030, following the arrival of new information. The 1.5 °C target remains achievable in the model, in light of some adverse information, provided a broad portfolio of technologies and measures is still available. If multiple pieces of adverse information arrive simultaneously, average annual emissions reductions near 3 GtCO 2 /yr for the first five years following the pathway adjustment, compared to 2 GtCO 2 /yr in 2020 when the Covid-19 pandemic began. Moreover, in these scenarios of multiple simultaneous adverse information, by 2050 mitigation costs are 4-5 times as high as a no adverse information scenario, highlighting the criticality of developing a wide range of mitigation options, including energy demand reduction options. Emerging limitations on climate and low-carbon technology would require adjusting our 15.C climate change mitigation pathways. However, this could increase average annual emissions reductions to around 3GtCO 2 /year using a broad portfolio of mitigation measures.

The range of future climate-induced sea-level rise remains highly uncertain with continued concern that large increases in the twenty-first century cannot be ruled out. The biggest source of uncertainty is the response of the large ice sheets of Greenland and west Antarctica. Based on our analysis, a pragmatic estimate of sea-level rise by 2100, for a temperature rise of 4°C or more over the same time frame, is between 0.5 m and 2 m—the probability of rises at the high end is judged to be very low, but of unquantifiable probability. However, if realized, an indicative analysis shows that the impact potential is severe, with the real risk of the forced displacement of up to 187 million people over the century (up to 2.4% of global population). This is potentially avoidable by widespread upgrade of protection, albeit rather costly with up to 0.02 per cent of global domestic product needed, and much higher in certain nations. The likelihood of protection being successfully implemented varies between regions, and is lowest in small islands, Africa and parts of Asia, and hence these regions are the most likely to see coastal abandonment. To respond to these challenges, a multi-track approach is required, which would also be appropriate if a temperature rise of less than 4°C was expected. Firstly, we should monitor sea level to detect any significant accelerations in the rate of rise in a timely manner. Secondly, we need to improve our understanding of the climate-induced processes that could contribute to rapid sea-level rise, especially the role of the two major ice sheets, to produce better models that quantify the likely future rise more precisely. Finally, responses need to be carefully considered via a combination of climate mitigation to reduce the rise and adaptation for the residual rise in sea level. In particular, long-term strategic adaptation plans for the full range of possible sea-level rise (and other change) need to be widely developed.

Due to complexities of creating sea-level rise scenarios, impacts of climate-induced sea-level rise are often produced from a limited number of models assuming a global uniform rise in sea level. A greater number of models, including those with a pattern reflecting regional variations would help to assure reliability and a range of projections, indicating where models agree and disagree. This paper determines how nine new patterned-scaled sea-level rise scenarios (plus the uniform and patterned ensemble mean rises) influence global and regional coastal impacts (wetland loss, dry land loss due to erosion and the expected number of people flooded per year by extreme sea levels). The DIVA coastal impacts model was used under an A1B scenario, and assumed defences were not upgraded as conditions evolved. For seven out of nine climate models, impacts occurred at a proportional rate to global sea-level rise. For the remaining two models, higher than average rise in sea level was projected in northern latitudes or around populated coasts thus skewing global impact projections compared with the ensemble global mean. Regional variability in impacts were compared using the ensemble mean uniform and patterned scenarios: The largest relative difference in impacts occurred around the Mediterranean coast, and the largest absolute differences around low-lying populated coasts, such as south, south-east and east Asia. Uniform projections of sea-level rise impacts remain a useful method to determine global impacts, but improved regional scale models of sea-level rise, particularly around semi-enclosed seas and densely populated low-lying coasts will provide improved regional impact projections and a characterisation of their uncertainties.

The effects of the anomalously warm European summer of 2003 highlighted the importance of understanding the relationship between elevated atmospheric temperature and human mortality. This review is an extension of the brief evidence examining this relationship provided in the IPCC's Assessment Reports. A comprehensive and critical review of the literature is presented, which highlights avenues for further research, and the respective merits and limitations of the methods used to analyse the relationships. In contrast to previous reviews that concentrate on the epidemiological evidence, this review acknowledges the inter-disciplinary nature of the topic and examines the evidence presented in epidemiological, environmental health, and climatological journals. As such, present temperature-mortality relationships are reviewed, followed by a discussion of how these are likely to change under climate change scenarios. The importance of uncertainty, and methods to include it in future work, are also considered.

From improving health outcomes and health inequalities to ensuring energy and income security, the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change has extensive and diverse benefits. This paper describes a systematic evidence synthesis of climate action (co)benefits and trade-offs as well as the development of a decision-support tool that enables policy makers to explore that evidence-base. The term ‘(co)benefit’ is used deliberately to encompass both the direct benefits of averted impacts due to climate change as well as the indirect or ancillary benefits resulting from mitigation and adaptation interventions. We conducted a systematic search of the peer-reviewed literature in the IPCC 6th Assessment Report, Web of Science, and the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change Reports. Our search strategy prioritised synthesised evidence (e.g. reviews, assessments) excluding primary studies and single case-studies. Data were extracted from 74 distinct records meeting our inclusion criteria and a total of 1785 rows of evidence were analysed. Scientific and technical teams then worked together to develop a tool interface that underwent iterative testing among a small group of potential users. The resulting (Co)Benefits Portal presents an assessment of the available scientific evidence of health, ecosystem, economic, energy, and socio-cultural (co)benefits and trade-offs associated with 40 different mitigation and adaptation actions for both global and regional scales. We then apply the (Co)Benefits Portal into a UK context, in combination with national policy documents and departmental guidance, to connect evidence about relevant climate interventions and reveal cross-sectoral policy implications that are essential for optimising opportunities and avoiding risks. We discuss how evidence-based tools can be developed to bridge critical climate adaptation and mitigation research, policy, and decision-making gaps.

