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The potential for biases being built into algorithms has been known for some time (e.g., Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996), yet literature has only recently demonstrated the ways algorithmic profiling can result in social sorting and harm marginalised groups (e.g., Browne, 2015; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018). We contend that with increased algorithmic complexity, biases will become more sophisticated and difficult to identify, control for, or contest. Our argument has four steps: first, we show how harnessing algorithms means that data gathered at a particular place and time relating to specific persons, can be used to build group models applied in different contexts to different persons. Thus, privacy and data protection rights, with their focus on individuals (Coll, 2014; Parsons, 2015), do not protect from the discriminatory potential of algorithmic profiling. Second, we explore the idea that anti-discrimination regulation may be more promising, but acknowledge limitations. Third, we argue that in order to harness anti-discrimination regulation, it needs to confront emergent forms of discrimination or risk creating new invisibilities, including invisibility from existing safeguards. Finally, we outline suggestions to address emergent forms of discrimination and exclusionary invisibilities via intersectional and post-colonial analysis.

Only recently have scholars of criminology begun to examine a wider spectrum of the effects of digital technologies beyond 'cybercrime' to include human rights, privacy, data extractivism and surveillance. Such accounts, however, remain anthropocentric and capitalocentric. They do not fully consider the environmental impacts caused by the manufacture, consumption, use and disposal of digital technologies under conditions of ecologically unequal exchange. The worst impacts of extractivism and pollution are borne by societies and ecosystems in the world's economic periphery and contribute to an acceleration of planetary ecocide. Three examples illustrate our argument: (1) deep-sea mining of metals and minerals; (2) the planned obsolescence of digital devices while limiting the right to repair; and (3) the disposal of e-waste. Acknowledging the urgent need to reorient the trajectory of technology innovation towards more-than-human futures, we advance some ideas from the field of design research-that is, the field of scholarly inquiry into design practices-on how to decouple technological progress from neoliberal economic growth. We venture outside criminology and offer a glimpse into how design researchers have recently begun a similar reflective engagement with post-anthropocentric critiques, which can inspire new directions for research across digital and green criminology.

This paper focuses on the operational-infrastructural puzzles of mHealth via COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (CTA). Significant literature exists on user adoption of the platformisation of public health during the pandemic, but there has been limited consideration of how those responsible for implementing CTA design, deployment, and use of public health infrastructures did so. We redress this imbalance by exploring some of the politics and practicalities of offering CTA as technical ‘solutions’ to pandemic problems. Our work adds to previous comparative analyses of mHealth by drawing on data from key actors across government, industry, and civil society involved in designing and implementing CTA into public health across 5 jurisdictions: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. While CTA research often frames tensions around efficacy and adoption (e.g. privacy trade-off), we find hidden infrastructural tensions within a situation of political and technical constraints in the ‘back end’ of the platformisation of public health. The paper offers new insights to pandemic politics by shifting questions from digital contact tracing and pandemic surveillance interfaces to understanding CTA as infrastructures of public health. While CTA user-software interactions produce certain research questions, querying the infrastructural complexity of digital public health projects require and produce a different set of data and knowledge.

This article presents a detailed case study of “RoboDebt” in Australia and examines the political rationalities that underpin automated welfare surveillance systems. First, it is argued that neoliberal political rationalities shape the bureaucratic strategies enacted by agencies established to administer neoliberal welfare policy. Second, it is shown that neoliberal political rationalities influence the design and deployment of new surveillance technologies, and therefore they are embedded with and within politics too. Third, it is argued that the political architecture of the welfare state and associated use of information communication technologies has consequences for social justice. This article demonstrates that information communication technologies are implicated in the neoliberal governance of poverty but are not responsible for it. The article concludes by reflecting on the relevance of critical qualitative inquiry as one possible political intervention to advance social (and data) justice agendas.

This article examines the “prison platform” as a novel technology of digital confinement. The focus is how United States multinational Honeywell established a prison platform in Australia and New Zealand, neighboring settler colonies where the Indigenous peoples never ceded sovereignty, and prison systems continue to be stamped by deeply entrenched patterns of Indigenous hyperincarceration. While studies of digital colonialism have tended to focus on how Global North actors exploit data relations in the Global South, we examine Honeywell building its prison platform across the “North-in-South” divide in Australia and New Zealand, states that are located geographically in the South but have large settler majorities and close ties to the North. We argue that Honeywell exploits the power relations of Indigenous confinement in the settler colony to advance a novel form of tech-facilitated prison privatization. The analysis reveals three key dynamics of prison platforming: the private sector capture of prison infrastructure formally governed by settler state agencies (infrastructural capture), the commercial logic of continual platform expansion through the integration of new data-extracting technologies (extractive integration), and the leveraging of control over infrastructure to entrench power over competitors in commercial markets for prison technology (market gatekeeping). The paper extends research into platform power by shifting focus from online commerce and communications to the built environment of the prison, and spotlights a convergence between cutting-edge digital technology and much older practices of settler colonial social control.

