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"Myagkov, Mikhail G"
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The socialization effect on decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An eye-tracking study
We used a mobile eye-tracking system (in the form of glasses) to study the characteristics of visual perception in decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In each experiment, one of the 12 participants was equipped with eye-tracking glasses. The experiment was conducted in three stages: an anonymous Individual Game stage against a randomly chosen partner (one of the 12 other participants of the experiment); a Socialization stage, in which the participants were divided into two groups; and a Group Game stage, in which the participants played with partners in the groups. After each round, the respondent received information about his or her personal score in the last round and the overall winner of the game at the moment. The study proves that eye-tracking systems can be used for studying the process of decision making and forecasting. The total viewing time and the time of fixation on areas corresponding to noncooperative decisions is related to the participants' overall level of cooperation. The increase in the total viewing time and the time of fixation on the areas of noncooperative choice is due to a preference for noncooperative decisions and a decrease in the overall level of cooperation. The number of fixations on the group attributes is associated with group identity, but does not necessarily lead to cooperative behavior.
Journal Article
From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants' behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction.
Journal Article
The Forensics of Election Fraud
This volume offers a number of forensic indicators of election fraud applied to official election returns, and tests and illustrates their application in Russia and Ukraine. Included are the methodology's econometric details and theoretical assumptions. The applications to Russia include the analysis of all federal elections between 1996 and 2007 and, for Ukraine, between 2004 and 2007. Generally, we find that fraud has metastasized within the Russian polity during Putin's administration with upwards of 10 million or more suspect votes in both the 2004 and 2007 balloting, whereas in Ukraine, fraud has diminished considerably since the second round of its 2004 presidential election where between 1.5 and 3 million votes were falsified. The volume concludes with a consideration of data from the United States to illustrate the dangers of the application of our methods without due consideration of an election's substantive context and the characteristics of the data at hand.
eBook
Distinctive Preferences Toward Risk in the Substantive Domain of Sociality
As with standard models of rationality, theorists generally treat prospect theory's demonstration of risk aversion in gains but risk tolerance in losses as domain-general. Yet evolutionary psychology suggests that natural selection has designed a domain specific cognitive architecture—with systems specialized for some substantive domains but not others. Here we address risky choices through that lens asking whether humans' risk responses dispose them to enter social relationships even when doing so is counter to normative rationality and regardless of whether the \"enter\" versus \"not enter\" choice is framed as between gains and losses. Laboratory findings in five sites across three countries provide a positive answer to both possibilities. Participants could enter or not enter inherently risky social relationships. They were more willing to enter such relationships than rational choice models would predict and were equally so willing regardless of whether equivalent alternatives were framed as gains and as losses. With the \"social context\" extracted in otherwise identical games, participants' risk responses were consistent with prospect theory. The present findings suggest the possibility of adaptations designed to facilitate sociality—despite its risks and how those risks are framed.
Journal Article
Social context reveals gender differences in cooperative behavior
A number of previous researches indicate that men prefer competition over cooperation, and it is sometimes suggested that women show the opposite behavioral preference. In the current study the effects of social context on gender differences in cooperation are investigated. For the purpose, we compared men and women behavior under two social conditions: in groups of strangers and in groups with long-term socialization—groups of friends. The differences were found in changes in the level of cooperation, taking into account the effects of mixing social and gender variables. Social interaction and communication made cooperation of group members strength and sustainable. However, men’s and women’s cooperative behavior in groups differed. Women were initially more inclined to cooperate in interaction with strangers. Men showed greater sensitivity to sociality effects. They tended to make cooperative decisions more often if there were friends in the group. Furthermore, men cooperated with previously unknown people after socialization with them significantly more than women.
Journal Article
Are the communists dying out in Russia?
Many predicted that the strength of the Communist Party in Russia would wane as the elderly pensioners who disproportionately supported the party died off. Contrary to this prediction, the findings of our analysis indicate that voters who reached retirement age during the past decade were even more supportive of the communists than the cohort of pensioners who preceded them. We believe this occurred because it was workers approaching retirement, not pensioners per se, who were disproportionately injured by the transition to a more market-oriented economy. Like pensioners they lost savings, but in many cases they also lost their jobs. They also had little opportunity to learn the new skills that the Russian economy increasingly calls for. There is as yet no indication that the communists have begun to die out.
Journal Article
Exchange Economies and Loss Exposure: Experiments Exploring Prospect Theory and Competitive Equilibria in Market Environments
Exchange economies were created in which individuals faced losses. If people are risk seeking in the losses, as predicted by prospect theory, then due to the nonconvexity, the competitive equilibria are all on the boundaries of the Edgeworth Box. The experimental results are that risk-seeking behavior is observed in many people and appears in markets as predicted. In addition, market behavior is consistent with answers to hypothetical questionnaires. Contrary to prospect theory, risk seeking seems to diminish with experience; preferences in the market setting are not labile; and risk-seeking preferences are not simply a result of framing effects.
Journal Article
Czar Rule in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies?
We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to characterize equilibrium strategies pursued by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yields several testable hypotheses. The model receives some empirical backing, but overall the results of our analyses do not support it. We therefore attribute the conflict between the Yeltsin government and the RCPD to fundamental disagreements over policy and not to internal contradictions in constitutional design.
Journal Article