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\"This is the first book to analyze the dynamics of interstate rivalries in the international relations of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and how they have changed dramatically in recent decades. The authors explore rivalry origins, persistence, escalation, and termination. They also analyze how shock events, such as internal revolts or regional wars, can change the trajectory of rivalries, including to begin or end them. The rivalries in the book, including both contemporary and twentieth-century rivalries, are Israel-Iran, Iran-Saudi Arabia, Iran-Turkey, Iran-Iraq-Syria, Egypt-Saudi Arabia, and Algeria-Morocco. Other chapters provide analysis across rivalries and over time. This book will address an understudied phenomenon in the international relations of the Middle East and is part of a larger trend in the discipline to study rivalries and particular regional dynamics. The book will appeal to scholars of international relations and Middle East Studies and will be a supplemental textbook for graduate and upper-level undergraduate classes\"-- Provided by publisher.

The BRICS + collective (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, with the + to denote the expansion in membership) claims to represent Global South (GS) interests. Core among these interests is to ameliorate global structural exchange inequalities through reforms to global governance architectures and encouraging collaboration among members. Reforms and collaborative work aim at improving economic conditions in the GS, which is a long-standing local demand. At the same time, GS regions suffer from rivalries among its constitutive members states. Regional rivalries contribute to worsening economic conditions by discouraging investments, limiting the utilization of regional complementarities, and channeling money towards arms build-up. This article argues that given BRICS + emphasis on fostering economic reforms and members’ interdependence, membership in this collective incentivizes rivals to de-escalate so that they can capture benefits in the service of their national interests. BRICS + members observe the behavior of rivals since it is in the interest of the collective to uphold its credibility and fulfil its promises. De-escalation occurs as states prioritize cooperation over conflict, benefiting from economic opportunities and shared platforms for exchanges and dialogue. The article examines the potential of BRICS + to create conditions conducive to rivalry de-escalation in West Asia and the Maghreb (WAM). The organizational structure of BRICS + as a flexible, Global South-oriented coalition makes it attractive to states with existing tensions, encouraging pragmatic steps toward de-escalation. But BRICS + itself accepts membership based on existing members unanimously accepting potential newcomers; these newcomers are primarily evaluated on the premise of their positive contributions to the goals of the collective and are (apparently) shunned if their membership brings divisions and rivalry to within the collective. We select for our analysis three case studies which vary in their demonstration of the effects of BRICS + membership/promise of membership on the rivalry. The cases offer insights into how the BRICS + collective has utilized the membership process to promote de-escalation—instrumentalizing it as a preliminary condition for joining. Accordingly, the Morocco-Algeria rivalry provides the strongest evidence of BRICS + activism, the Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry yields mixed results, and the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry presents the least robust evidence of instrumentalization (relative to other cases). This categorization is based on how strongly each case supports our study’s claims. Curiously, we find that the impact of these processes on security dynamics in the regional order varied – the outcome is reversed. This means that BRICS + succeeded in leveraging membership to de-escalate the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry and, to a lesser extent, achieved similar results with Egypt and Ethiopia. In contrast, the Morocco-Algeria rivalry demonstrates the limits to which BRICS + was able to instrumentalize membership as a tool for de-escalation and highlights the subsequent lack of contribution to regional security, which the collective could not achieve despite its potential to do so.

Involuntary celibates (incels) are individuals who feel alienated from society because of their perceived inability to attract women. They share a narrative which valorises violence as a means to restructure society according to misogynistic ideals. Since promoting a radical misogynistic ideology through violence is legally prohibited and socially unacceptable, it is necessary for incels to hide out online where virtual mediums promise anonymity. Virtual relationality (VR) allowed unorganised individuals with a shared grievance against mainstream societal values to develop into a secretive collective. VR means that individuals connect in chatrooms and internet forums where they exchange interpretations of a narrative which presents their social situation as oppressive and dehumanising. They blame ‘modernist’ values and social practices for their ills and share perspectives of how they should interact with the world. These perspectives frequently justify or condone acts of physical violence. Relating in the virtual world gave these individuals’ shared grievances a sense of coherence and allowed for an amplification of the influence of their violent acts by affirming the value of extremist ideas. VR turned individuals without consistent preferences and a unifying organisational medium into a ‘hydra’ with a felt global presence. The virtual nature of incels complicates responses by 1) enabling the collective to have global reach, 2) allowing it to function without an organised body or institutional structures, 3) making it difficult to identify individual incels, and 4) making it difficult to tell when incels pose a genuine security threat. These realities make it crucial to develop a fuller understanding of how the incel collective functions online.

