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This paper examines the market for initial coin offerings (ICOs). ICOs are smart contracts based on blockchain technology that are designed for entrepreneurs to raise external finance by issuing tokens without an intermediary. Unlike existing mechanisms for early-stage finance, tokens potentially provide investors with rapid opportunities thanks to liquid trading platforms. The marketability of tokens offers novel insights into entrepreneurial finance, which I explore in this paper. First, I document that investors earn on average 8.2% on the first day of trading. However, about 40% of all ICOs destroy investor value on the first day of trading. Second, I explore the determinants of market outcomes and find that management quality and the ICO profile are positively correlated with the funding amount and returns, whereas highly visionary projects have a negative effect. Among the 21% of all tokens that get delisted from a major exchange platform, highly visionary projects are more likely to fail, which investors anticipate. Third, I explore the sensitivity of the ICO market to adverse industry events such as China's ban of ICOs, the hack of leading ledgers, and the marketing ban on FaceBook. I find that the ICO market is highly susceptible to such environmental shocks, resulting in substantial welfare losses for investors.

A defining feature of initial coin offerings (ICOs) is that entrepreneurs bear the full marginal investment cost but profit only partially from the marginal investment payoff. This design may exacerbate agency conflicts inherent in corporate finance. As a consequence, signals of entrepreneurial quality such as CEO loyalty, which is an established concept in social psychology and can easily be linked to potential agency conflicts in corporate settings, might be a first-order determinant of economic outcomes in the ICO market. Consistent with this, I find that loyal CEOs have to offer lower financial incentives to attract investors and are still able to raise more proceeds, conduct ICOs more thoroughly, and are less likely to fail. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and investors entail agency costs that are decreasing in CEO loyalty.

This paper examines the efficiency of the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) market through a search-theoretical lens. Search intensity associated with the process of identifying valuable startups is increasing in market granularity. DLT increases market granularity because asset tokenization lowers entry barriers. Lower-end entrants, however, increase aggregate search intensity but may lack search skills. The resulting search-related inefficiency creates a niche for intermediaries or institutional investors that specialize on search. Consistent with the theory, specialized crypto funds increase ICO market efficiency by reducing search frictions, inter alia, by shortening the time-to-funding and increasing the funding amount. At the same time, crypto funds extract sizable economic rents for their intermediation services. Overall, the study relates to the general trade-off between centralization and decentralization in entrepreneurial finance. It suggests that market frictions specific to early-stage crowdfunding of entrepreneurship may prevent “perfectly” Decentralized Finance (DeFi) markets from functioning efficiently.Plain English SummaryDecentralized Finance (DeFi) markets may require a substantial degree of centralization to function efficiently. We show that centralization in the form of institutional investors that intermediate Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) lead to, first, shorter time periods to reach fundraising goals and, second, higher valuations. In a search-theoretical model, we quantify the extent to which centralization mitigates frictions in a decentralized market. Centralization reduces trading delays and improves decentralized market efficiency especially in times of market downturns and when there is uncertainty about the team or product quality. Thus, the principal implication of our study is that decentralized markets for startups may not be optimal for society. Centralization is valuable because it improves the speed with which entrepreneurs and investors meet, and because it mitigates market frictions arising from asymmetric information.

This paper examines rent sharing in private investments in public equity (PIPEs) between newly public firms and private investors. The evidence suggests highly asymmetric rent sharing. Newly public firms earn a negative return of up to −15% in the first post-PIPE year, while investors benefit due to the ability to dictate transaction terms. The results are economically relevant because newly public firms are, at least in recent years, more likely to tap private rather than public markets for follow-on financing shortly after the initial public offering (IPO), and because the results for newly public firms contrast with those for the broad PIPE market in Lim et al. (2021). The study also contributes to the PIPE literature by offering an integrative view of competing theories of the cross-section of post-PIPE stock returns. We simultaneously test proxies for corporate governance, asymmetric information, bargaining power, and managerial entrenchment. While all explanations have univariate predictive power for the post-PIPE performance, only the proxies for corporate governance and asymmetric information are robust in ceteris-paribus tests.Plain English SummaryWho benefits if public firms raise financing privately? In this study, we examine the returns to public firms vis-á-vis private investors in so-called private investments in public equity (PIPEs). The results indicate that public firms earn a significant negative return, while private investors earn a fair return. Public firms only marginally benefit from private investors in PIPEs if the latter help improve corporate governance or reduce informational asymmetries. Thus, the principle implication of this study is that, in general, PIPEs signal poor performance prospects for the issuing firm, and investors should not invest in those companies unless they are able to purchase PIPE stock at a privately negotiated discount. Given that PIPEs have recently become the dominant way to raise follow-on financing for newly public firms, the evidence in this study casts doubt on the attractiveness to go public in the first place.

