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Tracing the growth of philosophical justifications of toleration, this work discusses the grounds on which we may be required to be tolerant and the proper limits of toleration. The papers cover a range of perspectives on the subject, including Marxist and Socialist as well as liberal views.

In Torture, Terror and Trade - Offs: Philosophy for the White House Jeremy Waldron asks how moral philosophy can illuminate real life political problems. He argues that moral philosophers should remind politicians of the importance of adhering to moral principle, and he also argues that some moral principles are absolute and exceptionless. Thus, he is very critical of those philosophers who, post 9/11, were willing to condone the use of torture. In this article I discuss and criticize Waldron’s absolutism. In particular, I claim that the arguments he offers in support of it are either dependent on religious conviction or support only rule utilitarianism, not absolutism. Additionally, I argue that the character of politics is such that it is both undesirable and morally irresponsible for politicians to adopt the absolutist approach favoured by Waldron. We have reason to be glad that Professor Waldron does not go to Washington.

Sexuality and Subordination uses the insights of a range of disciplines to examine the construction of gender in nineteenth-century Britain and France. With contributions from history, literature, sociology and philosophy, its interdisciplinary approach demonstrates the extent to which a common focus can illuminate problems inaccessible to any single discipline. ‘Victorianism’ is generally understood to mean sexual double standards, hypocrisy and prudery among the middle classes. But, as this collection shows, the representation of sexuality in the nineteenth century was more diverse and complex than is sometimes realized. Both art and literature point to the deployment of sexual metaphors and imagery, and the language of educated public opinion was shaped by the dichotomy between mind and matter, between rationality and sexuality. The contributors to this volume explore how women, in questioning their subordination, had to challenge a construction of femininity which imposed sexual ignorance. Sexuality and Subordination uses the insights of a range of disciplines to examine the construction of gender in nineteenth century Britain and France. With contributions from history, literature, sociology, and philosophy, its interdisciplinary approach demonstrates the extent to which a common focus can illuminate problems inaccessible to any single discipline. ‘Victorianism’ is generally understood to mean sexual double standards, hypocrisy, and prudery among the middle classes. But, as this collection shows, the representation of sexuality in the nineteenth century was more diverse and complex than is sometimes realized. Both art and literature point to the deployment of sexual metaphors and imagery, and the language of educated public opinion was shaped by the dichotomy between mind and matter, between rationality and sexuality. The contributors to this volume explore how women, in questioning their subordination, had to challenge a construction of femininity which imposed sexual ignorance. As they did this, women claimed admission to a wider world of knowledge and experience, and came to construct an ideology of their own, a framework of thinking about sexual relationships and masculine power in a new way. With its new research presented within a unified collective framework, this book will be an indispensable text for women’s studies courses. It will also appeal to students of nineteenth-century history, philosophy, literature, art history, and political theory. Susan Mendus is Lecturer in Philosophy and Morrell Fellow in Toleration and Jane Rendall is Lecturer in History, both at the University of York. At the time of writing, the editors and contributors were all teaching on an interdisciplinary women’s studies course at the University of York.

In her provocative article, ‘Agency, Truth and Meaning: Judging the Hutton Report’, Diana Coole makes two important claims: first, that ‘political inquiry is impoverished to the extent that theorists … ignore the more mundane reports and statements that help constitute everyday political life’; and secondly, that a theoretical analysis of the Hutton Report shows it to have been informed by a particular conception of truth (Lord Hutton's own conception) that largely guaranteed its conclusions and served to make Dr Kelly and the BBC ‘victims of a particular sense of truth’. I share Coole's belief that political theorists should contribute more to the analysis and understanding of ‘mundane’ texts, but I have grave reservations about the kind of analysis she favours, and about its implications in this particular case. It seems to me that her focus on truth is de-politicizing, while her conclusion that Dr David Kelly was a ‘victim’ rests upon a simplistic understanding of moral agency and responsibility. If we wish to bring the resources of theory to bear on everyday political texts, we do better, I suggest, to focus on moral and political philosophy than on epistemology. TRUTH Coole claims that the conclusions of the Hutton Report were informed (even determined) by a ‘positivist-juridical (empiricist-legalistic)’ conception of truth, one which displayed ‘antipathy towards the idea that truth is a matter of interpretation and hence dependent on subjective judgements’. As this conception worked its way through the inquiry it ‘guaranteed’ partisan conclusions that were at odds with the self-understanding of other protagonists in the affair, most notably that of Dr David Kelly.

In Part III of A Theory of Justice John Rawls asks whether we can show that the disposition to act justly is congruent with the good of the agent who cultivates it. His answer to the problem of congruence has been widely criticized, and Rawls himself now seems to think that this part of A Theory of Justice is defective because the Kantian interpretation implies a comprehensive conception of the good. This article questions that conclusion, and aims to show how the analogy between love and justice can be developed in a way which ensures congruence without implying comprehensiveness. The case of love provides a sense in which our good is neither a function of immediate desires, nor something entirely independent of desire. By showing how congruence is possible it answers the motivational question which lies at the heart of Part III and also promises a richer understanding of what is involved in cultivating the disposition to justice.