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In October 2024, Oklahoma Attorney General Gentner Drummond told the US Supreme Court that \"justice would not be served by moving forward with a capital sentence that the State can no longer defend\" against Richard Glossip due to withheld evidence concerning the key witness whom prosecutors permitted to testify falsely. [...]defense lawyers must understand the best strategies for combatting prosecutorial misconduct. [...]NACDL highlights the need for credible cases of prosecutorial misconduct to be reported and vigorously litigated.

Distinguishing Advances from Retainers The opinion observes that some terms lawyers use to describe fees, such as \"retainer\" or \"retain-er fee,\" are not found in the Model Rules. Given the rarity of general retainers, the balance of the opinion fo-cusses on advance fees paid to a lawyer, such as for defense of criminal charges or discreet legal matters not handled on a contingent fee basis. Earning a Flat Fee in Stages In our experience, most lawyers providing criminal defense representation usually charge a fixed or flat fee for most state court and many federal court matters other than white-collar crimes or the representation of corporate and wealthy clients.

The court found \"Eisenburg would be in a conflict of interest situation between the duty of vigorous representation of Thomas Andretta and the duty of loyalty to Picardo, since confidences relating to Picardo's murder conviction and events of that period would be useful to impeach him as a witness against Thomas Andretta.\" Andretta had offered to waive both the conflict and any ineffective assistance of counsel claim to retain Eisenberg as his attorney, but the court of appeals found that the district court judge was correct in finding an actual conflict by presuming Eisenburg had access to privileged information that could be used in cross-examining Picardo. [...]the approach that would permit cross examination of a former client if both the former and current clients give informed consent is impractical.

Ms. Stefanik's complaint points out that at the ceremony Judge Howell acknowledged her prior work experience and longstanding relationships with several prominent lawyers who have served or are serving in the US Justice Department. First of all, it is worth noting that Professor Richardson is a tenured professor of history. [...]she is hardly an unreliable source to cite.

The federal indictment, pending in U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Florida, alleges that lawyer M. Evan Corcoran participated in the conduct that gave rise to the Espionage Act and obstruction charges Trump faces. Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 801(d)(2), dealing with admissions, provides a sure path around any hearsay objections. [...]Corcoran fought giving the notes to the grand jury and still is on the Trump legal team, so he would almost certainly be a hostile witness. Rule 4-1.6(e) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct requires a lawyer to take reasonable steps to prevent disclosure of information relating to client representation and to protect confidentiality. Corcoran fulfilled this obligation when he was subpoenaed before the grand jury, l-le or Trump's other lawyers may well reassert attorney-client privilege at the upcoming federal trial. The advocate witness rule would not, however, prevent him from retaining a position as one of Trump's advisors operating outside the court room.

In this column, we examine the policies behind conflict of interest rules and explore the likelihood that the Massachusetts high court will determine that the right to counsel demands isunbiased counsel. Dew's Claims In his appeal, Dew alleges that the appointment of Doyle to represent him violated his right to equal protection under the US Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and that the trial court erroneously used the ineffective assistance of counsel standard of review to deny him relief. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 397 Mass. 16, 20 (1986) (\"Once a genuine conflict of interest is shown, the defendant is not required under art. 12 to shoulder the additional burden of proving actual prejudice or an adverse effect on his counsel's performance.\"); Commonwealth v. Hurley, 391 Mass. 76, 81 (1984) (\"Such a fundamental right [the right to counsel] should not depend on a defendant's ability to meet the nearly impossible burden of proving that a genuine conflict of interest resulted in an adverse effect on his trial counsel's performance.\") If the Massachusetts high court views Dew's claims either as involving structural error under federal law or under Massachusetts precedent applying Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Dew will not have to satisfy the two-part test typically governing ineffective assistance claims.

Model Rule 1.8(f) states that \"[a] lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless: (l) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to the representation of the client is protected as required by Rule 1.6,\" the ethics rule requiring client information to remain confidential. Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) also states that a concurrent conflict of interest exists when \"there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by a personal interest of the lawyer.\" [...]party payment of attorney fees poses the risk of a conflict between the client's interests and the lawyer's personal financial interests in receiving the fee payment and in obtaining future work from the fee payer. Other Ethics Rules Even if the third-party payment of attorney fees does not trigger a conflict of interest, other ethics rules-such as the duty to render independent judgment, the duty of competence, and the duty to allow clients to make certain important decisions-may.

According to the National Registry of Exonerations, prosecutorial misconduct, such as concealing exculpatory evidence, witness tampering, and misconduct at trial, occurred in 30 percent of exonerations. [...]both the threat of sanctions and the reality of their imposition can also change prosecutorial behavior in more subtle ways, for example, by motivating prosecutor offices both to educate their employees about their ethical obligations as well as to encourage, monitor, and internally enforce adherence to them. [...]enforcement is important for the purpose of incapacitation. Transparency helps ensure that ethics authorities adhere to their duties to investigate and adjudicate ethics complaints, including initiating sua sponte investigations in cases in which a judge makes a finding of prosecutorial misconduct.