Academic freedom is a critical norm of science. Despite the widely postulated importance of academic freedom, the literature attests to a dearth of research on the topic. Specifically, we know little about how academic freedom relates to indicators of societal progress, such as innovation. We address this research gap by empirically assessing the impact of academic freedom on the quantity (patent applications) and quality (patent citations) of innovation output using a comprehensive sample of 157 countries over the 1900–2015 period. We find that improving academic freedom by one standard deviation increases patent applications by 41% and forward citations by 29%. The results are robust across a range of different specifications. Our findings constitute an alarming plea to policymakers: global academic freedom has declined over the past decade for the first time in the last century and our estimates suggest that this decline poses a substantial threat to the innovation output of countries in terms of both quantity and quality.

Token sales or initial coin offerings (ICOs) are smart contracts on a blockchain designed to raise external finance by issuing tokens or coins. This introduction provides an overview of this novel financing method. Differences between tokens and coins, types of tokens, and various ICO mechanisms are discussed. The author also describes the evolution of the ICO market and surveys some advantages of ICOs.

The authors examine to what extent the market for initial coin offerings (ICOs) is driven by investor sentiment. Their results, based on a comprehensive set of sentiment and coin price data, suggest that the ICO market is driven by crypto-related sentiment, but is almost unrelated to general capital market sentiment. Among the crypto-related sentiment, social media channels, rather than traditional news channels, are the main source of investor sentiment. The authors find that ICO firms exploit “windows of opportunity” and avoid periods of negative sentiment. Coins listed during periods with negative investor sentiment generate negative returns in the short run. Moreover, returns to investors on the first day of trading predict long-run returns up to six months.

This paper introduces a machine learning approach to quantify altruism from the linguistic style of textual documents. We apply our method to a central question in (social) entrepreneurship: How does altruism impact entrepreneurial success? Specifically, we examine the effects of altruism on crowdfunding outcomes in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). The main result suggests that altruism and ICO firm valuation are negatively related. We, then, explore several channels to shed some light on whether the negative altruism-valuation relation is causal. Our findings suggest that it is not altruism that causes lower firm valuation; rather, low-quality entrepreneurs select into altruistic projects, while the marginal effect of altruism on high-quality entrepreneurs is actually positive. Altruism increases the funding amount in ICOs in the presence of high-quality projects, low asymmetric information, and strong corporate governance.

This dissertation consists of three chapters.In Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I contribute to the inconclusive literature on labor empowerment and corporate innovation. The paper exploits a law that creates Labor-Controlled Firms (LCFs) for identification in a regression discontinuity design using administrative data that link employers, inventors, and patents in Germany. The law mandates that firms with more than 500 or 2,000 employees have a minority (33%) or parity (50%) share of labor-elected directors on their boards, respectively. Local average treatment effects on the number of patents and the forward citation-weighted number of patents per LCF are significantly positive at both the minority and parity cutoffs, although forward citations per patent are significantly negative at the parity cutoff. The results suggest that labor control causes innovative productivity to increase at the expense of a relative shift from exploratory toward exploitative search. Auxiliary tests support this conclusion. Labor control insures employed inventors against adverse labor market shocks, increasing firm-related specialization through longer employment spells while reducing the intensive margin of innovative labor supply. Moreover, inventors’ marginal income per patent is insensitive to the quality of the patent when the employer is labor-controlled, suggesting a lack of financial incentives for exploratory search in LCFs.In Chapter 2, we estimates that shares in Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) offered a discount of 3% for each year during which these shares could not be resold. The discount can be substantially larger in offerings in which marketability is a greater concern. Our estimates make use of the duration of the resale restriction and information about the effects of a regulatory change. In 2008, the SEC amended Rule 144 to shorten the default statutory holding period. Our estimates are smaller than previous estimates and robust to various controls and endogeneity concerns.In Chapter 3, we offer evidence from acquisition decisions that suggests that antitakeover provisions (ATPs) may increase firm value when internal corporate governance is sufficiently strong. We document that, in Germany, firms with stronger ATPs, and particularly supermajority provisions, are better acquirers. Managers of high-ATP firms create value in acquisitions by making governance-improving deals. They are more likely to engage in acquisitions that reduce their own entrenchment level and less likely to invest in declining industries. The empirical evidence is consistent with a short-termist interpretation. Takeover threats can induce myopic investment decisions, which ATPs can mitigate. They also lead managers to engage more often in value-creating long-term and innovative investing, and increase their sensitivity to investment opportunities. Our findings contribute to a growing literature challenging conventional wisdom that the agency-increasing effect of ATPs empirically dominates the myopia-eliminating effect, suggesting that a more contextual view of the value implications of ATPs is necessary.