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Immune systems distinguish \"self\" from \"nonself\" to maintain homeostasis and must differentially gate access to allow colonization by potentially beneficial, nonpathogenic microbes. Plant roots grow within extremely diverse soil microbial communities but assemble a taxonomically limited root-associated microbiome. We grew isogenic Arabidopsis thaliana mutants with altered immune systems in a wild soil and also in recolonization experiments with a synthetic bacterial community. We established that biosynthesis of, and signaling dependent on, the foliar defense phytohormone salicylic acid is required to assemble a normal root microbiome. Salicylic acid modulates colonization of the root by specific bacterial families. Thus, plant immune signaling drives selection from the available microbial communities to sculpt the root microbiome.

Plants intimately associate with diverse bacteria. Plant-associated bacteria have ostensibly evolved genes that enable them to adapt to plant environments. However, the identities of such genes are mostly unknown, and their functions are poorly characterized. We sequenced 484 genomes of bacterial isolates from roots of Brassicaceae, poplar, and maize. We then compared 3,837 bacterial genomes to identify thousands of plant-associated gene clusters. Genomes of plant-associated bacteria encode more carbohydrate metabolism functions and fewer mobile elements than related non-plant-associated genomes do. We experimentally validated candidates from two sets of plant-associated genes: one involved in plant colonization, and the other serving in microbe–microbe competition between plant-associated bacteria. We also identified 64 plant-associated protein domains that potentially mimic plant domains; some are shared with plant-associated fungi and oomycetes. This work expands the genome-based understanding of plant–microbe interactions and provides potential leads for efficient and sustainable agriculture through microbiome engineering. Comparative genomic analysis of 3,837 bacterial genomes, including new sequences from 484 root-associated isolates, identifies plant-associated gene clusters and plant-mimicking domains.

Diverse soil-resident bacteria can contribute to plant growth and health, but the molecular mechanisms enabling them to effectively colonize their plant hosts remain poorly understood. We used randomly barcoded transposon mutagenesis sequencing (RB-TnSeq) in Pseudomonas simiae, a model root-colonizing bacterium, to establish a genome-wide map of bacterial genes required for colonization of the Arabidopsis thaliana root system. We identified 115 genes (2% of all P. simiae genes) with functions that are required for maximal competitive colonization of the root system. Among the genes we identified were some with obvious colonization-related roles in motility and carbon metabolism, as well as 44 other genes that had no or vague functional predictions. Independent validation assays of individual genes confirmed colonization functions for 20 of 22 (91%) cases tested. To further characterize genes identified by our screen, we compared the functional contributions of P. simiae genes to growth in 90 distinct in vitro conditions by RB-TnSeq, highlighting specific metabolic functions associated with root colonization genes. Our analysis of bacterial genes by sequence-driven saturation mutagenesis revealed a genome-wide map of the genetic determinants of plant root colonization and offers a starting point for targeted improvement of the colonization capabilities of plant-beneficial microbes.

[...]state and federal courts have continued to develop fiduciary law in the areas of recognizing an independent tort of breach of fiduciary duty, determining the appropriate characterization of shareholder fiduciary claims in an employment context, and the minimum pleading standards for ERISA claims against a university. [...]comparable treatment across genders, for example firing both gay men and gay women, does not absolve the employer because the decision ultimately returns to one based on that individual's sex. [...]in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhartf7 the Court held that a defendant company's policy that required female employees to make greater contributions to the pension fund than males because females, on average, live longer violated Title VII, although the policy in question regarded men and women the same as groups. [...]in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,18 the male plaintiff alleged sexual harassment perpetuated by male colleagues.

