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result(s) for
"Mungiu, Alina"
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Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment
2006
Political corruption poses a serious threat to democracy and its consolidation. Many anticorruption initiatives fail because they are nonpolitical in nature, while most of the corruption in developing and postcommunist countries is inherently political. Successfully fighting this kind of corruption requires far more than instituting best practices from advanced democracies. Electoral revolutions can lead to consolidated democracies only if they are followed by revolutions against particularism. Nothing short of such a revolution will succeed in curbing corruption in countries where particularism prevails.
Journal Article
Romania's Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism
2018
In Romania today, as in Italy twenty years ago, the gradual politicization of anticorruption has come to shape the political scene. When the EU asked Romania to establish an anticorruption agency as a condition of EU accession (2004), the country responded by creating the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). Yet three unforeseen problems derailed what might have become a virtuous circle. First, the distinction between the corrupt and noncorrupt political camps gradually evaporated. Second, the growing effectiveness of DNA made it an irresistible political weapon for those in power to use against their opponents. Third, President Traian Băsescu had the country's National Defence Council declare corruption a security threat, which led to a massive increase in the number of wiretap warrants issued in corruption cases. The politicization of anticorruption has thus produced political instability and disillusioned voters.
Journal Article
Controlling Corruption Through Collective Action
2013
Control of corruption in a society is an equilibrium between resources and costs which either empowers or constraints elites predatory behaviour. While most research and practice focuses on legal constraints, this paper investigates normative constraints, deemed to be more important, especially civil society and the press. Fresh evidence—both historical and statistical—is found to support Tocqueville’s assertions regarding the importance of collective action and the joint action of media and associations in not only creating a democratic society, but controlling corruption as well. However, little is known on how to build normative constraints.
Journal Article
Corruption: Good governance powers innovation
2015
Corruption is a barrier to innovation, warns Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. Greater scrutiny of public spending is needed if science and technology are to fulfil their potential.
Journal Article
The Rise and Fall of Good-Governance Promotion
2020
With the 2003 adoption of the UN Convention Against Corruption, good-governance norms have achieved—on the formal level at least—a degree of recognition that can fairly be called universal. This reflects a centuries-long struggle to establish the moral principle of \"ethical universalism,\" which brings together the ideas of equity, reciprocity, and impartiality. The West's success in promoting this norm has been extraordinary, yet there are also significant risks. Despite expectations that international concern and increased regulation would lead to less corruption, current trends suggest otherwise. Exchanges between countries perceived as corrupt and countries perceived as noncorrupt seem to lead to an increase in corruption in the noncorrupt states rather than its decrease in the corrupt ones. Direct good-governance interventions have had poor results. And anticorruption has helped populist politicians, who use anti-elite rhetoric similar to that of anticorruption campaigners.
Journal Article
Good governance powers innovation
2015
Innovation is key to prosperity. But corruption is inimical to innovation. If firms and individuals are to be creative, and if their societies are to make the best use of that, competition and hard work must be more strongly valued than reliance on connections. My analyses show that governance that results in such societies is rarer than people think.
Journal Article
LEARNING FROM VIRTUOUS CIRCLES
2016
[...]country after country has acquired a written constitution, elections, political parties, bureaucracies, and courts. The solution of modernizing the recipient societies altogether, while obviously a longer-term one, was also tried by the development community and is still under way in many countries, although the engineered transition from traditional society has so far produced anything but ethical universalism.4 To the extent that we can measure it, there has been little or no evolution toward good governance globally for the past twenty years, though smaller improvements are discernible.5 The passage of time and economic development by itself do not seem to be enough to alter governance orders.\\n Nobody can organize them from outside-donor-sponsored coalitions are frail and disappear once financing is gone.
Journal Article
Seven Steps to Control of Corruption
2018
After a comprehensive test of today’s anticorruption toolkit, it seems that the few tools that do work are effective only in contexts where domestic agency exists. Therefore, the time has come to draft a comprehensive road map to inform evidence-based anticorruption efforts. This essay recommends that international donors join domestic civil societies in pursuing a common long-term strategy and action plan to build national public integrity and ethical universalism. In other words, this essay proposes that coordination among donors should be added as a specific precondition for improving governance in the WHO’s Millennium Development Goals. This essay offers a basic tool for diagnosing the rule governing allocation of public resources in a given country, recommends some fact-based change indicators to follow, and outlines a plan to identify the human agency with a vested interest in changing the status quo. In the end, the essay argues that anticorruption interventions must be designed to empower such agency on the basis of a joint strategy to reduce opportunities for and increase constraints on corruption, and recommends that experts exclude entirely the tools that do not work in a given national context.
Journal Article