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"Michaels, Jeffrey H"
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‘A very different kind of challenge’? NATO’s prioritization of China in historical perspective
In 2019, China emerged prominently on NATO’s agenda, growing more prominent ever since. What accounts for this phenomenon? Is it best explained by Chinese behaviour, changing perceptions of its behaviour, or by an internal Alliance snowball effect resulting from the desire to appear dynamic and relevant, particularly following the Trump administration’s prioritization of China over Russia as the United States’ principal security challenge? To help answer this question, this article provides an historic overview of NATO’s policy approaches towards China. Contrary to the belief of many officials and commentators, China is not a new topic for the Alliance. In fact, China has regularly featured in NATO policies since the early Cold War, alternating between adversary to ally and back again. This article argues that despite recently prioritizing China in its discourse, the historical record provides ample reasons to cast doubt on any expectations this will lead to major substantive changes in NATO’s diplomacy or military posture.
Journal Article
Rethinking the Relevance of Self-Deterrence
Self-deterrence is critically understudied in deterrence theory. Similarly, deterrence practitioners prefer to focus on adversaries' threats rather than seeking to account for the full scope of fears influencing the decision calculus of policymakers. Through historical case studies, this article identifies where self-deterrence has occurred, highlights the benefits of incorporating the concept in future strategic planning and intelligence assessments, and recommends that policymakers, strategists, and analysts acknowledge self-deterrence as an important factor when preparing for future wars.
Journal Article
Casting the atomic canon: (R)evolving nuclear strategy: A reply
We are grateful to Kjølv Egeland, Thomas Fraise, and Hebatalla Taha for their commentary on the four editions of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. In addition to their critique of the book, their review was intended to offer ‘a looking glass into the broader field of nuclear security studies’. Our reply to their review therefore touches both upon their critique, as well as the more general theme of writing about the history of nuclear strategy. Although we disagree with many of their criticisms, and in some instances believe our work was misrepresented, the reviewers have nevertheless made points that deserve serious consideration by ourselves as well as other scholars working in the field. In this reply, we not only defend our work, but also use this as an opportunity to discuss how to approach the past of nuclear strategy, which in turn can allow us to better appreciate the present and future. In the first half of our reply we discuss the reviewers’ more general criticisms of our approach. In the second half we deal with some specific criticisms.
Journal Article
An education in counterinsurgency
In Badges Without Borders Stuart Schrader provides a broad overview of the evolution of American counterinsurgency practices during the Cold War, particularly during the period covering presidents Eisenhower through Nixon. While the book’s focus is an examination of US overseas police programs in constituting a ‘discretionary empire’ and their ‘boomerang effect’ on domestic policing, these themes are nevertheless set against the background of the rise and decline of what was generally referred to as the ‘counterinsurgency fad’ inside the US Government. The concept of a ‘fad’ is not one that is well-explored despite being referred to by practitioners and academics alike. As used here, it simply refers to a topic and/or a term that receives a great deal of attention by policymakers and the bureaucracy, which can include being constantly referred to in the discourse of officials, policies generated or characterized by, funding and other resources associated with it, and so forth. With respect to ‘counterinsurgency,’ the concept of a ‘fad’ is not only appropriate as it qualifies on all the accounts just listed, but the term ‘fad’ was also employed by US officials to describe the phenomenon.
Journal Article
Waging “Protracted Conflict” Behind the Scenes
From the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Frank R. Barnett, a private U.S. citizen, became a central player among the West's ‘Cold Warriors’ by developing and applying a unique methodology for organizing anti-Communist “political warfare” both in the United States and around the world. Recognizing the limits of government-sponsored activities in prosecuting a more aggressive strategy to counter the Soviet Union, Barnett sidestepped U.S. officialdom and created a parallel and less-constrained private network to engage in “protracted conflict” for the purpose of “rolling back the Soviet empire.” A key aspect of his activism involved developing educational gatherings for policymakers, lawmakers, industrialists, military reserve officers, and scholars. Arguably the most notable achievement of this network was that it kept the ideology of hardline anti-Communism on the “back burner” during a period when the mainstream discourse of “peaceful coexistence” and détente prevailed.
Journal Article
Dysfunctional Doctrines? Eisenhower, Carter and U.S. Military Intervention in the Middle East
American presidents have had a penchant for enunciating foreign policy \"doctrines\" or claiming as their own the label of \"doctrine\" that others have given a particular policy statement they had made. Here, Michaels compares the Dwight Eisenhower doctrine (1957) and the Jimmy Carter doctrine (1980), both of which addressed the potential use of US military force in the Middle East. He narrates that both doctrines covered roughly the same geographic space and were enunciated publicly and were deliberately intended to attract attention. Moreover, both doctrines reflected basic continuities with earlier US policies in the region, yet it was still perceived as politically useful to cast them as doctrine, even if retrospectively. Finally, many of the same problems are noticeable in the formulation and reaction to both doctrines, despite the differences in time period and the political characteristics of the administrations.
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