Explore the vast range of titles available.

We employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to traditional office positions. Most workers are not willing to pay for scheduling flexibility, though a tail of workers with high valuations allows for sizable compensating differentials. The average worker is willing to give up 20 percent of wages to avoid a schedule set by an employer on short notice, and 8 percent for the option to work from home. We also document that many job-seekers are inattentive, and we account for this in estimation.

Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.

We compare estimates of peer effects on worker output in laboratory experiments and field studies from naturally occurring environments. The mean study-level estimate of a change in a worker's productivity in response to an increase in a co-worker's productivity (γ) is γ̂ = 0.12 (SE = 0.03, nstudies = 34), with a between-study standard deviation τ = 0.16. The mean estimated γ̂-values are close between laboratory and field studies (γ̂lab − γ̂field = 0.04, P = 0.55, nlab = 11, nfield = 23), as are estimates of between-study variance τ²(${\\hat{\\mathrm{\\tau }}}_{\\mathrm{l}\\mathrm{a}\\mathrm{b}}^{2}-{\\hat{\\mathrm{\\tau }}}_{\\mathrm{f}\\mathrm{i}\\mathrm{e}\\mathrm{l}\\mathrm{d}}^{2} = -0.003$, P = 0.89). The small mean difference between laboratory and field estimates holds even after controlling for sample characteristics such as incentive schemes and work complexity (γ̂lab − γ̂field = 0.03, P = 0.62, nsamples = 46). Laboratory experiments generalize quantitatively in that they provide an accurate description of the mean and variance of productivity spillovers.

We study peer effects in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team. Using high-frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain, we find strong evidence of positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. Worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him. Additionally, workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact. We conclude that social pressure can partially internalize free-riding externalities that are built into many workplaces.

We study the effect of disclosing information on peers' salaries on workers' job satisfaction and job search intentions. A randomly chosen subset of University of California employees was informed about a new website listing the pay of University employees. All employees were then surveyed about their job satisfaction and job search intentions. Workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and occupation report lower pay and job satisfaction and a significant increase in the likelihood of looking for a new job. Above-median earners are unaffected. Differences in pay rank matter more than differences in pay levels. (JEL I23, J28, J31, J64)

Using comprehensive data on bank lending and establishment-level outcomes from 1997–2010, this paper finds that small business lending is an unimportant determinant of small business and overall economic activity. A shift-share style research design is implemented to predict county-level lending shocks using variation in preexisting bank market shares and bank supply shifts. Counties with negative predicted lending shocks experienced declines in small business loan originations, indicating that it is costly to switch lenders. However, small business loan originations have an economically insignificant and generally statistically insignificant impact on both small firm and overall employment during the Great Recession and normal times.

We estimate the effect of new private-sector unionization on publicly traded firms' equity value in the United States over the 1961-1999 period using a newly assembled sample of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections matched to stock market data. Event-study estimates show an average union effect on the equity value of the firm equivalent to $ 40,500 per unionized worker, an effect that takes 15 to 18 months after unionization to fully materialize, and one that could not be detected by a short-run event study. At the same time, point estimates from a regression discontinuity design—comparing the stock market impact of close union election wins to close losses—are considerably smaller and close to zero. We find a negative relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns and the vote share in support of the union, allowing us to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings.

This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage cuts were larger in cities with higher initial compensation, but not in cities where compensation was initially out of line with (measured) fundamentals. The response is more consistent with public aversion to high compensation than the effects of increased accountability.

We document that rotation group bias—the tendency for the unemployment rate to vary systematically by month in sample—in the Current Population Survey (CPS) has worsened over time. Estimated unemployment rates for earlier rotation groups have grown sharply relative to later rotation groups; both should be nationally representative samples. This bias increased discretely after the 1994 CPS redesign, and rising nonresponse rates are likely a significant contributor. Survey nonresponse increased after the redesign, mirroring the evolution of rotation group bias. Consistent with this explanation, rotation group bias for households that responded in all eight interviews remained stable over time.

Henry (Hank) Farber is a luminary in labor economics. His major research contributions span subjects as broad as the behavior of unions, arbitration systems, wage-setting, employer–employee matching, and labor supply. These achievements are evident from his curriculum vitae, or perhaps more profoundly by considering the way his papers have shaped the field. But, in Hank’s case, there is a whole dimension of influence that isn’t as visible in public records but is as important to our profession. In a word, one might understand this contribution as generosity: Hank’s acuity, effectiveness, and support as a mentor and adviser have provided incalculable benefits to the profession. Hank has developed a whole generation of scholars who today help define labor economics. Few other labor economists have had such an influence. On the occasion of Hank’s 65th birthday, his many students, collaborators, and friends gathered in Princeton, New Jersey, for a conference in his honor. Seven of the papers presented are included in this special issue. The ILR Review is the natural home for such an issue given Hank’s long-standing connection with Cornell and the journal. Hank started his career in labor economics as an MS student at the Industrial and Labor Relations School of Cornell, served as an Associate Editor of ILR Review for five years, and published three of his most influential articles in the journal.