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Scholars universally regard Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāñjali (NK), or Flower Offering of Logic, as one of the great works of classical Indian philosophy, and more specifically, of rational or natural theology. But an important aspect of this masterpiece has not been appreciated by contemporary scholars: Udayana’s many references in the NK to Hinduism’s traditional sacrifices and sacred scriptures are integral to the philosophical case he develops for the existence of a Supreme Being. Or so we contend. We explain our interpretation of the NK through detailed examination of what we take to be the main argument of its first two chapters, an argument that only an extraordinary, omniscient being could have authored the Vedas, the Hindu scriptures. Then we show the importance of this argument for understanding the NK as a whole, including its final chapter, the chapter that has been the focus of most scholars. Though appeal to the Vedas is integral to Udayana’s full argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, his argument is not circular, we maintain; nor was he defending fideism. We believe that Udayana’s approach has relevance for persons of any faith who wish to affirm the centrality of the holy scriptures of their faith to their religious beliefs while recognizing the power of philosophical argument for the existence of a Supreme Being.

We build an argument directed to agnostics who think there’s a realistic possibility some specific revelatory claim is true (for instance, the Christian, or Judaic, or Islamic claim) and who find that claim more plausible than its theistic competitors. Though such agnostics may have serious reservations about the claim, perhaps not even deeming the chance it’s true to be at least fifty-fifty, we contend that—surprisingly—it’s obligatory for them to assent to the claim if it provides a means for remediation of wrong-doing. Our focus is the Christian revelatory claim, but the argument’s template can be applied to other religions that, like Christianity, promise to fix the world’s ills in an afterlife.

Contemporary philosophical discussion of religion neglects dualistic religions: although Manichaeism from time to time is accorded mention, Zoroastrianism, a more plausible form of religious dualism, is almost entirely ignored. We seek to change this state of affairs. To this end we (1) present the basic tenets of Zoroastrian dualism, (2) argue that objections to the Zoroastrian conception of God are less strong than typically imagined, (3) argue that objections to the Zoroastrian conception of the devil (and evil) are less strong than typically imagined, and (4) offer some brief concluding thoughts.

Kronen, Menssen, and Sullivan present the problem of the continuant in the form of an argument that there can be no substantial generation because there can be no argument. They then set out Thomistic and Suarezian responses to the argument that there can be no continuant and hence no substantial generation, and sketch an evaluation of these responses.

Thomas Aquinas' position that God does not will moral evil is explicated and defended. Aquinas offers various arguments for the claim that God wills natural evil and the evil of punishment per accidens but that God in no way wills sin.

What characterizes the ideal critical thinker? Within the critical thinking movement, it is sometimes suggested that the ideal critical thinker is a \"constructivist knower\" who integrates objective and critical ways of knowing with subjective and creative ways of knowing. In this article it is argued that descriptions of constructivist knowers are typically consisent with two very different approaches to epistemology. one approach leads so an extreme relativism which precludes shared standards of rationality; the other approach recognizes that the individual can integrate rational and emotive thought in a way that permits common standards of rationality This article also suggests that thinkers identified as model or exemplary constructivist knowers display critical and creative thinking in a way that underscores the existence of common standards of judgment and rationality

What characterizes the ideal critical thinker? Within the critical thinking movement, it is sometimes suggested that the ideal critical thinker is “constructivist knower” who integrates objective and critical ways of knowing with subjective and creative ways of knowing. In this article it is argued that descriptions of constructivist knowers are typically consisent with two very different approaches to epistemology: one approach leads to an extreme relativism which precludes shared standards of rationality; the other approach recognizes that the individual can integrate rational and emotive thought in a way that permits common standards of rationality. This article also suggests that thinkers identified as model or exemplary constructivist knowers display critical and creative thinking in a way that underscores the existence of common standards of judgment and rationality.