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284 result(s) for "MCLEAN, R. DAVID"
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Does Academic Research Destroy Stock Return Predictability?
We study the out-of-sample and post-publication return predictability of 97 variables shown to predict cross-sectional stock returns. Portfolio returns are 26% lower out-of-sample and 58% lower post-publication. The out-of-sample decline is an upper bound estimate of data mining effects. We estimate a 32% (58%-26%) lower return from publication-informed trading. Post-publication declines are greater for predictors with higher in-sample returns, and returns are higher for portfolios concentrated in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk and low liquidity. Predictor portfolios exhibit post-publication increases in correlations with other published-predictor portfolios. Our findings suggest that investors learn about mispricing from academic publications.
Why Does the Law Matter? Investor Protection and Its Effects on Investment, Finance, and Growth
Investor protection is associated with greater investment sensitivity to q and lower investment sensitivity to cash flow. Finance plays a role in causing these effects; in countries with strong investor protection, external finance increases more strongly with q, and declines more strongly with cash flow. We further find that q and cash flow sensitivities are associated with ex post investment efficiency; investment predicts growth and profits more strongly in countries with greater q sensitivities and lower cash flow sensitivities. The paper's findings are broadly consistent with investor protection promoting accurate share prices, reducing financial constraints, and encouraging efficient investment.
Anomalies and News
Using a sample of 97 stock return anomalies, we find that anomaly returns are 50% higher on corporate news days and six times higher on earnings announcement days. These results could be explained by dynamic risk, mispricing due to biased expectations, or data mining. We develop and conduct several unique tests to differentiate between these three explanations. Our results are most consistent with the idea that anomaly returns are driven by biased expectations, which are at least partly corrected upon news arrival.
The Business Cycle, Investor Sentiment, and Costly External Finance
The recent financial crisis shows that financial markets can impact the real economy. We investigate whether access to finance typically time-varies and, if so, what are the real effects. Consistent with time-varying external finance costs, both investment and employment are less sensitive to Tobin's q and more sensitive to cash flow during recessions and low investor sentiment periods. Share issuance plays a bigger role than debt issuance in causing these effects. Alternative tests that do not rely on q and cash flow sensitivities suggest that recessions and low sentiment increase external finance costs, thereby limiting investment and employment.
Corporate Leadership and Inherited Beliefs About Gender Roles
Some U.S. firms have women directors and executives, while many do not. We seek to explain this heterogeneity. Using U.S. Census data from 1900, we find that U.S. counties with populations originating from countries with stronger gender-egalitarian beliefs have more women in the labor market and in STEM occupations, and lower gender-pay gaps. Firms headquartered in such counties have more women executives and directors. When firms move to more gender-egalitarian counties, the representation of women on board increases. Our findings are consistent with the idea that inherited beliefs about gender roles impact the labor market and corporate leadership.
Do Cross-Sectional Predictors Contain Systematic Information?
Firm-level variables that predict cross-sectional stock returns, such as price-to-earnings and short interest, are often averaged and used to predict market returns. Using various samples of cross-sectional predictors and accounting for the number of predictors and their interdependence, we find only weak evidence that cross-sectional predictors make good time-series predictors, especially out-of-sample. The results suggest that cross-sectional predictors do not generally contain systematic information.
Idiosyncratic Risk, Long-Term Reversal, and Momentum
This paper tests whether the persistence of the momentum and reversal effects is the result of idiosyncratic risk limiting arbitrage. Idiosyncratic risk deters arbitrage, regardless of the arbitrageur’s diversification. Reversal is prevalent only in high idiosyncratic risk stocks, suggesting that idiosyncratic risk limits arbitrage in reversal mispricing. This finding is robust to controls for transaction costs, informed trading, and systematic relations between idiosyncratic risk and subsequent returns. Momentum is not related to idiosyncratic risk. Momentum generates a smaller aggregate return than reversal, so the findings along with those in related studies suggest that transaction costs are sufficient to prevent arbitrageurs from eliminating momentum mispricing.
The Year-End Trading Activities of Institutional Investors: Evidence from Daily Trades
At year-end, some allege that institutional investors try to mislead investors by placing trades that inflate performance (portfolio pumping) or distort reported holdings (window dressing). We contribute direct tests using daily institutional trades and find that year-end price inflation derives from a lack of institutional selling rather than institutional buying. In fact, institutional buying declines at year-end. Consistent with pumping, institutions tend to buy stocks in which they already have large positions. We find no evidence of window dressing, as institutions are not more likely to buy high-past return stocks or sell low-past return stocks at year- or quarter-end.
Fooled by Compounding
Compounding can make things appear to be larger than they really are. This confusion can arise when the return from an event is compounded over a long holding period, and the return from compounding is described as the return from the event. In this article, McLean reviews several examples of this common mistake, which are found in a popular book on rare events, newspaper articles, investment advisors' research reports, and finance journal articles. He also shows how compounding can distort inference in event studies and in the measurement of mutual fund performance. McLean describes alternative methods of return measurement that are not affected by compounding and shows that these methods can lead to different inferences than do measures that include compounding. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
When Is Stock Picking Likely to Be Successful? Evidence from Mutual Funds
Consistent with a costly arbitrage equilibrium in which arbitrage costs insulate mispricing, this study finds that mutual fund managers have stock-picking ability for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility but not for stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility. These findings suggest that fund managers and other investors may want to pay special attention to high-idiosyncratic-volatility stocks because they provide fertile ground for stock picking. The study also finds that the stockpicking ability of the average mutual fund manager declined after the extreme growth in the number of both mutual funds and hedge funds in the late 1990s.