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"Marmor, Andrei"
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Social conventions
Social conventions are those arbitrary rules and norms governing the countless behaviors all of us engage in every day without necessarily thinking about them, from shaking hands when greeting someone to driving on the right side of the road. In this book, Andrei Marmor offers a pathbreaking and comprehensive philosophical analysis of conventions and the roles they play in social life and practical reason, and in doing so challenges the dominant view of social conventions first laid out by David Lewis.
Marmor begins by giving a general account of the nature of conventions, explaining the differences between coordinative and constitutive conventions and between deep and surface conventions. He then applies this analysis to explain how conventions work in language, morality, and law. Marmor clearly demonstrates that many important semantic and pragmatic aspects of language assumed by many theorists to be conventional are in fact not, and that the role of conventions in the moral domain is surprisingly complex, playing mostly an auxiliary and supportive role. Importantly, he casts new light on the conventional foundations of law, arguing that the distinction between deep and surface conventions can be used to answer the prevalent objections to legal conventionalism.
Social Conventionsis a much-needed reappraisal of the nature of the rules that regulate virtually every aspect of human conduct.
eBook
Philosophy of law (Princeton foundations of contemporary philosophy)
InPhilosophy of Law, Andrei Marmor provides a comprehensive analysis of contemporary debates about the fundamental nature of law--an issue that has been at the heart of legal philosophy for centuries. What the law is seems to be a matter of fact, but this fact has normative significance: it tells people what they ought to do. Is the normative content of a law entirely determined by the facts that make it a law? Are there some normative moral constraints on what the law can be? And can we fully characterize and define the law without assuming a moral conception about what the law ought to be? Finally, is the philosophy of law about describing what law is, or prescribing what it should be?
Marmor argues that the myriad questions raised by the factual and normative features of law actually depend on the possibility of reduction--whether the legal domain can be explained in terms of something else, more foundational in nature. In addition to exploring the major issues in contemporary legal thought,Philosophy of Lawprovides a critical analysis of the people and ideas that have dominated the field in past centuries. It will be essential reading for anyone curious about the nature of law.
eBook
What Is the Right to Privacy?
This article argues that there is a general right to privacy grounded in people's interest in having a reasonable measure of control over the ways in which they can present themselves (and what is theirs) to others. This underlying interest justifies the right to privacy and explains its proper scope, though the scope of the right might be narrower, and fuzzier in its boundaries, than is commonly understood.
Journal Article
Soft Law, Authoritative Advice and Non-binding Agreements
One of the most fascinating developments in the domain of international law in the last few decades is the astonishing proliferation of non-binding legal instruments or soft law, namely, norms or directives explicitly avoiding the imposition of legal obligations on the relevant parties. From a philosophical perspective, this is rather puzzling: how can we explain the idea of a non-binding directive or a non-binding contract? In this article I aim to provide an account of the rationale of soft law from the perspective of the practical reasons in play. First, I analyse the idea of authoritative advice, suggesting that when authorities advise their putative subjects, they purport to give the subject presumptive reasons for action. I explain what presumptive reasons are. Secondly, I suggest the possibility that something very similar is at work in cases of non-binding agreements, coupled with special accountability relations that such agreements invariably constitute.
Journal Article
An Institutional Conception of Authority
The question of legitimacy has taken central stage in the philosophical debates about authority. Discussions typically begin with the normative question of what it makes a practical authority legitimate. Here, Marmor argues the institutional conception of authority by explaining why authorities are essentially institutional in nature. He examines how this institutional conception bears on the question of legitimacy, drawing on the distinction between voluntary and nonvoluntary institutions. Finally, he answers some possible objections to the institutional conception, focusing on some of the normative aspects of authority-subject relations.
Journal Article
Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral
It has become increasingly popular to argue that legal positivism is actually a normative theory, and that it cannot be purely descriptive and morally neutral as H.L.A. Hart has suggested. This article purports to disprove this line of thought. It argues that legal positivism is best understood as a descriptive, morally neutral, theory about the nature of law. The article distinguishes between five possible views about the relations between normative claims and legal positivism, arguing that some of them are not at odds with Hart’s thesis about the nature of jurisprudence, while the others are wrong, both as expositions of legal positivism or as critiques of it. Legal positivism does not necessarily purport to justify any aspect of its subject matter, nor is it committed to any particular moral or political evaluations.
Journal Article