This paper examines Lisa Austin’s (2015) concept of lawful illegality, which interrogates the legal foundations for potentially unlawful surveillance practices by United States (US) signals intelligence (SIGINT) agencies. Lawful illegality involves the technically lawful operation of surveillance powers that might be considered unlawful when examined through a rule of law framework. We argue lawful illegality is expanding into domestic policing through judicial decisions that sanction complex and technically sophisticated forms of remote online surveillance, such as the use of malware, remote hacking, or Network Investigative Techniques (NITs). Operation Pacifier targeted and dismantled the Playpen dark web site, which was used for distributing child exploitation material (CEM), and has generated many judicial rulings examining the legality of remote surveillance by the FBI. We have selected two contrasting cases that demonstrate how US domestic courts have employed distinct logics to determine the admissibility of evidence collected through the NIT deployed in Operation Pacifier. The first case, United States v. Carlson (2017 US Dist. LEXIS 67991), offers a critical view of the use of NITs by the FBI, with physical geography constraining the legality of this form of surveillance in US criminal procedure. The second case, United States v. Gaver (2017 US Dist. LEXIS 44757), authorizes the use of NITs because the need to control crime is believed to justify suspending the geographic limits on police surveillance to identify people involved in the creation and dissemination of CEM. We argue this crime control emphasis expands the reach of US police surveillance while undermining due process of law by removing the protective function of geography. We conclude by suggesting the permissive geographic scope of police surveillance reflected in United States v. Gaver (2017 US Dist. LEXIS 44757), and many other Playpen cases, erodes due process for all crime suspects, but is particularly acute for people located outside the US, and suggest a neutral transnational arbiter could help limit contentious forms of remote extraterritorial police surveillance.

Only recently have scholars of criminology begun to examine a wider spectrum of the effects of digital technologies beyond 'cybercrime' to include human rights, privacy, data extractivism and surveillance. Such accounts, however, remain anthropocentric and capitalocentric. They do not fully consider the environmental impacts caused by the manufacture, consumption, use and disposal of digital technologies under conditions of ecologically unequal exchange. The worst impacts of extractivism and pollution are borne by societies and ecosystems in the world's economic periphery and contribute to an acceleration of planetary ecocide. Three examples illustrate our argument: (1) deep-sea mining of metals and minerals; (2) the planned obsolescence of digital devices while limiting the right to repair; and (3) the disposal of e-waste. Acknowledging the urgent need to reorient the trajectory of technology innovation towards more-than-human futures, we advance some ideas from the field of design research-that is, the field of scholarly inquiry into design practices-on how to decouple technological progress from neoliberal economic growth. We venture outside criminology and offer a glimpse into how design researchers have recently begun a similar reflective engagement with post-anthropocentric critiques, which can inspire new directions for research across digital and green criminology.

Only recently have scholars of criminology begun to examine a wider spectrum of the effects of digital technologies beyond 'cybercrime' to include human rights, privacy, data extractivism and surveillance. Such accounts, however, remain anthropocentric and capitalocentric. They do not fully consider the environmental impacts caused by the manufacture, consumption, use and disposal of digital technologies under conditions of ecologically unequal exchange. The worst impacts of extractivism and pollution are borne by societies and ecosystems in the world's economic periphery and contribute to an acceleration of planetary ecocide. Three examples illustrate our argument: (1) deep-sea mining of metals and minerals; (2) the planned obsolescence of digital devices while limiting the right to repair; and (3) the disposal of e-waste. Acknowledging the urgent need to reorient the trajectory of technology innovation towards more-than-human futures, we advance some ideas from the field of design research-that is, the field of scholarly inquiry into design practices-on how to decouple technological progress from neoliberal economic growth. We venture outside criminology and offer a glimpse into how design researchers have recently begun a similar reflective engagement with post-anthropocentric critiques, which can inspire new directions for research across digital and green criminology.

DNA evidence has made a significant contribution to criminal investigations in Australia and around the world since it was widely adopted in the 1990s (Gans & Urbas 2002). The direct matching of DNA profiles, such as comparing one obtained from a crime scene with one obtained from a suspect or database, remains a widely used technique in criminal investigations. A range of new DNA profiling techniques continues to be developed and applied in criminal investigations around the world (Smith & Urbas 2012).

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