Explore the vast range of titles available.

This article examines the association between economic deprivation and the likelihood of experiencing physical intimate partner violence (IPV) in Germany. Although international studies have shown a link between economic deprivation and IPV, analyses utilizing probability-based surveys to examine this association in Germany are scarce. Within the framework of an economic power resource approach and using the German Family Panel pairfam , a large probability-based panel, this study aims to fill this gap. Results of linear probability models show that being unemployed and being unsatisfied with the household finances, as indicators of economic deprivation, significantly increase the risk of physical IPV. A range of sensitivity checks corroborate these findings.

Before the pandemic, many employers were hesitant to offer their employees the option of working from home. However, remote working has been widely adopted during the pandemic as one of the key methods of controlling the spread of the virus. The measure encountered a widespread acceptance and it is likely that the demand for work from home as a flexible work arrangement will persist also after the pandemic has ended. Although numerous studies have addressed the role of remote work during this crisis, as of yet we lack thorough research jointly addressing the question on how occupations/job characteristics on the one hand and family/household responsibilities on the other are associated with the propensity of working from home, and how gender cuts across those aspects. Using the COVID-19 survey of the German Family Panel ( pairfam ), covering the peak of the first wave of the pandemic in 2020, together with information from pairfam panel waves conducted before the pandemic, as well as a special evaluation of the 2019 German Labor Force Survey, we are able to address this gap. Employing linear probability models on a sample of 1,414 men (N = 641) and women (N = 773), our results show that occupational traits, especially the gender composition of an occupation, are an important predictor for working from home. Women employed in female-dominated occupations are less often in a position to work from home. Furthermore, our study confirms that it is particularly the highly educated, as well as those who work in high-prestige occupations, who are able to work from home. Family configurations and care obligations are less influential upon the transition to homeworking, even in times of an unprecedented situation of school and daycare closures and increased parental responsibilities for children’s (early) education.

During the past decades the importance of soft skills for labour market outcomes has grown substantially. This carries implications for labour market inequality, since previous research shows that soft skills are not valued equally across race and gender. This work explores the role of soft skills in job advertisements by drawing on methods from computational science as well as on theoretical and empirical insights from economics, sociology and psychology. We present a semi-automatic approach based on crowdsourcing and text mining for extracting a list of soft skills. We find that soft skills are a crucial component of job ads, especially of low-paid jobs and jobs in female-dominated professions. Our work shows that soft skills can serve as partial predictors of the gender composition in job categories and that not all soft skills receive equal wage returns at the labour market. Especially “female” skills are frequently associated with wage penalties. Our results expand the growing literature on the association of soft skills on wage inequality and highlight their importance for occupational gender segregation at labour markets.

Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans’ support for their continent’s economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right—and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center—to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left. Coincidiendo con el desplazamiento hacia la izquierda de la política latinoamericana, la integración regional en América Latina se ha acelerado durante las dos últimas décadas. Sin embargo, mientras que el apoyo a la integración europea ha sido estudiado sistemáticamente durante décadas, todavía no existen análisis referidos a las tendencias de la opinión pública con respecto a la integración de América Latina. Este artículo, al combinar los datos de ocho encuestas de Latinobarómetro realizadas a 106,590 encuestados de 17 países de América del Sur y América Central, proporciona el primer análisis longitudinal referido al apoyo por parte de los latinoamericanos a la integración política y económica del continente. Utilizando una regresión logística de efectos mixtos multinivel, revelamos tendencias y escisiones internas e inter-sociales. Nuestros resultados muestran que si bien existía un alto nivel inicial de apoyo, en general, este porcentaje está disminuyendo. Es más, si bien las brechas educacionales y de género se han mantenido estables a lo largo del tiempo en el ámbito de la opinión pública, se han producido cambios considerables respecto de la orientación política: en un comienzo con valores iniciales más bajos, la izquierda superó a la derecha y —al menos en el caso del apoyo a la integración política— también al centro para convertirse en el ala política que más propiciaba la integración. Este hallazgo demuestra, contrariamente a las ideas dominantes, que el centro político no es necesariamente el principal partidario de la integración. Cuando el regionalismo se ve cada vez más impulsado por los gobiernos de izquierda, el apoyo público a la integración regional también puede oscilar hacia la izquierda.

Many contemporary studies find that married couples are more satisfied with life than unmarried people. However, whether marriage makes people more satisfied with life or whether more satisfied couples are more likely to marry remains a debated question. We reassess this relationship with panel data from the German Family Panel (pairfam) and extend previous analyses by adding individual trajectories (slopes) to standard fixed-effects regressions (FEIS). We are thereby able to distinguish - controlling for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity - whether there is in fact an effect of marriage on life satisfaction, whether people who are simply happier in their relationship are more likely to get married, or whether people whose development in life satisfaction is more positive are more likely to get married. We translate these different social mechanisms into different analytical strategies and find that OLS regression - due to its confounding effects between and within persons - overestimates the effect of marriage on life satisfaction. A fixed-effects estimator reveals a much lower effect of marriage on life satisfaction for couples who marry compared to those who continue to live apart together or cohabitate. Additionally, using a FEIS estimator and adjusting for - non-linear - development of individual life satisfaction over time, suggests that this effect is in fact causal.

