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Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) both carry unique similarities in their geo-strategic location, natural resources and political instability. Both are located in areas which carry significance for global trade and arethe happening places in the world. The DRC located in Central Africa, gained independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960. As the second-largest country in Africa and the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, the DRC is endowed with exceptional natural resources, including critical minerals, hydropower potential, significant arable land, immense biodiversity, and the world’s second-largest rainforest. Pakistan, situated in South Asia, is also endowed with rich natural resources in its Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions. These resources have not shielded the DRC and Pakistan from significant social and political challenges. Currently, both Pakistan and the DRC are experiencing stable economic growth and are working to stabilise their economy and enhance international collaboration. There is a need to analyse the bilateral relationship between these two countries. This article employs a qualitative research design to explore the evolving Pakistan-DRC bilateral diplomatic, economic, and security relations. Although Central Africa has not been highly prioritised in Pakistan’s Look Africa Policy and Engage Africa Initiative, Pakistan maintains diplomatic and traderelations with the region, including the DRC. The article underscores the need for improved diplomatic engagement, institutional frameworks, and policy initiatives to maximise the benefits of this bilateral relationship.

In this paper I argue that strategic culture is shaped by the ideology of a political party and is carried through elites’ practices. A state’s decision to become a nuclear power is often explained by rational choice theories. These theories assume states as rational actors and explain their behavior by cost–benefit calculation, keeping in mind the material cost involved in such decisions. The problem with such approaches is that they usually underemphasize the impact of other influences like culture. One such variable is the role of a political party’s ideology that influences the identities of state elites and helps shape their strategic behavior. Therefore, strategic culture is appropriately explained by looking at intervening variable of elite socialization that stems from the persuasive power of socially constructed norms of political parties.

The security relationship between India and Pakistan is generally viewed through a neo-realist approach of International Relations.. Treading on a different path, this book explains the rivalry of these countries by looking at the socio-cultural norms found at two levels, elites versus popular. Furthermore, it also conceptualizes a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community that could result in peace in the region. The book describes how the rivalry between India and Pakistan is mostly centred on the elites of the two countries. It highlights the presence of a unique normative structure through social practices found at the popular level, and looks at how the common people of both India and Pakistan share many socio-cultural norms. Employing the theoretical framework of social constructivist approach of International Relations as well as the methodology of critical discourse analysis, the book discusses how an effort can be made to develop the concept of a bottom-up security community, from the popular to the elite level, and the impact this would potentially have for India and Pakistan. An interesting and valuable approach for analysing these issues of security through the socio-cultural lens, this book is of interest to academics and scholars of South Asian Politics, Security Studies and International Relations.

Mohammed Ayoob’s subaltern realism argues that postcolonial states’ behavior is shaped by colonial legacies, internal insecurities, and external pressures from major power interventions, as well as from regional disputes. This framework was developed by Ayoob to explain conflict dynamics in the “Third World/postcolonial/developing/Global South” and, more specifically, as Ayoob terms them, subaltern states. This study extends Ayoob’s argument in three key ways. First, we advocate for context-specific subaltern realism, moving beyond broad categorizations like “Third World/postcolonial/developing/Global South/subaltern states” to ensure analyses reflect each state’s unique historical, political, and socioeconomic conditions. Second, we apply subaltern realism to analyze Pakistan’s governance of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)—a disputed territory under its administration that is part of the broader Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. Unlike secessionist movements typically discussed by Ayoob, GB’s demand is integrationist, seeking provisional constitutional recognition rather than outright independence. We analyze internal and external factors contributing to Pakistan’s hesitation in granting GB provisional provincial status. Third, we extend subaltern realism by disaggregating “subaltern” into two registers—state-subalternity and societal subalternity—and centering the voices of GB’s subaltern publics—local experts, students, and communities—rather than focusing solely on the state. This shift foregrounds how marginalized populations articulate their political aspirations, offering a more nuanced application of subaltern realism to territorial disputes.

