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This paper looks back at China’s policy towards the establishment of a crisis management mechanism with Japan in the East China Sea from the beginning of the negotiations in 2008 to the deadlock reached at the end of 2015. During this period of seven years, China moved from being a reluctant negotiator to interrupting the negotiations and finally accepting their resumption, but only after setting such a high bar in terms of relative sovereignty gains that the talks unravelled. The paper argues that the socialisation of China to confidence-building norms in the security sphere – norms that the strategic community of the PRC traditionally rejects – is making very slow progress despite the rising risk of incidents in maritime East Asia. It concludes that Chinese foreign policy uses crisis management negotiations to secure a variety of foreign policy goals linked to sovereignty and balance of power rather than a tool purely dedicated to building security and stability by freezing an existing status quo.

This article argues that the European Union has more interests in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) modernisation and maritime security issues in East Asia than has traditionally been recognised. The PRC’s naval modernisation intersects with the EU’s foreign and security policy interests in five main areas: the international Law of the Sea; the risks for Europe of being dragged into an Asian maritime conflict and the safety of European trade with Asian partners; Europe’s competitiveness in international markets for naval military systems; the potential for maritime security cooperation against non-traditional threats; and finally, the arms embargo issue and the question of naval technology transfers to China. Through an assessment of the current PLAN modernisation – and Europe’s significant contribution to this effort – the article argues that European policy towards China doesn’t adequately address these five policy areas.

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.) Compiled and commented by Mathieu Duchâtel based on: * \"The new version of the history textbooks allows us to rediscover the true face of the history of Taiwan,\" editorial, Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times), 1 February 2007. * Chang Ching-wei, \"The revised versions of the high school history textbooks abandon a myth in a neutral manner,\" Xin Taïwan Xinwen Zhoukan, no 567, 1 February 2007. * Wang Yi-feng, \"National identity: the seeds have to be sown in academic textbooks,\" Xin Taïwan Xinwen Zhoukan, no 567, 1 February 2007. * \"Legalist independence hits a wall, psychological independence is inflamed,\" editorial, Lienhebao, 2 February 2007. * Philip Yang Yung-ming, \"Changing names at any price means playing on the heartstrings,\" Lienhebao, 11 February 2007, p. 15. * Lin Huo-wang, \"Chen Shui-bian is changing names to save his skin after 2006,\" Lienhebao, 12 February 2007, p. 15. Since the beginning of 2007, three issues have domi- nated domestic Taiwanese politics: the corruption cases, the selection by the political parties of their candidates for the 2008 presidential elections, and the desinicisation campaign (...) orchestrated by the island's authorities. [...]the number of lessons dedicated to Chinese history will once again be reduced. The American statements, motivated by the desire to maintain stability in cross-Strait relations, have sought to forestall a direction reaction from China against the desinicisation on Taiwan.

In late 2010 and early 2011, the Chinese press carried a number of analyses on the \"deterioration of China's regional security environment.\" The expression counteracts the notion, disseminated mostly by American analysts, of assertiveness in China's foreign policy in the region. In Beijing experts' point of view, the list of negative developments is long, so much so that Ma Xiaojun even perceives a \"new Cold War situation\". In the South China Sea, parties contesting Chinese sovereignty over some islands have hardened their stance by moving closer to the United States. In China's maritime neighbourhood, the United States has held the biggest joint naval exercises with Japan and South Korea in the histories of the two respective alliances. In Japan, the Democratic Party quickly shed its accommodating China policy once it came to power. Chinese experts are in agreement that the main factor behind this deterioration is the \"American return to East Asia\", symbolised by US participation in the East Asia Summit in October 2010 in Hanoi for the first time ever.

[...]it can secure for China a provider of tech- nology: this at a time when the US, Japan, and Germany are adopting a cautious approach to the usefulness of trans- ferring technology to a state whose strategic intentions are still opaque.

The passing of the Anti-Secession Law, on March 14th 2005, was a reminder that the People's Republic of China has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Following the election of Chen Shui-bian in March 2000, the positions of the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have hardened. Beijing demands from Taipei a recognition of the \"one China\" principle in order to resume dialogue, while Taipei considers the Republic of China in Taiwan to be a sovereign and independent state. This article describes the range of means–including modernisation of the military, reinforced military co-operation with the United States, and increasingly with Japan, as well as restrictions on various forms of exchanges between the two sides—which are used by the Chen Shui-bian government to resist Chinese irredentism. It emphasises the continuity with Lee Teng-hui's security policy, and the new constraints which affect the Taiwanese executive, in particular the refusal by the opposition parties, which control the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan, to approve the government's plans for arms acquisitions.

For the European Union, any conclusion of a Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CPA) is conditional upon the inclusion of a human rights clause in the final draft. The commission has made it clear that every new foreign agreement with countries outside the EU must link the further development of economic and commercial relations to a respect for human rights. The relevant clause allows the EU to suspend the preferential treatment granted to its partners in the event of a blatant human rights violation. So far, the differences between the two sides on the matter of human rights have delayed the signing of a CPA. While the negotiations on this new framework agreement to replace the 1985 agreement on economic and commercial cooperation began in early 2007 and are still ongoing, it appears that China is prepared to relax its opposition to the human rights clause. This article by Zhang Hua calls on the Chinese government to accept the clause, but with reservations intended to limit its range and to restrict the EU's ability to force China to make major changes in civil rights legislation.