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"Mark, Chi-Kwan"
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The everyday Cold War : Britain and China, 1950-1972
\"In 1950 the British government accorded diplomatic recognition to the newly founded People's Republic of China. But it took 22 years for Britain to establish full diplomatic relations with China. How far was Britain's China policy a failure until 1972? This book argues that Britain and China were involved in the 'everyday Cold War,' or a continuous process of contestation and cooperation that allowed them to 'normalize' their confrontation in the absence of full diplomatic relations. From Vietnam and Taiwan to the mainland and Hong Kong, China's 'everyday Cold War' against Britain was marked by diplomatic ritual, propaganda rhetoric and symbolic gestures. Rather than pursuing a failed policy of 'appeasement,' British decision-makers and diplomats regarded engagement or negotiation with China as the best way of fighting the 'everyday Cold War.' Based on extensive British and Chinese archival sources, this book examines not only the high politics of Anglo-Chinese relations, but also how the British diplomats experienced the Cold War at the local level\"--Publisher description.
The ‘Problem of People’: British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949–62
2007
From late 1956 onwards, British colonial officials spoke of the postwar influx of Chinese refugees from the mainland to Hong Kong as a ‘problem of people’, with serious consequences on housing, social services and even political relations. The problem was also one of an international concern: both Communist and Nationalist China and the United States saw it in the wider context of their Cold War struggles. At first, the Hong Kong government was ambivalent about providing massive relief for the refugees, either by itself or by the United Nations. But by the late 1950s and early 1960s, the political importance of turning potential rioters into responsible citizens, and the Cold War implications of great powers' involvement convinced British colonials that the only lasting solution to the problem was not overseas emigration (with outside aid) but full local integration (through trade and industrialization). The international history of the Chinese refugee problem epitomizes the local history of the Cold War over Hong Kong.
Journal Article
Hong Kong and the Cold War
2004
After 1949, the British Empire in Hong Kong was more vulnerable than the lack of Chinese demand for return and the success of Hong Kong's economic transformations might have suggested. Its vulnerability stemmed as much from Britain's imperial decline and America's Cold War requirements as from a Chinese threat. It culminated in the little known ‘1957 Question’, a year when the British position in Hong Kong appeared more uncertain than any time since 1949. This is the first scholarly study that places Hong Kong at the heart of the Anglo–American relationship in the wider context of the Cold War in Asia. Unlike existing works, which tend to treat British and US policies in isolation, this book explores their dynamic interactions — how the two allies perceived, responded to, and attempted to influence each other's policies and actions. It also provides a major reinterpretation of Hong Kong's involvement in the containment of China. The author argues that, concerned about possible Chinese retaliation, the British insisted and the Americans accepted that Hong Kong's role should be as discreet and non-confrontational in nature as possible. Above all, top decision-makers in Washington evaluated Hong Kong's significance not in its own right, but in the context of the Anglo–American relationship: Hong Kong was seen primarily as a bargaining chip to obtain British support for US policy elsewhere in Asia. Using a variety of British and US archival material as well as Chinese sources, the author examines how the British and US government discussed, debated, and disagreed over Hong Kong's role in the Cold War, and reveals the dynamics of the Anglo–American alliance and the dilemmas of small allies in a global conflict.
Waiting for the Dust to Settle
2015
This article examines the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over diplomatic normalization from a comparative perspective, and sheds valuable light on the transformation of the Cold War in the early 1970s. The Anglo-Chinese talks were inextricably linked with the complicated process of Sino-American rapprochement. At first, the White House kept Britain in the dark concerning its China initiative. After delivering the “shock” of his forthcoming China visit, Nixon asked Heath to delay reaching a deal with Beijing until the dust of the presidential party had settled. For all his initial outrage, Heath’s unsentimental attitude toward the “special relationship” made it easier for him to adjust to the “Nixon shock.” Ultimately, it was not the pressure from the White House, but the long-held British legal position that Taiwan’s status was “undetermined,” that prevented Britain from reaching an agreement with China until March 1972.
Journal Article
Development without Decolonisation? Hong Kong's Future and Relations with Britain and China, 1967–1972
2014
At a time when the United Kingdom accelerated decolonisation and slowly embraced Europe, London gradually lost the means and the will to fulfil its responsibilities to Hong Kong up until the expiry of the New Territories Lease in 1997. Although the immediate cause of this pessimistic mind-set was the leftist riots in 1967, the factors underlying despondency in London had to do with developments before 1967, namely Hong Kong's growing economic prosperity and administrative autonomy from London since the late 1950s, and beyond Hong Kong itself, the global implications of Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez and entry into the European Economic Community by the early 1970s. By 1972 the process of the “decolonisation” of Hong Kong was well underway. Although the British deemed the time unsuitable to initiate formal negotiation with the then Chinese government, they were prepared to take “informal soundings” concerning Hong Kong's future when a new pragmatic leadership emerged and before the crisis of confidence ensued nearer 1997.
Journal Article