South Africa occupies a strategic geographic position at the southern tip of the African continent, serving as a potential trade and investment gateway for countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. It is a key partner for Pakistan's Look Africa Policy. Pakistan and South Africa, bound by shared values and a focus on common interests since establishing diplomatic ties in 1994, have cultivated a long-standing partnership. However, a significant gap remains in the academic exploration of this relationship. This study delves into the politico-diplomatic, economic, and defence aspects of Pakistan-South Africa relations, employing the concept of national interest as outlined by Morgenthau and Neuchterlein. Employing a qualitative analysis, this study argues that high-level visits, the establishment of institutional mechanisms, and the formalisation of cooperation through Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) have significantly shaped the direction, facilitation, and governance of Pakistan-South Africa relations. This research highlights three key findings: despite frequent leadership-level exchanges and interactions between parliamentarians and policymakers, the relationship lacks the necessary vigour; while trade between Pakistan and South Africa has grown steadily, Pakistan experiences a trade deficit with its partner; and defence collaboration remains a significant aspect of their relationship. This article posits that the existing Pakistan-South Africa bilateral relationship holds the potential to blossom into a more formalised and enduring strategic partnership, contingent upon the implementation of well-defined and practical initiatives.

The term 'security community' refers to the development of a regional consensus of shunning war as a means of settling disputes among participant states. Assuming this basic premise of a security community, this article positions ASEAN as a unique security community by arguing that it is contingent upon the socio-cultural norms practiced in ASEAN member states' societies. The conceptual framework of a traditional security community is inapplicable to ASEAN as it does not have any supra-national institutions which can bind its members to compliance towards regional norms. The societal norms of member states give ASEAN a regional identity consciousness that is based upon informality and a unique normative structure. The intention of this article is to deconstruct these societal or popular socio-cultural norms and examine how they influence decision making at the elite level.

Mohammed Ayoob’s subaltern realism argues that postcolonial states’ behavior is shaped by colonial legacies, internal insecurities, and external pressures from major power interventions, as well as from regional disputes. This framework was developed by Ayoob to explain conflict dynamics in the “Third World/postcolonial/developing/Global South” and, more specifically, as Ayoob terms them, subaltern states. This study extends Ayoob’s argument in three key ways. First, we advocate for context-specific subaltern realism, moving beyond broad categorizations like “Third World/postcolonial/developing/Global South/subaltern states” to ensure analyses reflect each state’s unique historical, political, and socioeconomic conditions. Second, we apply subaltern realism to analyze Pakistan’s governance of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)—a disputed territory under its administration that is part of the broader Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. Unlike secessionist movements typically discussed by Ayoob, GB’s demand is integrationist, seeking provisional constitutional recognition rather than outright independence. We analyze internal and external factors contributing to Pakistan’s hesitation in granting GB provisional provincial status. Third, we extend subaltern realism by disaggregating “subaltern” into two registers—state-subalternity and societal subalternity—and centering the voices of GB’s subaltern publics—local experts, students, and communities—rather than focusing solely on the state. This shift foregrounds how marginalized populations articulate their political aspirations, offering a more nuanced application of subaltern realism to territorial disputes.

The former Indian Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, once commented, 'A solution between Pakistan and India had to be evolved, not presented to the people, as if a magician had pulled a rabbit out of a bag' (Nayar 16 July 2010). Accepting this evolutionary nature of India-Pakistan security relations, I have examined the security discourses of both states by exploring the complex and dichotomous relationship between elite and popular social practices. It is also important to understand this dichotomous analysis. In both countries, people have minimal contact with each other and this gives a free hand to the ruling elites to promote animosity through their social practices towards each other, in line with their own vested interests. These divergent attitudes are closely tied to the respective identity discourses of the two states. But paradoxically, the cross border transcendence of popular culture has brought the people of both states, who share linguistic commonalities, closer together. This inadvertently encouraged me to adopt the 'popular culture approach' and study these two societies at the popular level (Milliken 2001).