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"Munger, Michael"
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Tomorrow 3.0 : transaction costs and the sharing economy
\"With the growing popularity of apps such as Uber and Airbnb, there has been a keen interest in the rise of the sharing economy. Michael C. Munger brings these new trends in the economy down to earth by focusing on their relation to the fundamental economic concept of transaction costs. In doing so Munger brings a fresh perspective on the 'sharing economy' in clear and engaging writing that is accessible to both general and specialist readers. He shows how, for the first time, entrepreneurs can sell reductions in transaction costs, rather than reductions in the costs of the products themselves. He predicts that smartphones will be used to commodify excess capacity, and reaches the controversial conclusion that a basic income will be required as a consequence of this new 'transaction costs revolution'\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice
There is no unified theory that can explain both voter choice and where choices come from. Hinich and Munger fill that gap with their model of political communication based on ideology.
Rather than beginning with voters and diffuse, atomistic preferences, Hinich and Munger explore why large groups of voters share preference profiles, why they consider themselves \"liberals\" or \"conservatives.\" The reasons, they argue, lie in the twin problems of communication and commitment that politicians face. Voters, overloaded with information, ignore specific platform positions. Parties and candidates therefore communicate through simple statements of goals, analogies, and by invoking political symbols. But politicians must also commit to pursuing the actions implied by these analogies and symbols. Commitment requires that ideologies be used consistently, particularly when it is not in the party's short-run interest.
The model Hinich and Munger develop accounts for the choices of voters, the goals of politicians, and the interests of contributors. It is an important addition to political science and essential reading for all in that discipline.
\"Hinich and Munger's study of ideology and the theory of political choice is a pioneering effort to integrate ideology into formal political theory. It is a major step in directing attention toward the way in which ideology influences the nature of political choices.\" --Douglass C. North
\". . . represents a significant contribution to the literature on elections, voting behavior, and social choice.\" --Policy Currents
Melvin Hinich is Professor of Government, University of Texas. Michael C. Munger is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina.
eBook
Contractarianism, constitutionalism, and the status quo
The constitutional political economy (CPE) approach as developed by James Buchanan places emphasis on supermajority rules—in particular, a unanimity requirement for constitutional change. Critics argue that this approach “privileges the status quo” in two problematic ways: (1) alternatives are treated unequally, because the status quo requires a smaller coalition to be “chosen” than any other institutional arrangement selected to replace it; and (2) individuals are treated unequally, because those who happen to support the status quo have excessive power to impose their will on the larger group, implying that a minority illegitimately is privileged to block change. This is a serious and important challenge. At the same time, we argue that critics have conflated two analytically distinct issues in arguing that the CPE paradigm (and constitutionalism more generally) “privilege the status quo”. Moreover, we aim to show that in rejecting the “privileged position of the status quo”, critics must confront an equally challenging task: Providing a “measuring stick” by which the legitimacy of the status quo, and changes to it, can be judged. It is precisely skepticism regarding the possibility of providing a criterion of legitimacy that is independent of agreement that leads to the peculiar position of the status quo in Buchanan’s thought.
Journal Article
Race, risk, and greed: Harold Black's contributions to the institutional economics of finance
Dr. Harold Black has made a career of investigating the effects of different rules and institutional arrangements on the extent to which market participants in finance can exercise a taste for discrimination. This paper considers the nature of Black's contributions, and reviews some particulars of his voluminous published research, focusing especially on his work on the number of \"overages\" charged by banks, and the differences in the effects of the race of bank owners, as explained by the race of customers. The paper concludes by connecting Dr. Black’s work to his “origin story,” which helps explain his consistent focus on careful empirical distinctions rather than preconceptions and biases.
Journal Article
Moral community and moral order
In 1981, James Buchanan published the text of a lecture entitled “Moral Community, Moral Order, and Moral Anarchy.” The argument in that paper deserves more attention than it has received in the literature, as it closely follows the argument made by Adam Smith in Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith believed, and rightly, that moral communities—to use Buchanan’s words—are indispensable. Smith also believed that the system could be expanded to encompass norms that foster commercial society. Buchanan allows for the same possibility in his discussion of moral community, in some ways similar to Hayek’s “great society” norms. But Buchanan points out the dark possibility that moral orders can collapse, relegating interactions outside of small moral communities to moral anarchy. Buchanan’s contribution is an important, and unrecognized, link between Smith’s conception of propriety and Hume’s conception of convention.
Journal Article
Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption
Gordon Tullock developed an approach to understanding dynamic processes of political change and policy outcomes. The key insight is the notion that political insiders have a comparative advantage—because they face lower transaction costs—in manipulating rules. The result is that political actors can collect revenues from threatening to restrict, or offering to loosen, access to valuable permissions, permits, or services. To the extent that the ability to pay for such favorable treatment is a consequence of private activities that produce greater social value, there is a “political Coase theorem”: corruption makes bad systems more efficient. But the dynamic consequences are extremely negative, because of the inability to institute reforms resulting from application of Tullock’s “transitional gains trap.”
Journal Article
\Apparently, You Don't\: Economist Jokes as an Educational Tool
This paper addresses the growing literature on the comparative statics of rhetorical equilibrium, using humor as the animating device that corrodes existing norms for understanding the commercial system. Three motivations for economics jokes are advanced: to be funny, to illustrate, and to mock. A simple model of humor is advanced, with three independent variables-whether the joke is funny, insightful, or accurately mocking-that are argued to generate different levels of amusement, the dependent variable. One conclusion is that jokes economists tell each other, jokes economists tell outsiders, and jokes outsiders tell themselves about economists have different mixes of the essential arguments of the amusement function.
Journal Article