Tissue inflammation drives the infiltration of innate immune cells that generate reactive species to kill bacteria and recruit adaptive immune cells. Neutrophil activation fosters the release of myeloperoxidase (MPO) enzyme, a heme-containing protein generating hypochlorous acid (HOCl) from hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) and chloride ions. MPO-dependent oxidant formation initiates bioactive oxidation and chlorination products and induces oxidative post-translational modifications (oxPTMs) on proteins and lipid oxidation. Besides HOCl and H2O2, further reactive species such as singlet oxygen and nitric oxide are generated in inflammation, leading to modified proteins, potentially resulting in their altered bioactivity. So far, knowledge about multiple free radical-induced modifications of MPO and its effects on HOCl generation is lacking. To mimic this multi-oxidant microenvironment, human MPO was exposed to several reactive species produced simultaneously via argon plasma operated at body temperature. Several molecular gas admixes were used to modify the reactive species type profiles generated. MPO was investigated by studying its oxPTMs, changes in protein structure, and enzymatic activity. MPO activity was significantly reduced after treatment with all five tested plasma gas conditions. Dynamic light scattering and CD-spectroscopy revealed altered MPO protein morphology indicative of oligomerization. Using mass spectrometry, various oxPTMs, such as +1O, +2O, and +3O, were determined on methionine and cysteine (Cys), and -1H-1N+1O was detected in asparagine (Asp). The modification types identified differed between argon-oxygen and argon-nitrogen plasmas. However, all plasma gas conditions led to the deamidation of Asp and oxidation of Cys residues, suggesting an inactivation of MPO due to oxPTM-mediated conformational changes.

Did the election of Donald Trump affect the popularity of the European Union (EU) in Europe? Theoretically, both a positive rally effect (due to a perceived external threat) and a negative domino effect (due to resignation among Europhiles and/or reinforcement among europhobe nationalists) are plausible. We treat Trump’s unexpected victory as an external shock and use a Eurobarometer survey that was conducted in all EU-28 member states four days prior to (control group) and six days after the election (treatment group) as source material for a natural experiment. The analysis reveals that the election of Trump caused a significant increase in the EU’s popularity in Europe immediately after the election. This “Trump effect” is considerable in size, roughly equivalent to three years of education. Gains in popularity were particularly high among respondents who perceived their country as economically struggling and, surprisingly, among the political right, suggesting that Trump’s victory broadened and ideologically diversified the EU’s base of support.

Many contemporary studies find that married couples are more satisfied with life than unmarried people. However, whether marriage makes people more satisfied with life or whether more satisfied couples are more likely to marry remains a debated question. We reassess this relationship with panel data from the German Family Panel (pairfam) and extend previous analyses by adding individual trajectories (slopes) to standard fixed-effects regressions (FEIS). We are thereby able to distinguish – controlling for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity – whether there is in fact an effect of marriage on life satisfaction, whether people who are simply happier in their relationship are more likely to get married, or whether people whose development in life satisfaction is more positive are more likely to get married. We translate these different social mechanisms into different analytical strategies and find that OLS regression – due to its confounding effects between and within persons – overestimates the effect of marriage on life satisfaction. A fixed-effects estimator reveals a much lower effect of marriage on life satisfaction for couples who marry compared to those who continue to live apart together or cohabitate. Additionally, using a FEIS estimator and adjusting for – non-linear – development of individual life satisfaction over time, suggests that this effect is in fact causal. * This article belongs to a special issue on \"Identification of causal mechanisms in demographic research: The contribution of panel data\".

Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans' support for their continent's economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right--and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center--to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left.

The gender pay gap (GPG) remains a persistent phenomenon in contemporary labor markets. Despite a vast body of research examining its causes, as of today, unequal labor market power resources between men and women have remained an underappreciated factor in the literature. Drawing on the German Socio-economic Panel and the Microcensus, the association between the GPG and labor market closure – a crucial determinant of unequal power resources in labor markets – is followed from 1993-2011. Employing JMP decomposition, unionization, tertiary credentialing and part-time employment are found to exacerbate the overall wage differential by 41 percent. Part-time employment has been the only indictor that enlarged the gender pay gap (17 percent) between 1993 and 2011, while the remaining covariates contributed toward its convergence. These results advance our understanding of stalling GPGs by highlighting the so far widely neglected importance of power resources on the GPG.