This article demonstrates the growing adaptability of Chinese foreign policy to Gulf states’ expectations around issues that implicate them directly or are relevant (such as relations with the US, and the wars in Yemen and Syria). Gulf states reacted positively because China's approach incrementally integrated local demands in its strategizing, especially by finding common ground with Gulf states despite their own differences; China has done so while not being tied to a “hegemonic idea” (i.e. it is not trying to control or define Gulf politics). China's incrementalist and non-hegemonic regional approach significantly increased Gulf states’ acceptance of its interventions, adapted to Gulf states’ expectations, and, crucially, has been altering what these states expect of major powers in general. The article concludes by proposing that unfolding Gulf politics in light of the June 2017 GCC crisis is very likely to present China with multiple opportunities to demonstrate the adroitness of its strategic choices vis-à-vis the region. 本文表明， 中国外交政策的适应性日益增强， 因为它涉及海湾国家与美国直接相关的期望以及也门和叙利亚的战争。海湾国家的反应是积极的， 因为中国的做法逐渐结合了当地的战略要求， 特别是与海湾国家就自己的分歧找到共同点;中国已经这样做了， 而不是被束缚于 “霸权主义” （即它并不试图控制或定义海湾政治）。中国的渐进式和非霸权式的区域方式大大增加了海湾国家接受其干预措施， 适应海湾国家的预期， 并且最重要的是一直在改变这些国家对一般大国的期望。本文最后提出， 鉴 于 2017 年 6 月海湾合作委员会危机， 展开的海湾政治很可能为中国提供多种机会来展示其对该地区战略选择的熟练程度。

Kuwait's expanding engagement with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) sheds light on its strategies to meet its socioeconomic needs and navigate the Gulf's adversarial politics. The BRI presents a good case study of how the Kuwaiti leadership evaluates the benefits of and dilemmas created by asymmetric structural relationships. This article thus explores how governmental agency in strategically managing massive financial assets complicates our understanding of the vulnerability of so-called small states.

With the increase in population and urban mobilization worldwide, the rapid urbanization of Najaf has led to a massive increase in road traffic. Automobile traffic is now regarded as one of the most significant sources of air pollution in Iraq, with a considerable impact on air quality. This study conducted measurements in a selected urban-road network in Al-Najaf city in Iraq that witnessed a high traffic flow index to measure vehicle emissions and study the correlation between the traffic flow and emissions in this network during peak hours. Priority parameters were measured such as: “Carbon dioxide,” “Carbon monoxide,” “Nitrogen dioxide,” “Nitrogen monoxide,” “Sulfur dioxide,” and other parameters also monitored, including temperature, the direction of the wind, the velocity of wind, and the traffic parameters. It shows that the high heterogeneous traffic flow increases pollutants produced by vehicles. At the same time, it decreases substantially with the decrease in flow and speed. The highest level of Carbon dioxide was: 486ppm, 466ppm, and 447 ppm at peak hours when high traffic density. Also, the highest concentration of Co was 8.22, 4.52, and 3.98 ppm in all locations indexed in the moderate zone, No2 and SoD exceeding EPA levels marking the index in the (very unhealthy) zone. The correlation analysis showed a good and very good linear regression model between CO, CO2, and volume with average vehicle speed. According to these results, the pollution in Najaf due to transportation is significant, with potentially serious health repercussions.

Argues that the US & Hezbollah share interests with regard to achieving political stability in Lebanon. Why a nonviolent opportunity to stabilize Lebanon exists is explained, & policy recommendations for the US are offered. It is contended that mutual strategic accommodation between the US & Hezbollah is appropriate. Also, it is asserted that Hezbollah's capabilities & credibility have taken a hit, largely due to its own behavior. Lebanon's \"revolving door\" intercommunal politics is described in terms of three eras & the dimensions of communal dominance & external patronage. Hezbollah's dominance of the third era is noted, & a review of Shiite politics, Iran's involvement, & Hezbollah's origins & development is presented. Factors rendering Hezbollah's dominance precarious are identified, & its problematic behavior is addressed along with the prospect of changing that behavior & redefining this third era to yield political stability. The US role in this is outlined, & impediments to achieving its policy goals are acknowledged; the strategic gains sought by the US are briefly discussed. D. Edelman