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Operation Just Cause, the United States' incursion into Panama, was the culmination of a gradually escalating confrontation between the United States and the Noriega dominated government of Panama that extended from June, 1987 until early January, 1990. Applying diverse methodological approaches, this volume examines the various ways representative examples of the global media covered the developing crisis and the eventual US incursion into Panama. The volume: - sets the stage for this analysis by delineating the chronological development of the escalating confrontation, as well as by examining the confrontation from the perspective of the US government - analyzes the crisis from the perspective of the US, Soviet, Canadian, French, Portuguese, Arab, and the People's Republic of China media - exposes the challenges for public affairs officers operating within the context of the global media response to international crises, and provides an assessment of the implications of the crisis for inter-American and international relations. This analysis and evaluation of a variety of global media perspectives on the escalating US-Panamanian confrontation will serve to better illuminate and further enrich our understanding of a major international event - indeed, one of the final events of the Cold War era. Howard M. Hensel, Air War College, USA and Nelson Michaud, École nationale d'administration publique, Canada

Foreign policy statements—and, namely, white papers—offer diplomats, civil servants, and the general public, as well as international actors (friends and foes alike) an understanding of what motivates a country to engage in international issues. They are fundamental government declarations intended to direct the policy process toward its political and operational objectives. Is history embedded in the message these statements carry? And, if so, how is history used? Relying on Brands and Suri’s typology and framing categories (factual/normative), this article explores white papers issued by governments led by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Jean Chretien, Paul Martin Jr., as well as the 2017 House of Commons statement by Justin Trudeau’s foreign affairs minister, Chrystia Freeland. Based on Canada’s tradition of Pearsonian internationalism, we hypothesize that the factual use of history would prevail. We find this to be the case, but with important nuances.

The first major scholarly examination of the foreign policy of the Mulroney Conservative era, this collection analyzes free trade with the U.S., a continentalized energy policy, the transformation of peacekeeping into peacemaking, and other departures from traditional Canadian statecraft.

The overall recent development of Canadian foreign policy as expressed in its diplomatic behavior suggests that Canada has kept some elements of its foreign policy intact while substantially changing others.

Successful U.S. public diplomacy requires consonance between the actual message and what the audience comprehends. Contending consonance strategies involve initially formulating foreign policy goals and strategies to resonate with audience values or later changing audience values to support formulated goals. At what foreign-policy-making stage will public diplomacy involvement best facilitate message reception? Recognizing overseas presses as mediators in message reception, we analyze whether foreign affairs reporters are Bayesian or motivated reasoning information processors of U.S. foreign policy statements. Our findings support public diplomacy involvement in the policy formulation stage by showing the most frequently recounted sentences from United States president George W. Bush's post-September 11th speeches invoked frames resonating with Canadian national foreign policy values even when controlling for the effects of journalistic practices.

This article re-evaluates Graham Allison's approach to bureaucratic politics in the second edition of his Essence of Decision, authored with Philip Zelikow. Although the renewed analytical framework still appears to be an excellent tool for describing policy decision-making processes, the numerous criticisms it received in the past with respect to its difficult operationalization is a problem left unsolved. To respond to this major difficulty, the author of this article combines Vincent Lemieux's structuration of power with Allison's approach. In order to validate the ensuing model, an empirical test is then conducted using the case study of the 1987 Canadian White Paper on Defence. This original proposition opens up avenues of research in the fields of foreign as well as public policy making.

Balances perspectives on the international character & activity of Quebec against categories of true foreign policy as it is exercised by sovereign states. While it is here maintained that many of the concerns central to foreign policy may also be adopted into the planning & development of a province, the inability to operate with recognized instruments of sovereignty -- such as diplomatic & military installations -- prevents Quebec both from developing its capacity to act internationally & from having the will to such capacity recognized by other states. Many of the tensions that arise in Quebec's acceptance of these limitations while still persisting in the development of foreign relations are detailed here. Quebec's identity, largely through its cultural connections to other French-speaking parts of the world, is turned outward in an attempt to take as much initiative as possible under the currents of globalization. However, as is demonstrated here, advance in the cultivation of foreign relations & representation does not necessarily equate to establishment or exercise of legitimate foreign policy. 44 References. C. Brunski

In giving Canada’s official reaction to the invasion of Panama by the United States, Joe Clark, then Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Mulroney government, ‘regretted the American action’, perceiving the event as a ‘dangerous precedent’.2 After all, Clark was the man who had forcefully defended Canadian sovereignty when the American icebreaker Polar Sea ‘invaded’ Canadian waters by transiting the Northwest Passage during the summer of 1985.3 From this perspective, one might say that the message was consistent. However, in his February 1990 Toronto address, Clark toned down his response by adding that he ‘understood’ the reasons ‘why the US felt compelled to do what it did’.4 In other words, the Canadian government supported the object of the American intervention, but expressed some reservations about the means used to reach the goal.