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روسو وتجديد الفلسفة السياسية
كان التحدي لإمكان وجود أساس منطقي لحياتنا السياسية وتوجيهها في مرحلة ما بعد الحداثة حافزا لإعادة النظر في البحوث التي تناولت مؤلفات الفلاسفة السياسيين السابقين. المراد من إعادة النظر هذه إحياء الأسس القديمة أو الكلاسيكية للعقل المدني (civic reason)، وتوضيح نقاط القوّة والضعف في العقلانية الفلسفية الحديثة. ترد هذه السلسلة على هذه الجلبة بإتاحة معرفة أكاديمية إبداعية جديدة في تاريخ الفلسفة السياسية، معرفة مدفوعة بإعادة اكتشاف الاستراتيجيات البلاغية المتنوعة التي اعتمدها الفلاسفة السياسيون. تتضمن السلسلة دراسات تفسيرية تهتمّ بالسياق التاريخي واللغة، وبالطرق التي من خلالها أرغمت الرقابة والاهتمامات التعليمية المفكرين النجباء على توظيف استراتيجيات متشعبة، في أوضاع ثقافية شديدة التنوّع، لصياغة خطط شاملة تتيح لهم مخاطبة جماهير مختلفة تتميز بدرجات متفاوتة من الانفتاح على التفكير غير التقليدي.
BOOK
THE FUTURE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN A TIME OF LAWLESS VIOLENCE
Professors Reva B. Siegel and Joseph Blocher have focused attention on an underappreciated dimension of the debate about the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. They reject a narrow concept of \"public safety\" that evaluates regulations solely in terms of physical safety, without adequately recognizing the public's interest in securing \"a foundation for community and for the exercise of many of our most cherished constitutional liberties.\" At this level of generality, I agree. But I do not agree that an appropriately broad conception of public safety should widen the discretion of legislatures to impose restrictions on firearms. The issue that Professors Siegel and Blocher raise is especially important during this time of politically inspired riots and flaccid government responses to mob violence. The most practically important Second Amendment issue that is ripe for Supreme Court resolution concerns the scope of the constitutional right to bear arms in public. The Constitution's text and history offer little direct guidance, and the Justices will inevitably have to decide how to resolve the conflicts of interest that occur when governments seek to promote public safety by depriving individuals of the means to protect themselves. This Essay argues that the single most foundational principle on which our liberal regime rests is the inherent right of self-defense against violent assaults, whether from common criminals or political activists or tyrannical governments. The Second Amendment's core purpose is to insulate that right from improper government interference. But protecting the right to keep and bear arms also serves a broader civic purpose. An armed citizenry displays the spirit of courage and self-reliance on which genuine self-government depends. That spirit should be honored and defended more than ever in times of civil unrest and especially when governments have responded to mob violence with passive acceptance or with perverse encouragement.
Journal Article
Rousseau's rejuvenation of political philosophy : a new introduction
This book reads Jean-Jacques Rousseau with a view toward deepening our understanding of many political issues alive today, including the place of women in society, the viability of traditional family structures, the role of religion and religious freedom in nations that are becoming ever more secular, and the proper conduct of American constitutional government. Rousseau has been among the most influential modern philosophers, and among the most misunderstood. The first great philosophic critic of the Enlightenment, he sought to revive political philosophy as it was practiced by Plato, and to make it useful in the modern world. His understanding of politics rests on deep and often prescient reflections about the nature of the human soul and the relationship between our animal origins and the achievements of civilization. This book demonstrates that the implications Rousseau drew from those reflections continue to deserve serious attention.
eBook
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris
The republic will no doubt survive the Supreme Court's decision, in 'Lawrence v. Texas', to invalidate laws against private, consensual sodomy, including those limited to homosexual behavior. Such laws are almost never enforced, and the rare prosecutions for such acts are necessarily capricious. So the principal direct effect of the Court's decision is likely to be extremely limited, and largely salutary: a few individuals will be spared the bad luck of getting a criminal conviction for violating laws that are manifestly out of step with prevailing sexual mores.
Journal Article
Judicial independence, judicial virtue, and the political economy of the constitution
This short symposium piece, prepared for a panel on Economic Theory, Civic Virtue, and the Meaning of the Constitution, explains why the framers structured the judiciary in a way that departed dramatically from their general economic theory of government a theory summed up most succinctly in Madisons dictum that ambition must be made to counteract ambition. In defending an independent judiciary, The Federalist supplemented its well-known emphasis on the structural weaknesses of the courts with a less famous argument that relied on peculiar personal virtues of self-restraint that the ratifiers of the Constitution could reasonably expect the new federal judges to possess. The essay contends that modern Supreme Court Justices consistently promise to adhere to the traditional ideal of judicial self-restraint during confirmation hearings, but frequently depart quite dramatically from that ideal after they take their seats on the bench. The essay summarizes four steps (which Craig Lerner and I have explored in more detail elsewhere) that Congress could take to encourage greater fidelity to judicial virtue. Such reforms could actually have some salutary practical effects on judicial behavior, unlike the kabuki dramas that Senators orchestrate during confirmation hearings. And the reforms would at least help the Justices look a bit more like the sober and modest magistrates that The Federalist plausibly promised and that all recent nominees promise to be. Adapted from the source document.
Journal Article
May lawyers be given the power to elect those who choose our judges? \Merit selection\ and constitutional law
[...] those with strong private interests in appointments to public office are generally left free to share their information and preferences with the public and with appointing officials, and even to throw all their political weight behind their preferred candidates. The constitution, in turn, requires the governor to appoint one of the three nominees that this bar-controlled commission has selected.10 Although this system may not satisfy Madison's criteria for republican institutions, there is little doubt that the procedure would be upheld under the Guarantee Clause.11 The Supreme Court has stressed its extreme reluctance to invoke this clause as authority for adjudicating political disputes in the states.12 Perhaps that reluctance reflects an appropriate respect for the principles of federalism and a prudent recognition of the Court's very limited capacity for converting the finer points of political theory into law. [...] recent times, that would probably have been that.
Journal Article
The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence
District of Columbia v. Hellergave the Supreme Court an opportunity to apply a jurisprudence of original meaning to the Second Amendment’s manifestly puzzling text. Notwithstanding the chief justice’s decision to assign the majority opinion to Justice Scalia, the Court squandered the opportunity.
In a narrow sense, the Constitution was vindicated inHellerbecause the Court reached an easily defensible originalist result. But the Court’s reasoning is at critical points so defective—and so transparently non-originalist in some respects—thatHellershould be seen as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority opinion. It may also be widely (though
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