Explore the vast range of titles available.

The practice of law can seem so simple, yet so daunting.The lawyer earns fees by representing clients, but is also subject to limits that can put the brakes on client representation.This is called \"fighting fair,\" which requires zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law.

In Spring, 1996, the Ninth and Second Circuits were the first circuit courts in the country to find a constitutional prohibition against laws which make physician-assisted suicide a crime. These landmark decisions held that a competent adult suffering from a terminal illness could voluntarily seek the assistance of a physician in obtaining relief through suicide. This Essay argues that the law generated by these decisions is misguided and dangerous, as their effect is to displace the well-established line between killing and letting die. The authors argue that the new line drawn by the Ninth and Second Circuits is both untenable and dangerous, concluding that the line opens the door to involuntary euthanasia. The courts' reliance upon different clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that neither could find a definite, irrefutable constitutional basis for their decision. Instead of proposing and defending a new analysis of the constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide, the authors engage in a philosophical, moral and pragmatic discussion to establish that there are many compelling reasons to maintain the traditional line between killing and letting die.

The United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in \"Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health\" refused to recognize a constitutional right for Nancy Cruzan, a permanently comatose woman, to have her family decide whether life-sustaining medical treatment should be terminated. Eight members of the Court, however, acknowledged that a competent patient could have ordered the termination of life support. After reviewing the Supreme Court's decision, Professors Martyn and Bourguignon present what they find to be a critical error in the Court's \"Cruzan\" analysis. Earlier state court decisions required procedural protections in surrogate decisionmaking cases but did not impose the state's own substantive values upon the family's decision regarding termination of life support. The Supreme Court majority expressed concern for the risk of erroneous decisionmaking in refusing to defer to the decision of Cruzan's family without clear proof of her wishes. The authors argue, however, that the majority exacerbated rather than prevented Missouri's usurpation of Cruzan's rights. They then offer an alternative model for conservative constitutional analysis that would avoid the problems created by the Court's \"Cruzan\" decision.