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Because California was a pioneer in the development of large‐scale branching, we use its experience during the 1920s and 1930s to assess the effects of branching on competition and on the stability of banking systems. Using individual bank balance sheets, income statements, and branch establishment data, we show that smaller incumbent banks responded to the entry of a large branch bank by adjusting their operations in a manner consistent with increased efficiency. Competition from branching networks also produced an externality: unit banks exposed to this competition were more likely to survive the Great Depression than banks not exposed to it.

Scholars differ on whether central bank intervention mitigates banking panics. In April 1929, a fruit fly infestation in Florida forced the U.S. government to quarantine fruit shipments from the state and destroy infested groves. In July, depositors panicked in Tampa and surrounding cities. The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta rushed currency to member banks beset by runs. We show that this intervention arrested the panic and estimate that bank failures would have been twice as high without the Federal Reserve’s intervention. Our results suggest that similar interventions may have reduced bank failures during the Great Depression.

Interbank networks amplified the contraction in lending during the Great Depression. Panics induced banks in the hinterland to withdraw interbank deposits from Federal Reserve member banks located in reserve and central reserve cities. These correspondent banks responded by curtailing lending to businesses. Between the peak in the summer of 1929 and the banking holiday in the winter of 1933, interbank amplification reduced aggregate commercial bank lending by an estimated 15 percent.

Why did policymakers adopt the gold standard? We first examine the political economy of Japan's adoption of the gold standard in 1897 by exploring the ex ante motives of policymakers as well as how the legislative decision to adopt gold won approval. We then show that joining the gold standard did not reduce Japanese interest rates or lead to a domestic investment boom. However, we find that membership in the gold standard increased Japan's exports by lowering transactions costs. Joining gold allowed Japan to tap into its growing share of global trade that was centered on the gold standard.

Drawing on the variation in financial distress across U.S. states during the Great Depression, this article suggests how bank supervision and regulation affected banking stability during the Great Depression. In response to well‐organized interest groups and public concern over the bank failures of the 1920s, many U.S. states adopted supervisory and regulatory standards that undermined the stability of state banking systems in the 1930s. Those states that prohibited branch banking, had higher reserve requirements, granted their supervisors longer term lengths, or restricted the ability of supervisors to liquidate banks quickly experienced higher state bank suspension rates from 1929 to 1933.

Using a newly constructed panel data set, which includes annual estimates of lending rates for 47 Japanese prefectures, we analyze why interest rates converged over the period 1884–1925. We find evidence that technological innovations and institutional changes played an important role in creating a national capital market in Japan. In particular, the diffusion in the use of the telegraph, the growth in commercial branch banking networks, and the development of Bank of Japan's branches reduced interest rate differentials. Bank regulation appears to have played little role in impeding financial market integration.

Digitally-driven data design offers the potential to reinvigorate our field, make startlingly new observations about the past, and allow thousands of more flowers to bloom. 4D economic history has the possibility of drawing in scholars from other fields to study of the past and attracting a broader range of students interested in studying this discipline.

We use a novel data set spanning 1820–1910 to assess the factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions across American states. We show that it took more than a century for all states to create separate agencies tasked with monitoring the safety and soundness of banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks and competition with national banks propelled policymakers to adopt costly and permanent supervisory institutions.

We employ a new database of over 21,000 bilateral trade observations from 1870-1913 to assess the contemporaneous effects of empire on trade. Our analysis shows that belonging to an empire roughly doubled trade relative to those countries that were not part of an empire. The use of a common language, the establishment of currency unions, the monetisation of recently acquired colonies, and the establishment of preferential trade agreements and customs unions help to account for the observed increase in trade associated with empire.

This essay assesses whether network linkages within the banking system amplified the real effects of bank failures during the Great Contraction. In 1929, nearly all interbank deposits held by Federal Reserve member banks belonged to “shadowy” nonmember banks which were outside the regulatory reach of federal regulators. Regional banking panics in the early 1930s drained these interbank deposits from central reserve city banks. Money-center banks in Chicago and New York responded to volatile and declining interbank deposits by changing their asset composition. They reduced their lending to businesses and individuals, and increased their holdings of cash and government bonds.