Former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed is celebrated for his defence of the province and Western Canada during the energy wars of the 1970s, and deservedly so. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was a formidable opponent. He was able and willing to use the full arsenal of federal powers to redirect soaring western energy revenues away from Alberta to Ottawa. For those of us in Western Canada, it is unpleasant to imagine what the outcome of this struggle would have been if a lesser man than Peter Lougheed had been at Alberta’s helm. But there is another aspect of the Lougheed legacy that is less remembered because it is less celebrated—also deservedly so. These were Lougheed’s ambitious economic diversification projects. Between 1973 and 1993 (when Ralph Klein became premier), the Lougheed-Getty “forced-growth” economic diversification projects are conservatively estimated to have cost Albertans$2.2 billion. While former premier Don Getty got most the blame for these losses (as many occurred during his watch), most of these programs began earlier. Lougheed’s push for government-led diversification of the Alberta economy was a policy hallmark of his 1971 electoral breakthrough, and marked a sharp break from three decades of Social Credit laissez-faire policies. The Lougheed-Getty diversification fiascos are of more than just historical interest. While the subsequent Progressive Conservative (PC) regime of Premier Ralph Klein (1993–2006) followed an explicit philosophy of “government is not in the business of business,” the more recent Stelmach (2006–11) and Redford (2011-14) governments have not. Both have embraced government-sponsored “value-added” and diversification initiatives, including the North West Redwater Partnership upgrader and two new endowments to provide “funding for social and cultural innovation, and agricultural innovation.”† As Alberta’s fifth premier in the past nine years, Jim Prentice, takes the helm and tries to restore some stability to Alberta’s public finances, it merits revisiting the Lougheed-Getty experience for lessons learned. Our read of their record cautions against going down the same road again. While we identify several successes (e.g., Syncrude, Alberta Energy Company, and the ethane-based petrochemical industry), these were mostly in the hydrocarbon energy sector, and so contributed little to diversifying Alberta’s economy. Our analysis identifies the largest dollar losses (the “Dirty Dozen”), several of which suggest that failure to control costs is endemic to government-led projects. Last but not least, the sheer number and diversity of government-funded projects reflects an unhealthy culture of corporate cronyism. With billions of dollars sitting in the newly created Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund earmarked for “diversification” and “capital projects,” the temptation to spend became irresistible. The Heritage Fund, rather than serving its original purpose of a long-term “rainy-day account,” became a giant slush fund for ministers’ pet projects. The result is that, in real dollars, the Heritage Savings Trust Fund has a lower net worth in 2015 than it did in 1987. By the time Klein won the leadership of the PCs in 1993, his predecessors had racked up over $ 23 billion in net debt. Klein is widely celebrated by some (and criticized by others) for the harsh budget cuts he made to eliminate the structural deficit he inherited. Less well known is that the Klein team also terminated almost all the Lougheed-Getty diversification and stimulus programs. In their stead, the Klein governments—under the leadership of treasurers Jim Dinning and Stockwell Day—pursued a diversification policy based on macroeconomics: making Alberta the most taxcompetitive jurisdiction in Canada. This “build-it-and-they-will-come” approach was intended to attract both financial and human capital. This approach has enjoyed modest success thus far, as witnessed in the growth of the financial services sector and the relocation of many corporate head offices to Calgary. It is clearly a lower-risk path to sustained prosperity than the ill-fated, government-led “forced-growth” initiatives of the Lougheed-Getty era.

Former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed is celebrated for his defence of the province and Western Canada during the energy wars of the 1970s, and deservedly so. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was a formidable opponent. He was able and willing to use the full arsenal of federal powers to redirect soaring western energy revenues away from Alberta to Ottawa. For those of us in Western Canada, it is unpleasant to imagine what the outcome of this struggle would have been if a lesser man than Peter Lougheed had been at Alberta’s helm. But there is another aspect of the Lougheed legacy that is less remembered because it is less celebrated—also deservedly so. These were Lougheed’s ambitious economic diversification projects. Between 1973 and 1993 (when Ralph Klein became premier), the Lougheed-Getty “forced-growth” economic diversification projects are conservatively estimated to have cost Albertans $2.2 billion. While former premier Don Getty got most the blame for these losses (as many occurred during his watch), most of these programs began earlier. Lougheed’s push for government-led diversification of the Alberta economy was a policy hallmark of his 1971 electoral breakthrough, and marked a sharp break from three decades of Social Credit laissez-faire policies. The Lougheed-Getty diversification fiascos are of more than just historical interest. While the subsequent Progressive Conservative (PC) regime of Premier Ralph Klein (1993–2006) followed an explicit philosophy of “government is not in the business of business,” the more recent Stelmach (2006–11) and Redford (2011-14) governments have not. Both have embraced government-sponsored “value-added” and diversification initiatives, including the North West Redwater Partnership upgrader and two new endowments to provide “funding for social and cultural innovation, and agricultural innovation.”† As Alberta’s fifth premier in the past nine years, Jim Prentice, takes the helm and tries to restore some stability to Alberta’s public finances, it merits revisiting the Lougheed-Getty experience for lessons learned. Our read of their record cautions against going down the same road again. While we identify several successes (e.g., Syncrude, Alberta Energy Company, and the ethane-based petrochemical industry), these were mostly in the hydrocarbon energy sector, and so contributed little to diversifying Alberta’s economy. Our analysis identifies the largest dollar losses (the “Dirty Dozen”), several of which suggest that failure to control costs is endemic to government-led projects. Last but not least, the sheer number and diversity of government-funded projects reflects an unhealthy culture of corporate cronyism. With billions of dollars sitting in the newly created Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund earmarked for “diversification” and “capital projects,” the temptation to spend became irresistible. The Heritage Fund, rather than serving its original purpose of a long-term “rainy-day account,” became a giant slush fund for ministers’ pet projects. The result is that, in real dollars, the Heritage Savings Trust Fund has a lower net worth in 2015 than it did in 1987. By the time Klein won the leadership of the PCs in 1993, his predecessors had racked up over $23 billion in net debt. Klein is widely celebrated by some (and criticized by others) for the harsh budget cuts he made to eliminate the structural deficit he inherited. Less well known is that the Klein team also terminated almost all the Lougheed-Getty diversification and stimulus programs. In their stead, the Klein governments—under the leadership of treasurers Jim Dinning and Stockwell Day—pursued a diversification policy based on macroeconomics: making Alberta the most taxcompetitive jurisdiction in Canada. This “build-it-and-they-will-come” approach was intended to attract both financial and human capital. This approach has enjoyed modest success thus far, as witnessed in the growth of the financial services sector and the relocation of many corporate head offices to Calgary. It is clearly a lower-risk path to sustained prosperity than the ill-fated, government-led “forced-growth” initiatives of the Lougheed-Getty era.