Pattern scaling is widely used to create climate change projections to investigate future impacts. We consider the performance of pattern scaling for emulating the HadGEM2-ES general circulation model (GCM) paying particular attention to “high end” warming scenarios and to different choices of GCM simulations used to diagnose the climate change patterns. We demonstrate that evaluating pattern-scaling projections by comparing them with GCM simulations containing unforced variability gives a significantly less favorable view of the actual performance of pattern scaling. Using a four-member initial-condition ensemble of HadGEM2-ES simulations, we infer that the root-mean-square errors of pattern-scaled monthly temperature changes over land are less than 0.25°C for global warming up to approximately 3.5°C. Some regional errors are larger than this and, for this GCM, there is a tendency for pattern scaling to underestimate warming over land. For warming above 3.5°C, the pattern-scaled projection errors grow but remain small relative to the climate change signal. We investigate whether patterns diagnosed by pooling GCM experiments from several scenarios are suitable for emulating the GCM under a high-end warming scenario. For global warming up to 3.5°C, pattern scaling using this pooled pattern closely emulates GCM simulations. For warming beyond 3.5°C, pattern-scaling performance is notably improved by using patterns diagnosed only from the high-forcing representative concentration pathway 8.5 (RCP8.5) scenario. Assessments of climate change impacts under high-end warming using pattern-scaling projections could be improved by using change patterns diagnosed from pooled scenarios for projections up to 3.5°C above preindustrial levels and patterns diagnosed from only strong forcing simulations for projecting beyond that. Similar findings are obtained for five other GCMs.

The winter of 2013–14 witnessed severe flooding across much of the UK putting pressure on policy makers to improve future planning for periods of torrential rainfall. This Perspective puts the flooding in the context of historical records, critically examines a range of potential causes, and sets out research directions needed to achieve a definitive assessment on the possible human contribution to the flooding. During the winter of 2013/14, much of the UK experienced repeated intense rainfall events and flooding. This had a considerable impact on property and transport infrastructure. A key question is whether the burning of fossil fuels is changing the frequency of extremes, and if so to what extent. We assess the scale of the winter flooding before reviewing a broad range of Earth system drivers affecting UK rainfall. Some drivers can be potentially disregarded for these specific storms whereas others are likely to have increased their risk of occurrence. We discuss the requirements of hydrological models to transform rainfall into river flows and flooding. To determine any general changing flood risk, we argue that accurate modelling needs to capture evolving understanding of UK rainfall interactions with a broad set of factors. This includes changes to multiscale atmospheric, oceanic, solar and sea-ice features, and land-use and demographics. Ensembles of such model simulations may be needed to build probability distributions of extremes for both pre-industrial and contemporary concentration levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) assessed a range of scenarios of future greenhouse-gas emissions without policies to specifically reduce emissions, and concluded that these would lead to an increase in global mean temperatures of between 1.6°C and 6.9°C by the end of the twenty-first century, relative to pre-industrial. While much political attention is focused on the potential for global warming of 2°C relative to pre-industrial, the AR4 projections clearly suggest that much greater levels of warming are possible by the end of the twenty-first century in the absence of mitigation. The centre of the range of AR4-projected global warming was approximately 4°C. The higher end of the projected warming was associated with the higher emissions scenarios and models, which included stronger carbon-cycle feedbacks. The highest emissions scenario considered in the AR4 (scenario A1FI) was not examined with complex general circulation models (GCMs) in the AR4, and similarly the uncertainties in climate—carbon-cycle feedbacks were not included in the main set of GCMs. Consequently, the projections of warming for A1FI and/or with different strengths of carbon-cycle feedbacks are often not included in a wider discussion of the AR4 conclusions. While it is still too early to say whether any particular scenario is being tracked by current emissions, A1FI is considered to be as plausible as other non-mitigation scenarios and cannot be ruled out. (A1FI is a part of the A1 family of scenarios, with 'FI' standing for 'fossil intensive'. This is sometimes erroneously written as A1F1, with number 1 instead of letter I.) This paper presents simulations of climate change with an ensemble of GCMs driven by the A1FI scenario, and also assesses the implications of carbon-cycle feedbacks for the climate-change projections. Using these GCM projections along with simple climate-model projections, including uncertainties in carbon-cycle feedbacks, and also comparing against other model projections from the IPCC, our best estimate is that the A1FI emissions scenario would lead to a warming of 4°C relative to pre-industrial during the 2070s. If carbon-cycle feedbacks are stronger, which appears less likely but still credible, then 4°C warming could be reached by the early 2060s in projections that are consistent with the IPCC's 'likely range'.