[...]the Obama NLRB, which is charged with enforcing the Act, remains one of the most partisan Boards since the agency's formation, overturning large numbers of decades-old bipartisan precedent.2 Even given the Board's usual politicized nature, the decisions of its current majority reached new heights of rejecting established precedent. In 2014, the General Counsel filed a consolidated complaint stemming out of unfair labor practice charges against McDonald's USA, LLC, as a joint employer with numerous franchisees.3 The complaint alleges that McDonald's and its franchisees were jointly liable for interfering with and discriminating against local restaurant employees who participated in nationwide fast food worker protests about their terms and conditions of employment.4 After initial hearings were held, the Board enforced the administrative law judge's (ALJ) case management order requiring the General Counsel and the parties to present evidence on the joint-employment issue first before proceeding to the individual unfair labor practice cases.5 Presumably, the General Counsel will present evidence attempting to establish that McDonald's USA, LLC, is a joint employer under the NLRB's new standard in Browning Fends Industries, including whether McDonald's maintained indirect control over its franchisees' labor relations.6 In a continuing dispute over the Board's discovery requests, the Board recently found that the ALJ may also determine whether McDonald's properly complied with the Board's subpoena after it was enforced in federal court.

Former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed is celebrated for his defence of the province and Western Canada during the energy wars of the 1970s, and deservedly so. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was a formidable opponent. He was able and willing to use the full arsenal of federal powers to redirect soaring western energy revenues away from Alberta to Ottawa. For those of us in Western Canada, it is unpleasant to imagine what the outcome of this struggle would have been if a lesser man than Peter Lougheed had been at Alberta’s helm. But there is another aspect of the Lougheed legacy that is less remembered because it is less celebrated—also deservedly so. These were Lougheed’s ambitious economic diversification projects. Between 1973 and 1993 (when Ralph Klein became premier), the Lougheed-Getty “forced-growth” economic diversification projects are conservatively estimated to have cost Albertans $2.2 billion. While former premier Don Getty got most the blame for these losses (as many occurred during his watch), most of these programs began earlier. Lougheed’s push for government-led diversification of the Alberta economy was a policy hallmark of his 1971 electoral breakthrough, and marked a sharp break from three decades of Social Credit laissez-faire policies. The Lougheed-Getty diversification fiascos are of more than just historical interest. While the subsequent Progressive Conservative (PC) regime of Premier Ralph Klein (1993–2006) followed an explicit philosophy of “government is not in the business of business,” the more recent Stelmach (2006–11) and Redford (2011-14) governments have not. Both have embraced government-sponsored “value-added” and diversification initiatives, including the North West Redwater Partnership upgrader and two new endowments to provide “funding for social and cultural innovation, and agricultural innovation.”† As Alberta’s fifth premier in the past nine years, Jim Prentice, takes the helm and tries to restore some stability to Alberta’s public finances, it merits revisiting the Lougheed-Getty experience for lessons learned. Our read of their record cautions against going down the same road again. While we identify several successes (e.g., Syncrude, Alberta Energy Company, and the ethane-based petrochemical industry), these were mostly in the hydrocarbon energy sector, and so contributed little to diversifying Alberta’s economy. Our analysis identifies the largest dollar losses (the “Dirty Dozen”), several of which suggest that failure to control costs is endemic to government-led projects. Last but not least, the sheer number and diversity of government-funded projects reflects an unhealthy culture of corporate cronyism. With billions of dollars sitting in the newly created Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund earmarked for “diversification” and “capital projects,” the temptation to spend became irresistible. The Heritage Fund, rather than serving its original purpose of a long-term “rainy-day account,” became a giant slush fund for ministers’ pet projects. The result is that, in real dollars, the Heritage Savings Trust Fund has a lower net worth in 2015 than it did in 1987. By the time Klein won the leadership of the PCs in 1993, his predecessors had racked up over $23 billion in net debt. Klein is widely celebrated by some (and criticized by others) for the harsh budget cuts he made to eliminate the structural deficit he inherited. Less well known is that the Klein team also terminated almost all the Lougheed-Getty diversification and stimulus programs. In their stead, the Klein governments—under the leadership of treasurers Jim Dinning and Stockwell Day—pursued a diversification policy based on macroeconomics: making Alberta the most taxcompetitive jurisdiction in Canada. This “build-it-and-they-will-come” approach was intended to attract both financial and human capital. This approach has enjoyed modest success thus far, as witnessed in the growth of the financial services sector and the relocation of many corporate head offices to Calgary. It is clearly a lower-risk path to sustained prosperity than the ill-fated, government-led “forced-growth” initiatives of the Lougheed-Getty era.